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Abstract 
We depict the topic of Entrepreneurial Financing decisions through the lens of real 
options. We portray Entrepreneurial Financing decisions as an interaction between 
Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists (VCs) mediated by a given Growth Opportunity, 
which is in turn held by an Entrepreneurial or Start-up Firm. We argue that these three 
elements should be aligned so that an Entrepreneurial Financing decision is settled. We 
explore this topic through two different perspectives. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 we investigate the decision-making process of a capital-constrained 
Entrepreneur – who owns an Entrepreneurial Firm – and a VC. In Chapter 2, we introduce 
the real options framework for approaching this setting – under symmetric and asymmetric 
expectations on profit growth expectations – and showed how an optimum up-front share 
premium might be computed so that Entrepreneurs and VCs may reach an agreement to 
support a given Growth Opportunity. In Chapter 3, we extend this framework by deriving a 
set of optimum contingent payments to enable such an agreement.  
In Chapter 4, we analyse how Public Venture Capitalists (PVCs) and Independent Venture 
Capitalists (IVCs) may differ on their decision-making processes, with the purpose of 
identifying the most effective mechanism in anticipating investment in Start-up Firms. Based 
on a real options framework, we derived a set of empirically testable propositions on the 
determinants of PVC investment volumes and analyse their prevalence on a sample of 
European countries, through an ordinary least squares regression. Even though taxation 
proved not to be correlated with PVC investment volumes, the remaining results provided 
overall empirical support to our theoretical hypothesis. 
As a general conclusion to our research, we highlight that the outcomes of Entrepreneurial 
Financing decisions may eventually primarily depend on the relative position that each of 
the Entrepreneurs and VCs hold against such Growth Opportunity, rather than on the intrinsic 
value of such Growth Opportunity. 
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Resumo 
Esta tese pretende aprofundar o tópico das decisões de Entrepreneurial Financing (EF) 
através da ótica das opções reais. As decisões de EF são retratadas como o resultado da 
interação entre Empreendedores e Investidores de Capital de Risco (ICR), mediadas por uma 
dada Oportunidade de Crescimento, detida por uma Start-up ou por uma empresa já 
estabelecida. Argumentamos que estes três elementos devem alinhar-se para que a decisão 
de EF possa ser concretizada. Exploramos este tópico através de duas perspetivas distintas. 
Nos Capítulos 2 e 3 investigamos o processo de tomada de decisão de um Empreendedor 
com restrições de acesso a capital e detentor único de uma empresa, e um ICR. No Capítulo 
2, introduzimos um modelo baseado em opções reais – com expectativas simétricas e 
assimétricas quanto ao crescimento futuro da rentabilidade – e demonstramos de que forma 
um prémio de emissão de ações ótimo pode ser calculado para que Empreendedores e ICRs 
possam alcançar um acordo. No Capítulo 3, estendemos este modelo deduzindo um conjunto 
de pagamentos contingentes que permitem que tal acordo possa também ser alcançado. 
No Capítulo 4, analisamos de que forma Investidores de Capital de Risco Público (ICRP) 
e Investidores de Capital de Risco Independentes (ICRI) divergem no seu processo de tomada 
de decisão de investimento, com objetivo de identificar qual o mecanismo mais eficaz na 
antecipação da decisão ótima de investimento em Start-ups. Com base num modelo de 
opções reais, deduzimos um conjunto de hipóteses empiricamente testáveis quanto às 
determinantes do volume de investimento por ICRPs e analisamos a sua prevalência numa 
amostra de países Europeus. Apesar dos impostos não se encontrarem relacionados com o 
volume de investimento, os restantes resultados suportam as hipóteses teóricas formuladas. 
Como conclusão geral, realçamos que os resultados das decisões de EF poderão 
eventualmente depender principalmente da posição relativa que cada uma das partes detém 
face à Oportunidade de Crescimento que se encontram a considerar, mais do que do valor 
intrínseco dessa mesma Oportunidades de Crescimento. 
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1. Introduction 
The relevance of Entrepreneurial Financing (EF) as a research topic is highlighted by 
the over 1.4 million employer enterprises that were born worldwide in 20121, the over 
200,000 existing medium and high growth enterprises as of 20132, or the over 60 billion 
dollars invested by Venture Capital (VCs) funds worldwide in seed, start-ups, early stage and 
later stage ventures in 20143, according to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD). 
In addition to such economic relevance, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) finance 
has been receiving major political support since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, both from the 
Europe Union4, the United States5 and from a range of different international organizations, 
such as OECD (2015) or G-20 (International Finance Corporation & World Bank, 2010). 
While academia responded to such increasing interest through a growing volume of 
literature, two major gaps remain and motivated this research: on the one hand, the demand-
side gap – calling for more Entrepreneur-centric research – and, on the other hand, the gap 
                                                 
1 Sample compiled by Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) on the SDBS 
Business Demography Indicators (ISIC Rev. 4). Sample includes 31 countries. Data on the United States 
available on the SDBS Business Demography Indicators (ISIC Rev. 3) for 2012, which is not included on the 
ISIC Rev. 4 figures, records 113,292 employer enterprise births. 
2 Sample compiled by Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) includes 30 
countries. Data for New Zealand, Israel, Canada, Brazil, and the United States refer to over 20% growth 
enterprises. For the rest of countries the criterion used on the sample includes firms with over 10% growth. 
3 Sample compiled by Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) includes 32 
countries. Figures for South Africa and Japan refer back to 2013. 
4 Please refer to “An action plan to improve access to finance for SMEs” – a communication from the 
European Commission to the Council, to the European Parliament, to the Committee of the Regions and to the 
European and Social Committee (2011) and to the “Programme for the competitiveness of Enterprises and 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2013-200) and repealing Decision No 1639/2006/EC” (2013) 
5 Please refer to the “SupplierPay pledge” (2014) issued by The White House and to the announcement of 
the “QuickPay Initiative” on a press-release by The White House entitled “President Obama announces new 
partnership with the private sector to strengthen America’s Small Business; Renews the Federal Government’s 
QuickPay Initiative” (2014) 
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on analytically grounded theoretical developments on the topic. The latter will be presented 
on the following section, and the former will be highlighted on each of the introductory 
sections of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
1.1. Conceptual considerations 
This section aims to summarize the most relevant set of conceptual considerations 
which supported the research outline we will present in section 1.2. We will start by 
introducing a set of different theoretical perspectives with regards to the EF decision and 
highlight our intended positioning within the wide range of alternative approaches. Then, we 
will present some of the supporting literature on the existence of a demand-side gap. We will 
end by going through a set of key concepts to our research and stand out some of the major 
assumptions which drove our theoretical constructions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
1.1.1. Theoretical perspectives on Entrepreneurial Financing 
Agency theory stands as one of the main theoretical lens for analysing the VC – 
Entrepreneur relationship, where VCs are regarded as principals and Entrepreneurs are 
regarded as agents (Sapienza and Villanueva, 2007). Within the scope of such relationship, 
agency conflicts are originated by differing goals between Entrepreneurs and VCs, which are 
intensified when Entrepreneurs act like sole owners of the business after external equity 
providers joined the Entrepreneurial Firm. According to Arthurs and Busenitz (2003), 
perceived goals and actual goals should lead to different types of agency problems on the 
Entrepreneur – VC relationship (i.e., perceived, hidden or visible agency problems). In 
addition, agency conflicts are aggravated by information asymmetry, which is expected to be 
especially latent on early stage ventures, where asset tangibility is low, growth options are 
significant and asset specificity is high (Gompers, 1995). Overall, agency theory might be 
regarded as a rational economic framework to depict the behaviour of VCs and 
Entrepreneurs, in the sense that each of the parties is modelled as an individual agent who 
maximizes her or his individual payoff.  
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Stewardship theory takes an opposite view to agency theory, assuming that the behaviour 
of the steward is organization-centred, meaning that it seeks to improve organizational 
performance by satisfying the principals. Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) argue that agency 
costs occur mostly during the pre-investment stage, where VCs and Entrepreneurs are more 
likely to be misaligned. They posit that once an investment is made, Entrepreneurs and VCs 
had to previously agree on certain milestones which should at least partly alleviate potential 
goal misalignment.  
In addition, goal incongruence might be actually less pronounced in Entrepreneurial 
Firms, in the sense that (i) Entrepreneurs may retain a substantial fraction of firm ownership 
and may therefore drive their behaviour towards shareholder value maximization, on a 
similar way to VCs and (ii) VCs are expected to provide significant non-financial 
contributions to early stage ventures, which may actually increase the volume of interactions 
between VCs and Entrepreneurs and minimize potential information asymmetries. 
Still, these authors acknowledge that (i) stewardship theory fails to understand how can 
individuals align misaligned interests and (ii) stewardship theory assumes that Entrepreneurs 
will still act like an owner after VCs invests in the new venture. As a consequence, the 
Entrepreneur will not likely subordinate his or her interests to those of VCs – which in turn 
brings goal congruence problems. 
Other alternative theoretical frameworks and demand-side driven research have provided 
relevant insights to the debate. 
Along with Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996), Busenitz et al. (1998) studied the impact of 
procedural justice on Entrepreneur’s receptivity to investors. The authors concluded that 
VCs (or “investors” in their own terminology) who do not fairly and respectfully treat 
Entrepreneurs are more prone to face distortions or omissions on key information, while VCs 
who provide timely feedback to Entrepreneurs may benefit from leveraging positive 
relations. By examining which factors at the time of first-round funding frame perceptions 
of fairness in the VC – Entrepreneur relationship, with a special focus on contractual 
covenants over procedural justice, these authors revealed that Entrepreneurs are willing to 
accept a certain level of governance in the form of contractual covenants, but, beyond a 
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certain point, they may frame governance as excessive. In these circumstances, such 
contractual covenants may decrease the perception of fairness formed by Entrepreneurs on 
VCs. 
Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996) highlight that control and information sharing in the 
venture-building process can create mutual trust and commitment, mitigating fears of 
opportunism, reducing the costs of delegation of decision making and creating a cooperative 
advantage over competitors. Even though procedural justice provides significant predictors 
of attitudes of strategic decision makers, it is still taken as a partial driver of their behaviour, 
suggesting that the theory needs refinement when applied to settings involving high outcome 
uncertainty and ambiguous or non-hierarchical relationships. 
Overall, Sapienza and Villanueva (2007) posit that agency theory grounded on a rational 
economic framework has been the prominent theoretical lens used for analysing the VC – 
Entrepreneur relationship. These two authors argue that this is the result of the relevance of 
institutional VCs – in which motivation for venture selection is mostly driven by economic 
return – and due to the fact that early stage ventures are more prone to high agency costs, due 
to lower asset tangibility, significant growth options, and greater asset specificity (Gompers, 
1995). 
Acknowledging the relevant insights from different theoretical perspectives on the EF 
processes, such as the agency theory, stewardship theory or procedural justice and even 
admitting some of the criticism to the influence of neoliberal economics on small business 
research (Parry, 2015), we highlight the role that profit maximization holds as a driver of EF 
decisions. Although several other variables interfere with the EF (as we will point out in 
section 1.1.3), we believe that profit maximization still stands for one of the most significant 
decision-making factors both for Entrepreneurs and VCs. Moreover, and as described in 
section 1.1.3, provided we take EF decisions as processes between Entrepreneurs, VCs and 
Growth Opportunities, in which the latter are essentially potential profit enablers, profits 
should be regarded as the common ground between each of these drivers of EF processes, 
without which any decision-making model would be incomplete. Combined with real options 
perspective in which Entrepreneurs and VCs should support a given Growth Opportunity 
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when having equal optimum investment timing, this standpoint is a major assumption 
governing the theoretical developments introduced in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
1.1.2. Demand-side gap 
Sapienza and Villanueva (2007) pointed out the need for growing research on the EF 
process from the perspective of the Entrepreneur (i.e., from the demand-side), given that most 
research is grounded on a supply-side perspective and is focused on deal selection and 
portfolio monitoring issues. This demand-side gap is not only visible on the dominant area 
of research in institutional VC, but also on informal VC (Riding et al., 2007) or corporate 
VC (Zahra and Allen, 2007). 
  Interestingly, this literature gap prevails even though some of the earliest literature on 
EF and VC highlighted the importance that the Entrepreneur held on the EF process 
(Macmillan et al., 1985, Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984, Fried and Hisrich, 1994, Zacharakis and 
Meyer, 1998, Shepherd et al., 2003, Wright et al., 1997, Gompers et al., 2006, Baron and 
Markman, 1999, Hsu, 2007). 
Some of the first contributions on Entrepreneur-centric research were initiated on early 
2000s. Smith (1999) studied the criteria used by Entrepreneurs when evaluating VCs. Ueda 
(2004) addressed the question of how Start-up Firms (SuFs) decide to raise funds from banks 
or VCs, having shown that SuFs with little collateral, high growth prospects, high risk and 
high profitability would tend to primarily seek for VC funding, controlling for information 
asymmetry and intellectual property rights protection. de Bettignies and Brander (2007) 
highlight that as a VC funding would always require Entrepreneur’s ownership to be diluted, 
the Entrepreneur would always prefer bank financing unless high value-added managerial 
skills are expected to be brought in to the venture by the VC. On the finance literature, 
examples of Entrepreneur focused views come essentially from an agency perspective 
(Casamatta, 2003, Kirilenko, 2001, Bitler et al., 2005). 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the constraints it brought to access to finance – 
especially to SMEs – incentivized academia, especially from the field of entrepreneurship, 
to foster its research efforts to fill the demand-side gap. Contributions from this area are 
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methodologically rich – due to the multi-disciplinary of the entrepreneurship phenomenon – 
and are grounded from a wide range of disciplines, from economics and finance, to 
psychology.  
In fact, research on the field of entrepreneurship should be increasingly focused on 
understanding the psychological and cognitive processes that drive entrepreneurial 
opportunities and on how these mature (Wright and Stigliani, 2013, Fraser et al., 2015, 
Shepherd, 2015), as exemplified by Orser et al. (2006) and Roper and Scott (2009) who 
investigated the impact of gender differences on seeking external financing, or by Kon and 
Storey (2003), who coined the term “discouraged borrowers”, i.e., SMEs that refrain from 
seeking external financing because they feel they will be rejected – even when standing for 
potential good borrowers. 
While we acknowledge that the demand-side gap has been narrowing during the past 
decade, it is our understanding that analytical grounded research is scarce and still provides 
room for relevant theoretical developments, as we show on the introductory sections of 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
1.1.3. Building Blocks of Entrepreneurial Financing Decisions 
Embedded on a given macroeconomic and institutional context exerting influence on 
the overall behaviour of both supply and demand-side agents and on the size of capital 
markets (La Porta et al., 1997, Cumming et al., 2010), EF decisions result from the interaction 
between three interdependent elements: an Entrepreneur, a Growth Opportunity and a 
Financier, which we jointly name as the Building Blocks of Entrepreneurial Financing 
Decisions. Following McKelvie and Wiklund (2010), Rasmussen and Sørheim (2012), and 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2014), we take the view that no sound theoretical research on EF 
decisions is possible by separating each of these three elements. As portrayed in Figure 1, we 
take EF decisions as the outcomes of an alignment process between an Entrepreneur and a 
Financier, which is originated by a given Growth Opportunity. 
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1.1.3.1. The Entrepreneur 
EF decisions are influenced by a wide range of drivers far beyond the profit-maximization 
hypothesis. While our theoretical contribution relied heavily on former, the literature reveals 
that wealth maximization, wealth constraints, risk attitudes and individual goals form the 
main drivers of an Entrepreneur’s behaviour, and should encompass the interpretation of our 
theoretical results in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
Rasmussen and Sørheim (2012) suggest that Entrepreneurs’ perceptions, preferences, 
business case, relationship networks and the process of obtaining financing are issues of key 
importance for understanding the outcomes of an EF process, while Brush et al. (2012) 
highlight the concept of venture readiness. Sapienza et al. (2003) propose a multi-
dimensional conceptual framework, in which wealth maximization, and self-determination 
are the primary motives driving EF choices, from the Entrepreneur’s standpoint. 
Hvide and Panos (2014) highlight the role that risk tolerance holds as a major driver of 
entrepreneurial decisions. These authors found evidence that more risk tolerant individuals 
Growth 
Opportunities
Entrepreneur
Entrepreneurial 
Financing
Financier
Figure 1. Building Blocks of Entrepreneurial Financing Decisions 
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are more likely to become Entrepreneurs, but perform worse, yielding 25.0% lower sales and 
15.0% lower return on assets. Gompers et al. (2010) point out that Entrepreneurs with a track 
record of success are much more likely to succeed than first-time entrepreneurs and those 
who have previously failed, as they exhibit persistent behaviour in adequate industry 
selection and entry timing. Wright et al. (1997) noted that this entrepreneurial profile – named 
as “serial entrepreneur” – is especially attractive to VCs or Private Equity funds (PEs). 
Muzyka et al. (1999) acknowledge that the quality of the Entrepreneur is key to determine 
the funding decision. Similarly, Baron and Markman (1999) offered support for the 
hypothesis that the higher Entrepreneurs’ social competence is, the greater their financial 
success. This seems not to be the case for education, as Dimov and Shepherd (2005) found 
that although general management team human capital has a positive association with the 
proportion of portfolio companies that went public, specific management team human capital 
(i.e., MBA, law education, or consulting experience) has not, even though specific 
management team human capital was negatively associated with the proportion of portfolio 
companies that went bankrupt.  
Hsu (2007) investigated the sourcing and valuation of VC funding among Entrepreneurs 
with varied levels of prior start-up founding experience, academic training, and social capital, 
by examining venture valuation, as it reflects enterprise quality and Entrepreneurs’ cost of 
financial capital. Using data from a survey of 149 early stage technology-based SuFs, Hsu 
(2007) found that (i) prior founding experience (especially financially successful experience) 
increases both the likelihood of VC funding via a direct tie and venture valuation, (ii) 
Entrepreneur’s ability to recruit executives via their own social network (as opposed to the 
VC’s network) is positively associated with venture valuation and (iii) in the emerging (at 
the time) Internet industry, entrepreneurial teams with a doctoral degree holder are more 
likely to be funded via a direct VC tie and receive higher valuations, suggesting a signalling 
effect. 
Chaganti et al. (1995) highlight that the prevailing paradigm ignores factors such as 
owners’ values or goals. Winborg (2000) showed that Entrepreneurs who sought financing 
to achieve higher growth sought more external funding, and that those who professed a need 
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for external financing also held more positive attitudes towards it. The author talks about a 
“fear” (beyond economic loss) that Entrepreneurs have regarding external sources of funding.  
Although the fear of loss of control or, alternatively, the drive for independence has been 
frequently mentioned has a key motivator for Entrepreneurs (Ang, 1992), it is still unclear 
whether observed drive for self-determination is a means to achieve economic ends or a 
separate end in itself. Chaganti et al. (1995) posit that some Entrepreneurs are motivated by 
economic gain for themselves or their families and that others are motivated by their “desire” 
for control or their own affairs and to avoid dependence on others. Those driven by economic 
gain seek a different mix of external to internal financing mix than those driven by self-
determination. 
1.1.3.2. Growth Opportunities 
Growth Opportunities carried by Entrepreneurial Firms feature significant uncertainty on 
future cash flow generation, involve considerable irreversible costs and benefit from flexible 
plans, forming investment opportunities that might be modelled as real options 
(Schwienbacher, 2007, Li, 2008). In addition, option-games might be useful for modelling 
EF as an interactive process, as shown by the pricing models for Mergers & Acquisitions 
(M&A) by Lukas et al. (2012) and Yu and Xu (2011). 
Debt financing is usually not an option for backing such Growth Opportunities (Revest 
and Sapio, 2012), as Entrepreneurial Firms typically bear losses (or record low initial profits) 
and lack tangible assets, driving Entrepreneurs to choose between different sources of equity 
(Fairchild, 2011, Andrieu and Groh, 2012, Schwienbacher, 2013, Chemmanur and Chen, 
2014, Kim and Wagman, 2016), rather than deciding between equity and debt financing as 
in Winton and Yerramilli (2008) or simply seeking for a debt provider (Adelino et al., 2015, 
Chatterji and Seamans, 2012). 
Accordingly, similarly to Parhankangas (2007) and following the results obtained by 
Hechavarría et al. (2015) when testing the prevalence of the pecking-order hypothesis on 
early-stage firm, we consider that within an EF context, retained earnings are insignificant, 
Entrepreneurs are equity constrained (Elston and Audretsch, 2009) and, therefore, Financiers 
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are mostly external equity providers and, particularly VCs in the broad sense – either 
institutional, captive, informal, public or corporate VCs. While in Chapters 2 and 3, we take 
VCs as a homogenous class of investors, in Chapter 4 we will point out the differences on 
investment behaviour of Independent Venture Capitalists (IVCs) and Public Venture 
Capitalists (PVCs). 
1.1.3.3. Venture Capitalists 
PE and VC are essentially portrayed as financial intermediaries that invest in private 
companies for a limited time period and through equity or quasi-equity instruments. 
However, we should further distinguish these two concepts and highlight how our research 
is positioned between these two. Following the approach by Landström (2007), we take VC 
as “primarily devoted to equity or equity-linked investments in young growth-oriented 
ventures”, and PE to “investments that go beyond venture capital – covering a range of other 
stages and established businesses”. From this definition, it becomes clear that if EF decisions 
involve young and growth-oriented ventures, equity providers for such Entrepreneurial Firms 
stand for VCs and not for PEs. This allows us to exclude from our theoretical contributions 
some of the specific characteristics and types of PE investment, such as deal leverage 
(Axelson et al., 2009), replacement capital, turnarounds (Cuny and Talmor, 2007) or 
management buyouts (Kaplan, 1989). 
VCs might be regarded as profit maximisers with specific return on investment thresholds, 
which make use of a set of mechanisms to deal with information asymmetry and potential 
agency conflicts, as highlighted by Reid (1996) or from an entrepreneurial perspective by 
Zou et al. (2015). Examples of these mechanisms include anti-dilution clauses, non-compete 
clauses, liquidation rights (Leisen, 2012), preferred and convertible stock (Cumming, 2008, 
Sahlman, 1990, Gompers, 1997, Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001, Bascha and Walz, 2000), 
staged capital infusion and rights of first refusal (Dahiya and Ray, 2012, Lukas et al., 2016, 
Sahlman, 1990, Gompers, 1995, Gompers and Lerner, 2001, Wang and Zhou, 2004), tag-
along and drag-along rights (Carter and Van Auken, 1994, Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001, 
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Cumming and Johan, 2007) and compensation schemes involving equity and options 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2001).  
In addition, and as argued by Hellmann and Puri (2002), VCs may provide non-financial 
contributions to Growth Opportunities and Entrepreneurial Firms, such as value-adding 
monitoring (Bernstein et al., 2015), professionalization (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001) and 
firm certification and reputation (Hsu, 2004, Nahata, 2008). These may in turn influence how 
Entrepreneurs may choose between different sources of equity. 
While financial contributions, non-financial contributions and contractual mechanisms 
form the grounds for understanding how VCs drive EF processes, the existing literature 
points out that fund demography (defined as fund size, fund location, fund age and fund 
experience) may also exert significant influence on their behaviour (Tian, 2011). Following 
this perspective, Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) revealed that the quality of the human 
capital of the VC partners seems to be two to five times more important than organizational 
capital in explaining consistency in VC fund performance. 
In fact, assessing the determinants and the actual performance – properly adjusted for risk 
and liquidity – of PE and VC funds has been highlighting an area of vast research (Korteweg 
and Nagel, 2016, Sorensen and Jagannathan, 2015, Harris et al., 2014, Braun et al., 2015, 
Franzoni et al., 2012, Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009, Cochrane, 2005, Benson and 
Ziedonis, 2010), which has highlighted the debate on the actual economic contribution of PE 
and VC sponsored firms (Popov and Roosenboom, 2013, Alperovych and Hübner, 2012, 
Inderst and Mueller, 2009) and to a discussion on whether VCs and PEs actually provide a 
value-enhancing contribution to investees or they cherry-pick best-in-class firms instead 
(Croce et al., 2013, Bertoni et al., 2011, Bertoni et al., 2016). 
1.1.4. Real options 
Myers (1977) coined the term real options by noticing that several of the features of 
investment and growth opportunities resemble those of a call option, standing for rights – 
and not obligations – to invest or to expand a certain business in the future. Moreover, Myers 
(1977) conceptualized the value of the firm as the combined value of “real assets” – whose 
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market value should not depend on the firm’s investment strategy – and of “real options”, 
which are “opportunities to purchase real assets on possibly favourable terms”. 
Following this conceptual view, some of the earliest analytical contributions on real 
options include Tourinho (1979), Brennan and Schwartz (1985), McDonald and Siegel 
(1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986). These authors explored a wide range of different 
types of real options – having emphasized the role played by uncertainty and flexibility on 
valuing at least partially irreversible investment opportunities – and which were later 
summarized by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). These authors presented a comprehensive review 
of a wide range of growth options which form a range of different backgrounds for the setting 
in which EF processes takes place. These include combined entry and exit strategies, growth 
options with lay-up reactivation and scrapping options, multistage projects, or growth options 
in competitive industry settings, covering distinct sources of uncertainty, from prices, to 
costs, to volumes. 
Why did we rely on the real options framework to approach the EF phenomenon? First, 
because Growth Opportunities are taken as a nuclear component to EF decisions, as we 
described in section 1.1.3.2 above. Without a Growth Opportunity, the EF decision becomes 
a capital structure decision and might be explained by the trade-off (Kraus and Litzenberger, 
1973), market-timing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), neutral mutations (Miller, 1977), 
stakeholder (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987), and managerial over-optimism (Heaton, 2002) 
perspectives. 
Second, because Growth Opportunities held by Entrepreneurial Firms resemble the three 
key features of real options (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), covering at least a partially 
irreversible investment (most of the times, involving intangible assets or working capital 
requirements), a significant level of uncertainty on future cash flow generation and flexible 
strategic development options – covering waiting, expansion, scrapping or switching options. 
While in Chapters 2 and 3, we combine the both expansion and waiting options, as our setting 
is focused on established Entrepreneurial Firms – in Chapter 4, we highlight the waiting 
feature of such investment opportunities – as our setting relies on SuFs. 
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Third, because real options are an analytical tool that explicitly derives optimal investment 
timing. We take the view that this is crucial for investigating EF decisions, where 
Entrepreneurs and VCs should only be willing to jointly support the investment opportunity 
held by each of the parties if their optimum investment timing is the same. This view regards 
EF as an alignment process between Entrepreneurs and VCs, mediated by the underlying 
Growth Opportunity. Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) and Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) took 
a similar approach within a M&A context. 
Fourth, Entrepreneurial Firms hold monopolistic options to invest in their Growth 
Opportunities, in the sense that no other firm should hold that same investment opportunity 
or should be able to replicate it. As a result, we find no need to augment our real options 
framework to account for competition issues in order to generate sound theoretical 
developments. We will portray Entrepreneurial Firms as small scale profit-makers that are 
intended to be scaled up through its EF decision, seizing a previously generated proprietary 
technology or competitive advantage. 
This is not to say that competition is irrelevant for EF decisions, but rather that it is 
softened within the context of EF decisions. We acknowledge that our theoretical 
contribution could be extended to account for competition (either between Entrepreneurs, or 
between VCs) through the use of options-games. Some examples of analytical models on EF 
with competition include Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2004), who highlight how VC 
industry structure and managerial expertise can create rents which eventually attract new 
VCs who compete them away in the long-run and Elitzur and Gavious (2011), who developed 
a model of EF where Entrepreneurs compete in an auction-like setting for VC funding in an 
information asymmetry context. 
1.2. Research outline 
We organized our research in two different stages standing for two different perspectives 
on the EF process. On the first stage, featuring Chapters 2 and 3, we focused on EF decisions 
involving Entrepreneurs and VCs at a micro-level. We started by asking “how do 
Entrepreneurs and VCs individually screen their option to invest in Growth Opportunities 
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held by Entrepreneurial Firms?”. The answer to this question drove us to design the real 
options framework presented in Chapter 2, in which most of our theoretical developments 
are grounded. 
Then we asked “how can Entrepreneurs and VCs be willing to simultaneously support 
the Growth Opportunity?”. We answered this question on Chapters 2 and 3. On Chapter 2, 
we analysed whether there is a certain profit growth expectation that would allow parties to 
align their optimal investment timing. However, given that in our framework profit growth 
expectations are exogenously set by parties, these could not be taken as a way to line up 
Entrepreneurs and VCs. Therefore, we focused our research efforts into two different 
mechanisms: share premiums (or discounts), which are set up-front (i.e., at the moment in 
which the EF decision is agreed between Entrepreneurs and VCs) and are derived in Chapter 
2 and contingent payments (or earn-outs), which are deferred payments due to Entrepreneurs 
by VCs, dependant on future performance of the Entrepreneurial Firm. This is the focus of 
Chapter 3. 
The second research stage is featured in Chapter 4 and shows a different perspective on 
EF decisions. Unlike Chapters 2 and 3, in which we depicted the EF decision covering 
Entrepreneurs and VCs, in Chapter 4 we compared the investment behaviour of independent 
VCs (IVCs) and PVCs. We therefore answered the question “how do IVCs and PVCs screen 
their options to invest in SuFs?”. As a result, while in Chapters 2 and 3 we took VCs as 
homogenous – meaning that they are assumed to be either IVCs, PVCs, business angels or 
corporate VCs – in Chapter 4 we investigated the differences on investment screening 
between IVCs and PVCs, by taking into account some of their specific features, such as 
taxation, relative efficiency and performance compensation. In addition, as several PVC 
initiatives have been launched throughout the world with the purpose of fostering investment 
volumes on the early stage firms, we scrutinized the question of “which is the most effective 
investment strategy to be set by Governments to anticipate optimal investment timing in 
SuFs?”. We compared four different approaches that might be put in place for this purpose: 
(i) directly investing in SuFs through a PVC initiative, (ii) co-investing in SuFs alongside 
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IVCs, (iii) letting IVCs invest in SuFs and providing a subsidy and (iv) refraining from 
intervening on the SuF financing market, by letting IVCs invest in SuFs.  
As co-investing requires an alignment between PVCs and IVCs similarly to EF decisions 
between Entrepreneurs and VCs, alignment on EF decisions forms the common ground for 
our research topic. Our research outline is then summarized in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Research outline 
From a methodological perspective, theoretical developments rely on the real options 
framework, by taking a profit-maximization perspective on the investment behaviour of 
Entrepreneurs and VCs. Provided that no empirical data is available to test our theoretical 
propositions from Chapters 2 and 3, these were illustrated with numerical examples and 
through analytical sensitivity analysis. In Chapter 4, we were able to take a different 
approach. Since solutions for optimal investment timing are numerically derived, a set of 
theoretical hypothesis were obtained from a numerical example and then empirically 
assessed through a multivariate ordinary least squares linear regression. 
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Wolfram Mathematica 10© and IBM SPSS Statistics 22© were used as supporting 
software packages, respectively, for the analytical and econometric tasks performed 
throughout this research. 
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2. A framework for understanding 
Entrepreneurial Financing decisions with 
profit growth expectations and up-front 
share premiums or discounts 
Even though there is a vast stream of conceptual research taking Entrepreneurial 
Financing (EF) as an interactive process between Entrepreneurs and Financiers (Sapienza 
and Korsgaard, 1996, Cable and Shane, 1997, De Clercq and Sapienza, 2001, De Clercq and 
Fried, 2005), the existing contributions on decision-making models with similar approaches 
come mostly from a mergers and acquisitions context with interacting bidding and target 
firms (Lukas et al., 2012, Lukas and Heimann, 2014, Yu and Xu, 2011, Morellec and 
Zhdanov, 2005, Hackbarth and Morellec, 2008) and not from an Entrepreneurial Financing 
one. We now point out some of these notable exceptions. 
Elitzur and Gavious (2003) discuss optimum EF contract design through a game-theoretic 
model, comprising one Entrepreneur and one Venture Capitalist (VC). Parties intend to draft 
an incentive contract for a given investment period, in which fixed payments to the 
Entrepreneur are set in advance and the Entrepreneur incurs in a cost of effort at each stage. 
In turn, if the investment by the VC does not exceed its gross benefits before the end of the 
investment period, the exit stage takes place and the game ends. 
Schwienbacher (2007) analyses two different financing strategies that Entrepreneurs may 
choose between: either waiting until raising enough money to complete the project, or using 
limited resources to achieve some intermediate milestone before reaching a VC to proceed 
with its growth strategy. Entrepreneurial types (“profit-maximizing”, “life-style” and 
“serial”), alongside entrepreneurial choice on which type of uncertainty to be first resolved 
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– technological or financial – are the primary drivers on determining the choice on the best 
EF strategy. 
Fairchild (2011), Andrieu and Groh (2012), Schwienbacher (2013) and Chemmanur and 
Chen (2014) examined how Entrepreneurs choose between different types of equity investors 
to support their ventures. Fairchild (2011) considered a setting in which Entrepreneurs are 
deciding between two different sources of equity (VCs or business angels) and in which there 
is a double-sided moral hazard, with ex-ante effort-shirking and ex-post project 
expropriation. VCs are taken as having higher value-creating abilities than business angels, 
but Entrepreneurs anticipate to establish a closer and more trusting relationship with the 
former. This choice between VCs and business angels is also examined by Chemmanur and 
Chen (2014) and Kim and Wagman (2016). Chemmanur and Chen (2014) conceived a 
theoretical model with a setting where VCs are assumed to be scarcer, but may exert effort, 
which, together with the Entrepreneur’s effort, are assumed to increase the probability of 
success of the Entrepreneurial Firm. The equilibrium VC financing contract ensures optimal 
effort-exertion by both Entrepreneur and VC. Kim and Wagman (2016) discuss the choice 
between VCs and business angels in a setting where a negative signal is inferred by the 
market when inside investors do not to follow on a subsequent investment. As a result, given 
that business angels are unlikely to follow on throughout subsequent equity rounds, these are 
expected to be chosen by Entrepreneurs to finance lower quality ventures than VCs. Andrieu 
and Groh (2012) considered Entrepreneur’s choice between independent VCs or bank-
affiliated VCs, where the latter are assumed to provide better support quality and the former 
are assumed to be less financially constrained. Entrepreneur’s decision-making is then 
affected by this trade-off. In Schwienbacher (2013), Entrepreneurs seek early-stage financing 
from either a specialist or a generalist investor in a context of staged financing. Early-stage 
specialists are assumed to be less efficient in assisting a venture beyond the early-stage round 
than generalists, creating a trade-off on the Entrepreneur’s decision-making process. 
This topic was further explored by Hsu (2010), Dahiya and Ray (2012) and Lukas et al. 
(2016), who investigated how investment staging may influence EF decisions. Hsu (2010) 
introduced a real options based principal-agent framework, where a VC acts as a principal 
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and as a value-maximizer who may choose between providing staged financing and lump-
sum financing, and an Entrepreneur acts as an agent, who can in turn choose the riskiness 
borne by the Entrepreneurial Firm with the purpose of maximizing the probability of 
obtaining subsequent financing. Dahiya and Ray (2012) designed a setting in which VCs 
make use of staging to sort investments, i.e., to decide those that shall be abandoned and 
those to hold, highlighting the contribution that staging may provide to cope with uncertainty. 
Lukas et al. (2016) developed a dynamic model of EF based on option exercise games 
between an Entrepreneur and a VC, with multi-staged financing, and economic and 
technological uncertainty. In this context, and by combining compound option pricing with 
sequential non-cooperative contracting, uncertainty is posited to positively influence the 
equity share held by the VC on the Entrepreneurial Firm, while renegotiation may actually 
lead to a shift of control on the Entrepreneurial Firm, eventually preventing it from failure.  
Our approach differs from its related literature in the sense that we provide a tractable 
framework for understanding the foundations of Entrepreneurial Financing decisions, by 
analysing the conditions under which any of the parties will demand for entering into a 
negotiation process, and by analysing the conditions which will actually ease an agreement 
between Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists. In addition, we highlight how Entrepreneurs 
and VCs may settle an agreement when facing different expectations on Entrepreneurial Firm 
profit growth, in an information symmetric but potentially expectation asymmetric context. 
Within our framework, parties know which stochastic process governs the profit flow of the 
Entrepreneurial Firm and its Growth Opportunity, even though holding different expectations 
on future profit growth. Therefore, we take the view that, prior to initiating a negotiation 
process, parties define their own perspectives on the Growth Opportunity, and that such 
expectations might diverge, even when parties have access to the same level and amount of 
information. We therefore emphasize the role that cognition may have on generating the 
concept of opportunity which underlies any Entrepreneurial Financing process. 
Moreover, most of the related literature deals with the topic of how Entrepreneurs choose 
from alternative sources of equity. We believe that our contribution does not challenge the 
relevance of this topic, but rather introduces a set of conditions – grounded on profit-
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maximizing agents  – which should be relevant irrespective of their nature (i.e., to whatever 
“type” of Entrepreneur or VC), and over which additional trade-offs could be grounded. 
Our contribution to the existing literature is then essentially twofold. First, we designed a 
framework for analysing EF decisions, in which the key three elements of any EF process − 
the Entrepreneur, the Growth Opportunity (defined by a given capital outlay and an expected 
profit growth) and the Financier (taken as a VC) – interact, serving as a ground for further 
theoretical research. Second, within this framework, we showed how Entrepreneurs and VCs 
may be willing to jointly support the Growth Opportunity, by having the same optimum 
investment timing. We highlight how asymmetric expectations on profit growth, usually 
taken as a blocking force, may actually be reconciled to support EF decisions and show how 
intrinsic firm valuation may not entirely drive the outcomes of EF decisions. Taking the view 
that more demand-side research is required for further theoretical and empirical 
developments (Sapienza and Villanueva, 2007, Rasmussen and Sørheim, 2012), we highlight 
throughout the paper the conditions which, from the Entrepreneur’s perspective, should be 
verified so that an agreement with a prospective VC might be reached. 
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 outlines the base case where 
Entrepreneurs and VCs hold symmetric expectations on profit growth, while section 2.2 
analyses the case for asymmetric expectations. Section 2.3 presents a numerical example, 
while section 2.4 summarizes some the major findings arising from this theoretical 
framework. 
2.1. The case with symmetric profit growth expectations 
In this section, we describe the base case, comprising a setting in which Entrepreneurs and 
VCs hold symmetric expectations on the Entrepreneurial Firm’s profit growth. First, we will 
derive the conditions under which Entrepreneurs and VCs would be individually willing the 
support the Growth Opportunity. We then depict how share premiums or discounts might be 
computed with the purpose of aligning Entrepreneurs and VCs to back the Entrepreneurial 
Firm and seize the envisaged Growth Opportunity. 
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2.1.1. Setup 
The base case comprises one Entrepreneurial Firm, owned by a single Entrepreneur 
(named as 𝐸), which generates a flow of positive profits (𝜋). This Entrepreneurial Firm, in 
which the Entrepreneur invested an initial capital of 𝑘𝑖  >  0, holds a Growth Opportunity, 
defined by an expansion of its current profit flow (given by 𝑒 >  1) and a given capital 
expenditure (𝑘 >  0). Assuming that neither the Entrepreneurial Firm nor the Entrepreneur 
have access to debt6, such capital expenditure should be funded through an equity round 
backed by the Entrepreneur, who is assumed to own limited resources (given by 0 <  𝑘𝑎  <
 𝑘), and by an external financier, who is assumed to be a VC with no funding constraints. 
VCs are then assumed to fund the part of the required equity that the Entrepreneur is not able 
to provide (i.e., 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎). Post-equity round firm ownership held by the Entrepreneur is 
denoted by 0 <  𝑄𝐸  <  1 while post-equity round firm ownership held by the VC is denoted 
by 0 <  𝑄𝑉𝐶  <  1 and 𝑄𝑉𝐶  =  1 – 𝑄𝐸. 
2.1.2. Individual assessment of the Growth Opportunity 
Firstly, each of the parties shall individually analyse the investment opportunity held by 
the Entrepreneurial Firm, assuming that post-equity round firm ownership will be split 
according to the capital contributions made by each of the parties to the Entrepreneurial Firm. 
Therefore, 𝑄𝐸 =
𝑘𝑖+𝑘𝑎
𝑘𝑖+𝑘
 and 𝑄𝑉𝐶 =
𝑘−𝑘𝑎
𝑘𝑖+𝑘
= 1 − 𝑄𝐸. 
The Entrepreneurial Firm generates a continuous-time profit flow (𝜋), which is assumed 
to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) diffusion process given by: 
                                                 
6 We find this as a reasonable assumption, considering that these firms typically (i) present a limited or 
inexistent historical firm performance, whereby banks can accurately assess credit risk for the Entrepreneurial 
Firm, (ii) do not own tangible assets which could serve as a collateral to debt financing, or would have to bear 
prohibitive interest costs otherwise, and (iii) debt financing could potentially lead to inadequate capital 
structures, with debt repayment schedules causing major cash-flow constraints to small and rapidly growing 
firms facing significant uncertainties. In addition, there could exist major credit restrictions due to 
macroeconomic and other exogenous factors that can exclude any debt financing alternatives. 
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 𝑑𝜋 = 𝛼𝜋𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝜋𝑑𝑧 (2.1) 
where 𝜋 >  0, 𝛼 and 𝜎 stand for the trend parameter (i.e., the drift) and to the 
instantaneous volatility, respectively. Additionally, assuming that Entrepreneurs and VCs are 
risk neutral, 𝛼 =  𝑟 –  𝛿, where 𝑟 >  0 is the risk-free rate and 𝛿 >  0 stands for the asset 
yield. Finally, 𝑑𝑧 is the increment of a Wiener process. We assume that both Entrepreneurs 
and VCs understand that the continuous profit flow (𝜋) follows the same stochastic process. 
Two important considerations should be taken into account at this point. First, by 
considering that the continuous-time profit flow (𝜋) is governed by a Geometric Brownian 
Motion diffusion process, we implicitly assume that profits present percentage returns that 
are normally distributed and that such profits are always greater than zero. From our 
perspective, this stands for a reasonable assumption either in the current Chapter, but also in 
Chapter 3 – where we deal with established and profit-making Entrepreneurial Firms – and 
in Chapter 4, where even though we deal with Start-up Firms (SuFs), we are particularly 
interested in determining optimum investment timing for Independent Venture Capitalists 
(IVCs) and Public Venture Capitalists (PVCs) and it seems plausible to admit that such 
entities would only be willing to support a SuF when the present value of its profits is 
expected to be positive. 
However, given that Entrepreneurial Firms and SuFs may present operating losses, some 
authors make use of Arithmetic Brownian Motions to portray their profitability  (Lukas et 
al., 2012). While the prospects of bearing operating losses is plausible, we understand that 
its assumption of normally distributed absolute changes in profits disregards current 
profitability of a determinant of its expected change. In fact, in an Arithmetic Brownian 
Motion, the expected amount of change in profits is the same whether the Entrepreneurial 
Firm yields a one euro or a one million euro profit. Taking into account that within our setting 
the value of Growth Opportunities stand for a proxy of firm value, using Arithmetic 
Brownian Motions implies that agents considering to invest in such Growth Opportunities 
would be assuming that relative return of firm value would decrease with its level of 
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profitability. We understand that this would violate an important feature of investment 
decision-making processes by profit maximizing agents. 
Overall, we believe that more than which stochastic process should govern firm 
profitability, the assumption that Entrepreneurs and VCs accept that profits are driven by the 
same stochastic process is of much more relevance to our findings, in the sense that we are 
systematically interested in understanding how two parties interact within the course of an 
EF process. Accordingly, we take a GBM as a proper stochastic process for the purposes of 
our research as its tractability will highlight the impact that the specific variables that 
distinguish the decision-making process of Entrepreneurs and VCs hold on the outcomes of 
EF processes. In addition, the choice for GBM allows a vast range of previously developed 
option value formulations, comprising all derivations from the seminal Black-Scholes model 
(Black and Scholes, 1973), to be consistently used along the real options frameworks we 
conceived, as their stochastic variables are also assumed to follow GBMs. 
Second, we assume that Entrepreneurs and VCs are equally diversified and require the 
same asset yield, given by 𝛿. However, one may argue that Entrepreneurs are not as 
diversified as VCs and should therefore seek a differentiated return profile when screening 
the option to invest in the Growth Opportunity when compared to VCs. We claim there are 
reasons for believing that neither VCs are as diversified as other investors and that neither 
Entrepreneurs are as undiversified as one may imagine. 
On a sample of 865 Private Equity (PE) funds with fund vintages from 1974 to 2010 and 
an average fund size of 1,045 million dollars, Braun et al. (2015) computed an average of 
15.6 deals per fund, which is significantly below the range of 30 to 40 stocks required by a 
well-diversified portfolio of randomly chosen stocks (Statman, 1987). This means that even 
though Limited Partners (LPs) may benefit from diversification by deploying capital into a 
set of different PE and VC funds, General Partner (GPs) – those who actually manage each 
of those funds and drive their investment and divestment decisions – do not. In addition, 
diversification benefits to GPs are restrained by contractual covenants typically imposed by 
LPs to fund managers with the purpose of limiting their investment behaviour or even their 
outside activities (Gompers and Lerner, 1996), meaning, for example, that they may not be 
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allocated to more than a given number of funds and benefit from the diversification effects 
on their performance-based compensation. Still on the fund perspective, diversification 
benefits are also limited by covenants restricting the types of investment that might be carried 
by the funds managed by GPs, including other PE or VC funds, public securities, leveraged 
buyouts, foreign securities and other asset classes (Gompers and Lerner, 1996). 
In turn, and differently to VCs, Entrepreneurs are not restrained to certain asset classes or 
investment strategies on managing their personal wealth. As a result, they may not fully 
deploy their entire wealth on her or his Entrepreneurial Firm or SuF. For example, several 
authors point out that “hybrid entrepreneurs” remain as employees while proceeding with a 
part-time entrepreneurial activity (Folta et al., 2010, Raffiee and Feng, 2014). If “hybrid 
entrepreneurs” do not entirely allocate their time to their Entrepreneurial Firm, we may also 
argue that their wealth is also not fully allocated to their Entrepreneurial Firm. In addition, 
“serial entrepreneurs” hold a track-record of success in setting up and selling companies and 
they are also not likely to deploy most of their wealth on an entrepreneurial play (Wright et 
al., 1997, Gompers et al., 2006). Finally, we argue that Entrepreneurs and VCs face the same 
liquidity risk when investing in an Entrepreneurial Firm or SuF, as these are not publicly 
listed and they cannot be readily traded irrespective of any capital demands held by 
Entrepreneurs and VCs (Lerner and Schoar, 2004). 
2.1.2.1. The decision to invest in the Growth Opportunity for the 
Entrepreneur 
Following the contingent-claim approach used by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the value of 
the option held by the Entrepreneur to invest in the growth opportunity of the Entrepreneurial 
Firm, 𝐸(𝜋), must satisfy the following ordinary differential equation (ODE): 
 1
2
𝜎2 𝜋2 𝐸′′(𝜋) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝜋 𝐸′(𝜋) − 𝑟 𝐸(𝜋) + 𝜋 = 0 (2.2) 
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where the last term on the left hand side of equation (2.2) refers to the current profit flow 
of the Entrepreneurial Firm and the remaining terms refer to the growth option held by the 
Entrepreneurial Firm. The general solution for (2.2) comes: 
 𝐸(𝜋) = 𝐴𝜋𝛽1 + 𝐵𝜋𝛽2 +
𝜋
𝛿
 (2.3) 
where 𝐴 and 𝐵 are constants to be determined, while 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the roots of the 
fundamental quadratic 𝑄𝐸, given by: 
 
𝑄𝐸(𝛽) =
1
2
𝜎2 𝛽 (𝛽 − 1) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝛽 − 𝑟 = 0 (2.4) 
i.e. 
 
𝛽1 =
1
2
−
(𝑟 − 𝛿)
𝜎2
+√(
𝑟 − 𝛿
𝜎2
−
1
2
)
2
+
2𝑟
𝜎2
> 1 (2.5) 
 
𝛽2 =
1
2
−
(𝑟 − 𝛿)
𝜎2
−√(
𝑟 − 𝛿
𝜎2
−
1
2
)
2
+
2𝑟
𝜎2
< 0 (2.6) 
Assuming that 𝜋𝐸
∗  stands for the optimal profit trigger to obtain Entrepreneur’s support to 
the Growth Opportunity, and considering that, in order to execute the growth strategy, 𝑄𝐸  <
 100%, the problem must be solved by considering the following boundary conditions: 
 𝐸(0) = 0 (2.7) 
 
𝐸(𝜋𝐸
∗ ) =
𝑒. 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝛿
. 𝑄𝐸 − 𝑘𝑎 (2.8) 
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 𝐸′(𝜋𝐸
∗ ) =
𝑒
𝛿
. 𝑄𝐸 (2.9) 
Respecting condition (2.7) and noting that 𝛽2  <  0, then 𝐵 on the equation (2.3) must be 
equal to zero and 𝛽 ≡  𝛽1. The unknowns 𝐴 and 𝜋𝐸
∗  are obtained by combining conditions 
(2.8) and (2.9). Solutions for the optimal profit trigger and for the option to invest on the 
growth opportunity then come: 
 
𝜋𝐸
∗ =
𝛽
𝛽 − 1
∙
𝛿
𝑒. 𝑄𝐸 − 1
𝑘𝑎 (2.10) 
 
𝐸(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 𝜋
𝛿
+ (
(𝑒. 𝑄𝐸 − 1). 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝛿
− 𝑘𝑎)(
𝜋
𝜋𝐸
∗)
𝛽
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 < 𝜋𝐸
∗  
𝑒. 𝜋. 𝑄𝐸
𝛿
− 𝑘𝑎 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥ 𝜋𝐸
∗  
 (2.11) 
Notice that as 𝑒. 𝑄𝐸  →  1, 𝜋𝐸
∗  → +∞, meaning that for a given 𝑘 and 𝑘𝑎, the lower the 
level of profit growth, the profit trigger will be prohibitive and no Entrepreneur would be 
willing to obtain support from an external equity provider for the growth strategy held by the 
Entrepreneurial Firm. This forms an ownership dilution condition for the Entrepreneur to 
consider an equity round to support a given Growth Opportunity: no Entrepreneur would be 
willing to seek for external equity unless the profit expansion of the Entrepreneurial Firm 
offsets the loss coming from a lower ownership on the Entrepreneurial Firm. Formally, this 
will lead to an asymptote on 𝜋𝐸
∗  when 𝑒 =
1
𝑄𝐸
. 
Model outcomes reveal that 𝜋𝐸
∗  is smaller, (i) the larger the profit growth is (
𝜕𝜋𝐸
∗  
𝜕𝑒
< 0) 
and (ii) the higher the post-project firm ownership retained is (
𝜕𝜋𝐸
∗  
𝜕𝑄𝐸
< 0), while this profit 
trigger 𝜋𝐸
∗  becomes higher, the higher the overall capital outlay for deploying the growth 
strategy 𝑘 is (
𝜕𝜋𝐸
∗  
𝜕𝑘
=
𝜕𝜋𝐸
∗  
𝜕𝑄𝐸
𝜕𝑄𝐸 
𝜕𝑘
> 0). In turn, the value of the growth opportunity increases 
both with the underlying profit expansion factor 𝑒 and post-project firm ownership 𝑄𝐸. 
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2.1.2.2. The decision to invest in the Growth Opportunity for the VC 
Similarly to the Entrepreneur, the value of the option to invest on the Growth Opportunity 
held by the VC, given by 𝑉𝐶(𝜋), should also satisfy an ODE, as presented in equation (2.12). 
However, unlike the Entrepreneur, this option does not include the current profit flow 𝜋 of 
the Entrepreneurial Firm. VCs can only profit by undertaking the Growth Opportunity, and 
not from existing firm profitability, when they decide not to participate in this growth 
strategy. 
 1
2
𝜎2 𝜋2 𝑉𝐶′′(𝜋) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝜋 𝑉𝐶′(𝜋) − 𝑟 𝑉𝐶(𝜋) = 0 (2.12) 
The general solution for (2.12) is: 
 𝑉𝐶(𝜋) = 𝐶𝜋𝛽1 + 𝐷𝜋𝛽2 (2.13) 
where 𝐶 and 𝐷 are constants to be determined, while 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the roots of the 
fundamental quadratic, according to equations (2.5), (2.6) and (2.4), respectively. Similarly 
to the Entrepreneur, the boundary conditions are as follows: 
 𝑉𝐶(0) = 0 (2.14) 
 
𝑉𝐶(𝜋𝑣
∗) =
𝑒. 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝛿
. 𝑄𝑉𝐶 − (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) (2.15) 
 𝑉𝐶′(𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ ) =
𝑒
𝛿
. 𝑄𝑉𝐶 (2.16) 
where 𝜋 𝑉𝐶
∗  stands for the optimal profit trigger to support the growth strategy for the VC 
firm. Respecting condition (2.14) and noting that 𝛽2  <  0, then 𝐷 on equation (2.13) must 
be equal to zero. Therefore, and assuming that Entrepreneurs and VCs consider that the profit 
flow of the Entrepreneurial Firm is governed by the same stochastic process and underlying 
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variables, 𝛽 ≡  𝛽1 for the remaining of this paper. Solutions to the unknowns underlying the 
option value are given by: 
 
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ =
𝛽
𝛽 − 1
∙
𝛿
𝑒. 𝑄𝑉𝐶
(𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) (2.17) 
 
𝑉𝐶(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 
(
𝑒. 𝑄𝑉𝐶 . 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝛿
− (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎))(
𝜋
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ )
𝛽
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 < 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗  
𝑒. 𝜋
𝛿
. 𝑄𝑉𝐶 − (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥ 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗  
 (2.18) 
It is implicitly assumed that the VC does not burden any additional opportunity costs from 
foregoing other potential investments in other companies or equivalently, it is assumed that 
the current investment opportunity is the best opportunity in which the VC fund may invest 
in. 
2.1.2.3. Aligning optimum investment timing through a share premium or 
discount 
So far, we have considered that parties assumed that post-equity round ownership on the 
Entrepreneurial Firm should be split according to the equity contributions each committed to 
the Entrepreneurial Firm. However, this would not enable the Entrepreneurial Firm to secure 
financing to its Growth Opportunity, by leading both Entrepreneurs and VCs to hold the same 
optimum investment timing, i.e., 𝜋𝐸
∗ = 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ 7. 
In addition, given that the value of the existing assets in place held by the Entrepreneurial 
Firm might be greater than the face value of the equity contributions made by the 
Entrepreneur previous to the growth opportunity (i.e., 𝑘𝑖), the former could legitimately 
                                                 
7 We could obtain solutions for k and e that would impose 𝜋𝐸
∗ = 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ , by equating (2.10) and (2.17) and 
solving for 𝑘 and 𝑒, respectively. However, we argue that these two variables are exogenous to the model and 
that any of the parties would not revise their profit growth expectations or capital outlay required by the Growth 
Opportunity with the purpose of reaching a joint agreement. 
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argue that if there is no share premium, then, the VC would be having an arbitrage gain equal 
to the difference between the fair value of the equity stake that the VC obtained in the 
company, and the amount of the actual equity contribution made by the VC. 
Conversely, if the value of the existing assets is low or if the expected profit growth by 
the Entrepreneur is very high, the Entrepreneur could be willing to offer a discount on equity 
issuance, in order to secure the necessary funding for executing the envisaged growth 
strategy. In fact, VCs might argue that without their equity contribution, the value of the 
Growth Opportunity held by the Entrepreneurial Firm is equal to zero, since neither the firm, 
nor the Entrepreneur, hold enough resources to proceed with its execution. 
As a result, and given the relevance of this topic within the negotiation context between 
Entrepreneurs and VCs, we are interested in understanding how this premium (or discount) 
might be computed and actually work as an alignment mechanism between the two parties. 
In this setting, this share premium (or discount) is named as 𝑝 and it is introduced as an 
additional ownership dilution effect over the VC8, subject to 𝑝 >  − (𝑘𝑖  +  𝑘𝑎). Therefore, 
in the presence of this share premium (or discount) we denote the post-equity round firm 
ownership held by the Entrepreneur as 𝑄𝐸𝑃 =
𝑘𝑖+𝑘𝑎+𝑝
𝑘𝑖+𝑘
  and the post-equity round firm 
ownership held by the VC as 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃 =
𝑘−𝑘𝑎−𝑝
𝑘𝑖+𝑘
. 
As no further changes are introduced, we obtain the new boundary conditions and profit 
triggers simply by replacing 𝑄𝐸 and 𝑄𝑉𝐶by 𝑄𝐸𝑃 and 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃 respectively on equations (2.9) to 
(2.11) and (2.16) to (2.18) as shown in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
8 Share discounts might be subject to legal constraints, whose impacts on the model outcomes are far beyond 
the scope of this paper. Our intention is to focus on the purely economic drivers that, within the framework 
herein presented, would induce both Entrepreneurs and VCs to become willing to accept a share premium or 
discount on the equity issuance to be carried by the Entrepreneurial Firm. 
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For the Entrepreneur For the VC 
𝐸(𝜋𝐸
∗) =
𝑒. 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝛿
. 𝑄𝐸𝑃 − 𝑘𝑎 (2.19) 𝑉𝐶(𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ ) =
𝑒. 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝛿
. 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃 − (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) (2.20) 
𝐸′(𝜋𝐸
∗ ) =
𝑒
𝛿
. 𝑄𝐸𝑃, leading to (2.21) 𝑉𝐶′(𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ ) =
𝑒
𝛿
. 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃, leading to (2.22) 
𝜋𝐸
∗ =
𝛽
𝛽 − 1
∙
𝛿
𝑒. 𝑄𝐸𝑃 − 1
𝑘𝛼 (2.23) 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ =
𝛽
𝛽 − 1
∙
𝛿
𝑒. 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃
(𝑘 − 𝑘𝛼) (2.24) 
Table 1. Boundary conditions and profit triggers with a share premium (or discount) 
Equating the resulting profit triggers for the Entrepreneur and the VC – i.e., equating 
(2.23) and (2.24) – and solving this for the premium 𝑝, we obtain the following result: 
 𝑝 =
(𝑘−𝑘𝑎)[𝑘−𝑘𝑖(𝑒−1)]
𝑒𝑘
, or equivalently (2.25) 
 
𝑄𝐸𝑃 = 
𝑘 + 𝑘𝑎(𝑒 − 1)
𝑒𝑘
 (2.26) 
Referring to equation (2.25), these results show that the share premium (or discount) that 
would lead Entrepreneurs and VCs to support the growth opportunity: 
 
− Is positively influenced by the amount of capital to be deployed by the VC to 
support the growth strategy (i.e., 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎); 
 
− Is equal to zero when 𝑘 − 𝑘𝑖(𝑒 − 1) = 0 (i.e., when 𝑒 = 1 +
𝑘
𝑘𝑖
9), highlighting 
that if 𝑒 > 1 +
𝑘
𝑘𝑖
  a share discount on equity issuance is obtained. This term also 
                                                 
9 In fact, this is the solution we obtain by combining equations (2.23) and (2.24), and solving for 𝑒, i.e., 
when we would allow parties to change their profit growth expectations to ensure that they would both support 
the Growth Opportunity held by the Entrepreneurial Firm. 
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shows that the lower is the capital initially deployed by the Entrepreneur (𝑘𝑖), the 
greater should be the share premium required by the Entrepreneur, as the greater 
is the ownership dilution loss caused by the growth opportunity; 
 
− Is negatively influenced by the expected profit growth e, given that 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑒
=
−
(𝑘−𝑘𝑎)𝑘𝑖
𝑒𝑘
−
(𝑘−𝑘𝑎)[𝑘−𝑘𝑖(𝑒−1)]
𝑒2𝑘
< 0, ∀ 𝑒 >  1. This results also holds for the post-
deal Entrepreneur’s ownership stake on the Entrepreneurial Firm, as 
𝑑𝑄𝐸𝑃
𝑑𝑒
<
0, ∀ 𝑒 > 1. This reveals that the greater the profit growth expectations, the more 
is the Entrepreneur willing to trade-off ownership on the Entrepreneurial Firm for 
the profit generated by the growth strategy. This means that, if the Entrepreneur is 
growth-oriented and not adverse to control risk, the greater her or his profit growth 
expectations are, the more is she or he willing to have a “smaller share” of a 
“bigger venture”. 
 
Equations (2.25) and (2.26) also reveal that Entrepreneurs attain a benefit when obtaining 
external equity to support a given Growth Opportunity, since they retain 𝑄𝐸𝑃 of its profits, 
but by spending a fraction 
𝑘𝑎
𝑘
 of its required capital outlay. Such benefit is formally derived 
as 𝑄𝐸𝑃. 𝑘 −  𝑘𝑎 (i.e., the difference between the capital outlay 𝑘 that the Entrepreneur should 
have made considering the firm ownership she or he retained, and the capital outlay that the 
Entrepreneur actually made), and is equal to 
𝑘−𝑘𝑎
𝑒
. 
Interestingly, equation (2.25) and (2.26) show that the optimum share premium (or 
discount) set by the Entrepreneur and the VC does not depend on any of the parameters of 
the underlying stochastic process that governs the profit flow of the Entrepreneurial Firm, 
provided that both the Entrepreneur and the VC regard its profit flow to follow the same 
Geometric Brownian Motion. 
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2.2. The case with asymmetric profit growth expectations 
Taking the general view from de Meza and Southey (1996) that Entrepreneurs and 
Financiers hold different prospects on future firm performance, we will now relax the 
assumption that Entrepreneurs and VCs share the same perspectives on profit growth, given 
by 𝑒. In fact, Entrepreneurs and VCs often hold distinct prospects over the same growth 
strategy, which could in turn lead to long discussions during negotiation stages. We argue 
that, even in these conditions, an agreement might be reached. 
In this new setting, we take the profit growth envisaged by the Entrepreneur as 𝑒𝐸 and the 
profit growth envisaged by VC as 𝑒𝑉𝐶 and re-write the boundary conditions and profit 
triggers for each of the options to invest on the growth strategy held by the Entrepreneur and 
the VC. Similarly to the previous section, we derive the conditions for the share premium (or 
discount) that, in the presence of asymmetric expectations on profit growth, would allow 
Entrepreneurs and VCs to optimally and simultaneously invest on the Growth Opportunity 
held by the Entrepreneurial Firm. 
In this setting, 𝑄𝐸𝑃 and 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃 are computed as before. The new boundary conditions and 
profit triggers are obtained by replacing by replacing 𝑒 by 𝑒𝐸 and 𝑒𝑉𝐶, respectively, on 
equations (2.19), (2.21), (2.20) and (2.22), as shown in Table 2. 
 
For the Entrepreneur For the VC 
𝐸(𝜋𝐸
∗) =
𝑒𝐸 . 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝛿
. 𝑄𝐸𝑃 − 𝑘𝑎 (2.27) 𝑉𝐶(𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ ) =
𝑒𝑉𝐶 . 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝛿
. 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃 − (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) (2.28) 
𝐸′(𝜋𝐸
∗ ) =
𝑒𝐸
𝛿
. 𝑄𝐸𝑃, leading to (2.29) 𝑉𝐶′(𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ ) =
𝑒𝑉𝐶
𝛿
. 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃, leading to (2.30) 
𝜋𝐸
∗ =
𝛽
𝛽 − 1
∙
𝛿
𝑒𝐸 . 𝑄𝐸𝑃 − 1
𝑘𝛼 (2.31) 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ =
𝛽
𝛽 − 1
∙
𝛿
𝑒𝑉𝐶 . 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃
(𝑘 − 𝑘𝛼) (2.32) 
Table 2. Boundary conditions and profit triggers with different prospects on profit growth and with an up-front share 
premium (or discount) 
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Equating the resulting profit triggers for the Entrepreneur and the VC – i.e., equating 
(2.31) and (2.32) – and solving this for the premium 𝑝, we obtain the following result: 
 𝑝 =
(𝑘−𝑘𝑎)[𝑘−𝑘𝑎(𝑒𝐸−𝑒𝑉𝐶)−𝑘
𝑖(𝑒𝐸−1)]
𝑒𝐸𝑘−𝑘𝑎(𝑒𝐸−𝑒𝑉𝐶)
, or equivalently (2.33) 
 
𝑄𝐸𝑃 = 
𝑘 + 𝑘𝑎(𝑒𝑉𝐶 − 1)
𝑒𝐸𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎(𝑒𝐸 − 𝑒𝑉𝐶)
 (2.34) 
Provided that the general intuition of these results was presented on the previous section, 
we now focus on how asymmetric expectations on profit growth (i.e., 𝑒𝐸 − 𝑒𝑉𝐶) affect the 
optimum share premium or discount on equity issuance given by 𝑝. On the one hand, the 
numerator in equation (2.33) shows that profit growth expectations held by the Entrepreneur 
negatively influence the optimum share premium or discount, given the negative coefficients 
that drive the terms on 𝑘𝑎 (𝑒𝐸 − 𝑒𝑉𝐶) and 𝑘
𝑖  (𝑒𝐸 − 1) and that essentially capture the growth 
effect on the capital deployed by the Entrepreneur (𝑘𝑖 and 𝑘𝑎) on the Entrepreneurial Firm. 
Interestingly, the term on 𝑘𝑖 does not depend on 𝑒𝑉𝐶 but only on 𝑒𝐸, reflecting the fact the 
capital initially deployed by the Entrepreneur  (𝑘𝑖) fully benefits from the outcomes of the 
Growth Opportunity. 
On the other hand, the denominator in equation (2.33) shows that the profit growth 
expectations held by the Entrepreneur negatively influence the optimum share premium or 
discount, as it may be written as 𝑒𝐸  (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎) + 𝑘𝑎  𝑒𝑉𝐶. This term should be jointly 
interpreted with the coefficient (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) presented on the numerator, as it grosses down the 
overall ownership dilution effect caused by the growth opportunity (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) through the 
expected profit growth effects (𝑒𝑉𝐶 and 𝑒𝐸). However, the greater the profit growth 
expectations (𝑒𝐸) are, the lower the overall ownership dilution effect is she or he willing to 
accept and the higher optimum share premium is. 
Overall, given that 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑒𝐸
< 0, ∀ 𝑒𝐸 > 1, the growth effects underlying the investment 
opportunity dominate over the ownership dilution and, therefore, the greater the profit growth 
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expectations held by the Entrepreneur, the more she or he is willing to trade-off ownership 
on the Entrepreneurial Firm for the profit generated by the growth strategy. 
Equation (2.33) also shows that the Entrepreneur would accept an equity issuance with no 
share premium (i.e., 𝑝 =  0), when 𝑒𝐸 =
1
𝑄𝐸
+ 𝑒𝑉𝐶
𝑘𝑎 
𝑘𝑖+ 𝑘𝑎
. As a result, when 𝑒𝐸 >
1
𝑄𝐸
+
𝑒𝑉𝐶
𝑘𝑎 
𝑘𝑖+ 𝑘𝑎
, the Entrepreneur would be in fact willing to accept a discount on the equity 
issuance in favour of the VC. 
2.3. Numerical example 
After having formally derived our framework for discussing Entrepreneurial Financing 
decisions, we will now introduce a numerical example to illustrate our findings and highlight 
their underlying economic intuition.  We will first present an example for the case for 
symmetric expectations on profit growth, and then move to the case in which Entrepreneurs 
and VCs hold different prospects on profit growth. 
2.3.1. Numerical assumptions 
In this example, and following de Meza and Southey (1996) and Hmieleski and Baron 
(2009), we will take the view that Entrepreneurs are usually more optimistic than financiers 
and, therefore, 𝑒𝐸 is assumed to be greater than 𝑒𝑉𝐶. The rest of the parameters are standard. 
 
Variable 
Numerical 
Assumption 
 
Variable 
Numerical 
Assumption 
 
Variable 
Numerical 
Assumption 
𝑘𝑖 150 
 
𝑟 0.04 
 
𝑒 3.00 
𝑘𝑎 275 
 
𝜎 0.30 
 
𝑒𝐸 3.00 
𝑘 500 
 
𝛿 0.08 
 
𝑒𝑉𝐶  2.00 
Table 3. Numerical assumptions 
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2.3.2. The optimum share premium (or discount) with symmetric profit 
growth expectations 
In this setting, we will have 𝑄𝐸  =  65.4%, 𝑄𝑉𝐶 =  34.6%, and no joint support from both 
Entrepreneurs and VCs to this Growth Opportunity, if 𝑒 =  3.00. In the absence of a share 
premium or discount, this Growth Opportunity would not obtain joint support from 
Entrepreneurs and VCs – as shown in Figure 3 – and would then become valueless. 
 
Figure 3. Profit triggers for Entrepreneurs and VCs with symmetric expectations on profit growth with no share premium 
or discount 
By combining equations (2.23) and (2.24), we obtain the optimum share premium 𝑝 =
 30.00 that would allow Entrepreneurs and VCs to engage on the growth strategy, as shown 
in Figure 4. A share premium (𝑝 >  0) is consistent with the example shown in Figure 3, 
given that 𝑒 is below the optimum profit growth that allows parties to jointly support the 
investment opportunity (𝑒 =  4.33). As a result and according to equation (2.26), 𝑄𝐸𝑃  =
 70.0%, instead of 𝑄𝐸  =  65.4%. 
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Figure 4. Profit triggers for Entrepreneurs and VCs with symmetric expectations on profit growth 
2.3.3. The optimum share premium with asymmetric expectations on profit 
growth 
In this setting, 𝑄𝐸 and 𝑄𝑉𝐶 are again affected by the share premium or discount given by 
p and are therefore replaced by 𝑄𝐸𝑃 and 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃. We are interested in obtaining the optimum 
share premium that would allow Entrepreneurs and VCs to reach an agreement towards 
supporting the growth opportunity and visualizing the impact of different profit growth 
expectations held by the Entrepreneur on the optimum share premium or discount. 
The optimum share premium is given by equation (2.33). Considering 𝑒𝐸  =  3.0 and 
𝑒𝑉𝐶  =  2.0, we obtain 𝑝 = − 13.77, as shown on Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Profit triggers for Entrepreneurs and VCs with asymmetric expectations on profit growth and a share premium 
(p > 0) or discount (p < 0) on equity issuance 
As a result, 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃 would equal 36.7%, increasing from 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑃  =  34.6%, as the 
Entrepreneur would actually be willing to trade a lower shareholding for the chance of 
entering into the Growth Opportunity. In this case, there is also an asymptote on the 
Entrepreneur’s profit triggers given by 𝑝 = ‒  208.33, meaning that for discounts above this 
threshold, no agreement is possible to be settled10. Similarly, there is an asymptote on the 
VC’s profit trigger, given by 𝑝 =  225.00, as the share premium cannot be greater than the 
amount of capital that the VC is deploying on the Entrepreneurial Firm (i.e., 𝑘 – 𝑘𝑎) and 
𝑄𝑉𝐶  >  0. 
Taking a look at how different Entrepreneur’s profit growth expectations 𝑒𝐸 drive the 
optimum share premium 𝑝, on Figure 6 we may observe that 𝑝 is decreasing with 𝑒𝐸, and 
                                                 
10 This asymptote captures the ownership dilution condition, which was introduced in section 2.1.2 and it is 
given by solving the condition 𝑒𝐸 (
𝑘𝑖+𝑘𝑎+𝑝
𝑘𝑖+𝑘
) − 1 = 0 on the denominator of the Entrepreneur’s profit trigger, given 
by equation (2.31). 
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that for 𝑒𝐸  >
1
𝑄𝐸
+ 𝑒𝑉𝐶
𝑘𝑎
𝑘𝑖+𝑘𝑎
, 𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑒𝐸  > 2.82 , the Entrepreneur would actually be willing 
to accept a discount on its shareholding to allow the VC to support the Growth Opportunity. 
This is the same trigger on 𝑒𝐸 that would allow Entrepreneurs and VCs to jointly support the 
growth strategy, in the absence of any share premium or discount. 
 
Figure 6. Optimum share premium or discount and the Entrepreneur’s profit growth expectations 
The numerical example shows that the greater the Entrepreneur’s expectations on profit 
growth, the more is she or he willing to trade-off firm ownership for the profit growth 
underlying the Growth Opportunity. 
2.4. Chapter summary 
In this Chapter we developed a real options framework for determining alignment 
conditions between Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists (VCs) on EF decisions under 
symmetric and asymmetric profit growth expectations, for a given Growth Opportunity.  
We showed that Entrepreneurs would only be willing to seek for external equity if value 
creation effects rising from the growth opportunity offset the loss caused by her or his 
ownership dilution, while, on the other hand, VCs would only be willing to support the 
Growth Opportunity if its value creation effects are such that will offset the loss from 
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retaining a lower share of the Entrepreneurial Firm than the one for which they provided to 
the Growth Opportunity.  
In addition, we presented how a share premium (or discount) mechanism could be 
computed so that the Growth Opportunity obtains joint support from Entrepreneurs and VCs 
and showed how asymmetries on future profit growth expectations may actually contribute 
to aligning Entrepreneurs and VCs in supporting Growth Opportunities. 
On the next Chapter, we will introduce contingent payments as alternative enablers of EF 
decisions. In that setting – and differently from the framework we revealed on this Chapter 
– instead of settling up-front the definite financial terms of the EF decision, VCs agree to pay 
Entrepreneurs an extra amount of cash, subject to the accomplishment by the Entrepreneurial 
Firm of certain performance goals within a pre-determined future time horizon. 
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3. Contingent Payment Mechanisms and 
Entrepreneurial Financing decisions 
Entrepreneurial Financing (EF) decisions cover a distinct range of financial and non-
financial terms that Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists (VCs) negotiate, which should as 
a whole trigger their willingness to forego firm ownership, provide funds to support a given 
growth strategy or get access to a range of financial and managerial skills (Croce et al., 2013, 
Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001, Hsu, 2004). 
From a financial perspective, and leaving aside post-deal compensation and interest 
alignment mechanisms which may be set between the parties, EF decisions usually involve 
discussions on valuing the Entrepreneurial Firm, and on how parties will split firm 
ownership. Considering how uncertainty surrounds the prospects of Entrepreneurial Firms, 
parties may choose to solve discussions on valuation and firm ownership by engaging into 
an up-front share or cash premium (or discount) or, alternatively, by setting a deferred and 
Contingent Payment Mechanism (CPM) subject to a given performance benchmark or 
strategic milestone of the Entrepreneurial Firm. 
While up-front cash and shares largely dominate as deal currency mechanisms, accounting 
for 80.8% and 24.9%11 of the total transactions that took place between 2000 and 30th June, 
2015 according to Zephyr12, deals involving CPMs – also known on the literature as Earn-
                                                 
11 Bear in mind that one given deal may have more than one deal currency mechanism (for example, a 
combination of cash and shares). Therefore, summing up the share of different deal currency mechanisms on 
total deal volumes leads to over 100.0%. 
 
12 Estimates based on a sample extracted from Zephyr comprising completed deals from 1st January, 2000 
to 30th June, 2015, including acquisitions, institutional buy-outs, capital increases, management buy-ins, 
management and buy-outs, involving targets located in the Baltic States, Eastern Europe, North America, 
Oceania, Scandinavia, and Western Europe and acquisitions with, at least, 15.0% stakes on target firms, totaling 
331,419 transactions. Deals for which no payment terms are available are excluded from the statistics of deal 
payment terms mentioned throughout the paper. 
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Outs or Contingent Earn-Outs – stood for 7.9% of total deal volumes during this period, and 
are being increasingly used, standing for 11.3% of total deal volumes from January to June, 
2015 against 4.5% in 2000. CPMs seem to be more popular in industries especially reliant 
on intangible assets, such as “Computer, IT and Internet Services” (where 14.2% of deal 
volumes between 2000 and 30th June, 2015 used CPMs) or “Biotechnology, Pharmaceuticals 
and Life Sciences” (11.4%), or industries featuring significant volatility on cash flow 
generation, such as “Construction13” (10.3%).  As they introduce additional complexity on 
deal terms, CPMs are more popular on professional investors, such as deals involving Private 
Equity or VCs divestment (12.6%) or on deals involving Sovereign Wealth Funds (6.7%). In 
addition, CPMs are more frequent on smaller deals in terms of deal value, as only 23.7% of 
the deals including CPMs involve deal values on the top quartile of our sample (i.e., deals 
above 34 million euros).  
Such evidence on CPMs is broadly consistent with previous literature findings. Cain et al. 
(2011) posited that higher contingent payments are observed when targets possess high 
growth opportunities and are exposed to greater uncertainty, while Datar et al. (2001) found 
that acquisitions of high technology, service intensive or small private companies are more 
prone to use CPMs. Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) points out that contingent payments 
are more likely in the “Media and Entertainment”, “Consumer Products”, “High 
Technology”, “Healthcare” and “Telecommunications” industries, which hold large 
intangible assets, and are surrounded by greater volatility on their cash flow generation, 
taking prospective bidders to higher value at risk alongside information asymmetries. 
Overall, both literature and empirical findings support the idea that CPMs should be 
particularly relevant within an Entrepreneurial Financing context, in which Entrepreneurial 
Firms also face valuable growth opportunities, and major uncertainties on future cash flow 
generation and business prospects. 
In spite of such conceptual argument, literature on decision-making models for EF 
decisions involving CPMs – or, even more broadly, within a Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) 
                                                 
13 Industry taxonomy as provided by Zephyr database according to Zephus classification. 
43 
context – is scarce (Lukas et al., 2012) and has not still, at the moment, comparatively 
discussed the design  of different types of CPMs. Therefore, we expect to provide a 
contribution to fill this gap, (i) by presenting a taxonomy for classifying different CPMs 
based on their payment term and amount, (ii) by introducing an options-based approach to 
value each of the four major different CPMs we identified, and (iii) by demonstrating how 
the key terms on each of the four major CPMs should be computed so that Entrepreneurs and 
VCs would be jointly willing to support a given Entrepreneurial Firm and its growth strategy. 
With this purpose, we extend the real options based framework for analyzing Entrepreneurial 
Financing decisions introduced on the previous Chapter. 
This Chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.1 we go through the existing literature 
on the topic. In section 3.2, we propose a taxonomy for classifying CPMs. In section 3.3 we 
value each of the four major CPMs we identified and derive optimum CPM terms that enable 
Entrepreneurs and VCs to jointly support a given Entrepreneurial Firm with a growth 
opportunity. In section 3.4 we illustrate the different CPMs with a numerical example. In 
section 3.5 we discuss our findings and present a summary of this Chapter in section 3.6. 
3.1. Literature review 
The concept of Contingent Payment Mechanisms is often defined on the literature. For 
example, Bruner and Stiegler (2014) highlight that CPMs are “contingent on achievement of 
financial or other performance targets after the deal close”14, while Reuer et al. (2004) 
underline that they are “deferred variable payments (…) within a certain time frame after the 
deal has been consummated”15. We understand that a more general definition is required for 
                                                 
14 Bruner and Stiegler (2014) define an Earn-Out as “an arrangement under which a portion of the purchase 
price in an acquisition is contingent on achievement of financial or other performance targets after the deal 
closes”. 
 
15 Reuer et al. (2004) define Contingent Earn-Outs as “deferred variable payments tied to the target's ability 
to meet pre-specified performance goals within a certain time frame after the deal has been consummated”. 
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a better understanding of CPMs, as these (i) may either comprise fixed or variable amounts 
(for example, when it equals a given multiple over revenues, EBITDA or profits above a 
certain threshold, measured at a given date), (ii) may either be paid on a pre-determined date 
or at any date within a given period (i.e., when a certain financial or business milestone is 
met) or (iii) may either require or not require a pre-specified goal to be met (for example, 
when a contingent payment equals a given multiple of all incremental EBITDA generated 
post-deal against the one on the deal completion accounts). Therefore, we follow the more 
general approach introduced by Datar et al. (2001) in which CPMs are defined as “a method 
of acquisition where the final consideration received by the seller is based on the future 
performance of his business”16.  
Some general insights on the pros and cons of CPMs from the M&A literature are 
extendable to an EF context, even though, differently from an M&A process, EF decisions 
do not involve a sale and purchase agreement of part of the whole firm ownership17.  
On the one hand, CPMs may reduce the risk of adverse selection and overpayment on the 
existence of private information on the business of the target firm (Kohers and Ang, 2000, 
Datar et al., 2001, Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009) or, conversely, reduce the risk of inverse 
adverse selection and underpayment, where bidders are potentially more informed than 
vendors, by allowing the latter to benefit from post-deal value creation (Ragozzino and 
Reuer, 2009). In addition, CPMs mitigate potential moral hazard risks on the post-deal stage, 
by providing incentives for vendors and/ or target management to adjust their behavior with 
the purpose of maximizing the probability of obtaining a contingent payment in the future 
(Krug and Hegarty, 2001, Kohers and Ang, 2000). Finally, CPMs may also be regarded as a 
                                                 
16 Usually CPMs do not require vendors to return part of the initial consideration to acquirers whether a 
certain future performance is not achieved by the target firm. This would lead to the introduction of “Contingent 
Earn-Ins”, which are rarely found on the M&A market. This kind of purchase price adjustment mechanism is 
more frequent for addressing potential liabilities of the target firm, rather than for establishing some kind of 
performance-based compensation. 
17 In Entrepreneurial Financing decisions, an outside investor financially supports a given growth 
opportunity held by an Entrepreneurial Firm, through an equity round. The Entrepreneurial Firm is in turn 
owned by a wealth constrained shareholder (or set of shareholders), taken as the Entrepreneur(s), who is not 
able to provide the Entrepreneurial Firm with all the necessary financial resources to execute its growth strategy. 
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financial leverage enhancer, by providing the acquirer with an option to fund total deal 
consideration with the underlying cash flow of the target firm through a deferred payment, 
or by providing the acquirer with the benefits of a staged investment process, given that it 
may be required to commit additional capital to support the growth opportunities of the target 
firm (Del Roccili and Fuhr Jr, 2001). 
On the other hand, CPMs may incentivize acquirers, vendors or target managers to 
influence the performance of the target firm with the purpose of maximizing or minimizing 
the amount of the future contingent payment, and therefore influencing the firm towards 
short-term rather than long-term goals (Lukas et al., 2012). Moreover, CPMs may introduce 
complexities on performance measurement, which may slow down post-deal integration and 
value creation effects, and may consequently introduce significant contracting and 
monitoring costs (Caselli et al., 2006, Datar et al., 2001). Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam 
(2012) argues that CPMs do not, in fact, provide a superior benefit against stock offers, since 
these may present similar contingency and value mitigation characteristics to CPMs, 
especially when entities have comparable sizes, a comparable contribution to post-deal value 
creation or when the stock of the acquirer is publicly traded and therefore allows the vendor 
to easily transform her or his ownership in cash. In fact, and by making use of a logistic 
model, these authors empirically concluded that acquisitions of privately owned firms or of 
subsidiaries of public firms are more prone to involve contingent payments. Lastly, one may 
also argue that, specifically within an Entrepreneurial Financing context, the risk-return 
profile of Entrepreneurial Firms, where failure rates are high, may advise investors not to 
reduce their potential upsides on the few successful Entrepreneurial Firms they support 
through CPMs or other similar mechanisms. 
Empirical research on designing CPMs reveals that contingent payments may stand from 
15.0% to 80.0% of total deal consideration (Bruner and Stiegler, 2014), with an average of 
33.0% according to Cain et al. (2011) and acquisitions involving privately owned firms 
recording a 44.0% higher average contingent payment (Kohers and Ang, 2000). The CPM 
period ranges from one month to twenty years, with an average of 2.57 years (Cain et al., 
2011), but more frequently laying on the two to five years range (Kohers and Ang, 2000). 
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In general, empirical research on acquirer stock returns provides support to a more 
widespread use of CPMs, at least from the bidder perspective. Supporting evidence includes 
Kohers and Ang (2000), who revealed that acquirers using CPMs recorded an abnormal 
return of 1.356% on the date of announcement against those that did not employ CPMs, on a 
sample comprising 938 deals with 82.1% Anglo-American bidders. Lukas and Heimann 
(2014) recorded an average 1.439% abnormal return at the date of announcement, and an 
average abnormal return on a three days window around the announcement date of 2.036%, 
in a sample exclusively involving deals in Germany. On a sample of bids announced by UK 
firms, Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) found that overall earn-out bids yield 
significantly higher returns than non earn-out bids (i.e., 1.48% against 1.07%) on a two days 
window around the announcement date, and that the benefits of optimal CPM use are 
exhausted by the second year after deal completion. In turn, unclear evidence is presented by 
Mantecon (2009), who found an average cumulative return of 1.01% for a three days window 
around the announcement date with a sample involving 2/3 of Anglo-American bidders, but 
weekly positive for domestic transactions and even insignificant for cross-border deals. 
From an analytical point-of-view, several authors argue the existence of an analogy 
between CPMs and real options (Bruner and Stiegler, 2014, Caselli et al., 2006, Lukas et al., 
2012), as shown in Table 4. Even though contingent payments do not hold an optionality 
feature, they provide payoffs that mirror those of real options and might be specified as call 
options, as argued by Bruner and Stiegler (2014). 
Notwithstanding, there are only a few analytical papers discussing how CPMs may drive 
acquisitions. 
Lukas et al. (2012) took a two-stage option-game approach to CPMs to examine the 
impact of uncertainty and of contingent payment terms on optimal M&A timing. The 
resulting model allowed the authors to specify a set of three empirically testable hypothesis, 
regarding Earn-Out ratios, Earn-Outs premiums18 and initial deal consideration. In particular, 
                                                 
18 “Earn-Out Premium” is defined as the amount of the contingent payment itself that was set by the parties, 
while the “Earn-Out Ratio” is defined as the ratio of all contingent payments in relation to the maximum price 
paid. 
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uncertainty is argued to positively drive the initial deal consideration, the Earn-Out premium 
and the Earn-Out ratio, while the Earn-Out period negatively influences the initial payment 
and positively affect the Earn-Out premium and the Earn-Out ratio. In turn, higher 
performance benchmarks positively drive initial payments and negatively drive both Earn-
Out premium and ratio. On this model, the contingent payment is fixed and paid at a given 
pre-determined date. 
 
Call Options 
on Common Stock 
CPMs 
Underlying Asset Shares of common stock 
Some index or measure of financial 
or operating performance (sales, 
earnings, cash flow, awards) 
Exercise Price 
The stated strike price of the 
options contract 
Any benchmark, hurdle or 
triggering event, beyond which the 
CPM starts paying off 
Price of the 
Underlying Asset 
Share price of the underlying 
common stock 
The level of the index or measure of 
performance (sales, earnings, cash 
flow, etc.) 
Interim Payouts Dividends 
Dividends and any interim cash 
flows associated with the CPM 
Term of the Option 
On a pre-specified date, typically 
from 3 to 9 months from original 
issue 
On a pre-specified date, or when a 
given event takes place during an 
certain period set by the parties 
Uncertainty 
Volatility of returns on the 
underlying asset 
Uncertainty about the performance 
of the underlying asset to which the 
CPM is pegged 
Adapted from Bruner and Stiegler (2014) 
Table 4. Comparison of Contingent Payment Mechanisms and call options on stock  
Lukas and Heimann (2014) also derived a set of testable empirical propositions on CPMs 
through a theoretical model set for an M&A context featuring information asymmetries. 
Grounded on a classic principal-agent model, the authors conceived a utility model in which 
the target firm envisages no uncertainty on product launch, while the bidder computes 
expected target performance through a uniform distribution. Model outputs reveal that CPMs 
increase the utility of buyers, by transferring some of the acquisition risk to vendors, 
especially when the volatility of cash flow generation of the target firm increases. Shorter 
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Earn-Out periods are also argued to increase the utility of buyers and extremely high levels 
of information asymmetry may actually impede deals from taking place, by lowering the 
utility of both bidders and vendors. Overall, in the absence of technological information 
asymmetry, as CPMs allow buyers to improve their utility, such deal currency should be 
preferred over a classical lump sum. On this setting, the contingent payment equals a fraction 
(from 0.0 to 1.0) of the cash flow generated by the target firm on a pre-specified date. 
Choi (2015) developed a two stage game-theoretic model for an M&A context with the 
purpose of addressing the question of how the post-closing stage influences the design of 
optimal CPMs. The authors drafted two different settings (one in which vendors holds private 
information, and one where bidders and sellers hold different expectations on future profit 
generation by the target firm) and showed that CPMs will be structured with the purpose of 
minimizing the deadweight loss resulting from a smaller incentive component and that, when 
there is a small valuation gap between acquirer and vendors, parties may actually forego from 
using a CPM. Similarly to Lukas et al. (2012), the contingent payment is also fixed and paid 
at a given pre-determined date on this model. 
Overall, the literature reveals that there is still room for progressing analytical research on 
CPMs in two different ways. Firstly, by cataloguing and valuing alternative designs for 
CPMs, and secondly by expanding such analytical tools to an EF context. We intend to 
address these two issues on the coming sections. 
3.2. A taxonomy for Contingent Payment Mechanisms 
Recent news on M&A deals reveal that CPMs may present several distinctive features. 
For example, on the recent acquisition of GlaxoSmithKline’s oncology products unit by 
Novartis, completed on March, 2015, whose total consideration amounted to 16 billion 
dollars in cash, Zephyr reported that up to 1.5 billion dollars are contingent on the results of 
the Combi-D trial, a Phase III study evaluating the safety and efficacy of the combination of 
Tafinlar and Mekinist against BRAF monotherapy. Differently, on the acquisition of the 
Portuguese assets of Portugal Telecom from Oi, which was completed on June, 2015, Altice 
offered a total consideration of 7.03 billion euros, including 800 million euros contingent on 
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revenue milestones being met. Moreover, on the acquisition of the price comparison site 
uSwitch that was completed on May, 2015, the property search portal Zoopla offered a total 
consideration of 130 million British pounds, including a “potential payment of up to 30 
million British pounds for uSwitch’s management dependent on achievement of certain 
financial performance targets for fiscal 2016”, according to Zephyr.   
Such cases illustrate that different types of CPMs should be put in place for different 
circumstances. On the sale of the oncology business unit held by GlaxoSmithKleine to 
Novartis, a variable payment up to 1.50 billion dollars was put in place contingent on the 
accomplishment of a relevant research and development initiative, which is due when the 
results of such ongoing research are known. On the sale of the Portuguese assets held by 
Portugal Telecom to Altice, one might argue that the 800 million euros contingent payment 
served as a mechanism for narrowing a potential valuation gap. Finally, on the acquisition 
uSwitch by Zoopla, the contingent payment is explicitly aimed at providing an incentive to 
uSwitch’s management, who also sold their stakes to Zoopla, to achieve certain financial 
targets. 
We propose a simple, but still not exhaustive, taxonomy for CPMs, which is aimed to 
cover the most common cases and which is essentially defined by the key financial terms of 
a contingent payment: its amount and its due date. On the one hand, we understand that the 
amount of the contingent payment might be fixed, i.e., irrespective of the completion rate of 
the performance benchmark that triggers the contingent payment (e.g., a contingent payment 
of one million euros if revenues by the end of the first twelve months after deal completion 
reach or surpass five million euros) or variable, i.e., dependent on the completion rate of the 
performance benchmark (i.e., a given multiple on the excess revenue between the first twelve 
months after deal completion and the last twelve months prior to deal completion). On the 
other hand, we understand that contingent payments might be due at the term of the CPM 
period (as in the case for uSwitch, i.e., subject to the performance of the 2016 fiscal year) or 
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at hit (as in the case for GlaxoSmithKleine), i.e., at the moment in which the performance 
benchmark is achieved19. Our taxonomy is then summarized on Table 5. 
  Due Date 
  At Hit At Term 
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t 
V
ar
ia
b
le
 
Variable at Hit 
CPM 
Variable at Term  
CPM 
F
ix
ed
 
Fixed at Hit 
CPM 
Fixed at Term 
CPM 
Table 5. A taxonomy for Contingent Payment Mechanisms 
We understand that these two CPM segmentation variables pose different challenges from 
a valuation and analytical perspective – as we will depict in section 3.3 – and primarily serve 
two different purposes within the context of an M&A or Entrepreneurial Financing process. 
The due date essentially addresses valuation gaps when parties set the contingent payment 
to be due at term, as at the moment of deal completion they may diverge on expectations 
regarding future performance of the target firm within a specific time-frame, yielding a direct 
impact on settling an agreement regarding firm valuation. In this setting, parties may “agree 
to disagree” and wait for time to resolve their gaps on firm performance and firm valuation 
(Kohers and Ang, 2000). When set at hit, CPMs foremost privilege the provision of 
incentives to vendors or target management to pursue a certain goal. Alternatively, CPMs 
which are due at hit may also be suitable when the moment in which the attainment of given 
milestone or performance benchmark does not depend on the willingness or effort of the 
                                                 
19 Notwithstanding, we argue that even when due at hit, CPMs require parties to define a given time period 
under which they allow the contingent payment to take place. 
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parties to pursue that goal (e.g., a license to operate a given plant, to which all the 
requirements were fulfilled by the target firm, and whose issuance is currently pending by 
public authorities). 
The amount primarily addresses the perception of parties regarding the attainment of the 
contingent payment triggers and their willingness to benefit (or lose) from potential 
performance upsides or downsides. When they are set in a way in which they do not replicate 
fixed contingent payments20, variable contingent payments may allow vendors to start 
profiting from the contingent payment when lower levels of performance are achieved by the 
firm (i.e., minimizing the down-side risk, if a CPM is put in place), and to exceed the payoff 
of a fixed contingent payment, when performance benchmarks are beaten by far (i.e., 
maximizing the upside potential, if a CPM is put in place).  
Other potential variables for classifying CPMs are grounded on the underlying asset (for 
example, whether the CPM is based on a financial or on an operating measure or event, such 
as obtaining a pending license), on the underlying method of payment (for example, cash, 
shares of the acquiring firm or shares of the target firm), on the number of contingent 
payments to take place (for example, parties can set one single contingent payment, or a set 
of contingent payments to take place throughout several years), or on the different types of 
performance benchmarks – fixed, moving or cumulative – as proposed by Reum and Steele 
(1970). 
We argue that within an Entrepreneurial Financing context, CPMs stand for a valuable 
framework to engage Entrepreneurs and VCs to support an investment opportunity held by a 
previously established Entrepreneurial Firm. 
On the one hand, if parties accept to split firm ownership according to the face value of 
their equity contributions, Entrepreneurs may argue that VCs would be benefiting from an 
                                                 
20 For example, when a contingent payment, due on a pre-determined moment of time, equals a given 
multiple on the revenues in excess of a given performance benchmark, there is no difference between variable 
and fixed contingent payments. 
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arbitrage gain equal to the difference between the fair value of the equity stake that the VC 
obtained in the company, and the amount of the actual equity contribution made by the VC. 
On the other hand, the volatility of the underlying profit flow of the Entrepreneurial Firm 
and its growth opportunity advises VCs to be cautious on valuing Entrepreneurial Firms and 
accepting up-front share or cash premiums. CPMs may then allow these two parties to “agree 
to disagree” (Kohers and Ang, 2000) on firm valuation, by letting time resolve part of the 
uncertainty that the VC faces when investing on the Entrepreneurial Firm and letting actual 
(instead of expected) firm performance set the amount of the cash premium that the 
Entrepreneur should be entitled to. 
3.3. Contingent Payment Mechanisms and Entrepreneurial 
Financing decisions 
In this section, we extend the analytical framework to support decision-making and 
determine investment timing in EF processes introduced on the previous Chapter, with the 
purpose of establishing the grounds for investigating how CPMs may influence their 
outcomes. Therefore, we first briefly present the real options model which we will make use 
throughout the paper and show how CPMs might be valued and introduced on such 
framework. We then derive the optimum investment timing conditions that allow 
Entrepreneurs and VCs to jointly and simultaneously support the execution of a given growth 
strategy by an Entrepreneurial Firm. 
3.3.1. A real options framework for Entrepreneurial Financing decisions 
with Contingent Payment Mechanisms 
Building on the previous Chapter, the setting comprises one Entrepreneurial Firm, owned 
by a single Entrepreneur, which generates positive profits and holds a Growth Opportunity, 
defined by an expansion of its current profit flow (named as 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 >  1) and a given capital 
expenditure (named as 𝑘 >  0). Assuming that neither the Entrepreneur nor the 
Entrepreneurial Firm have access to debt financing, such capital expenditure should be 
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funded through an equity round backed by the Entrepreneur, who is assumed to own limited 
resources, and by an external financier, who is assumed to be a VC with no funding 
constraints. VCs are then assumed to provide the part of the required equity that the 
Entrepreneur is not able to provide. 
In this setting, 𝑘 𝑖 > 0 stands for the amount of capital initially invested by the 
Entrepreneur on the Entrepreneurial Firm, 𝑘𝑎 <  𝑘 stands for the amount of additional capital 
that the Entrepreneur is willing to deploy on the Entrepreneurial Firm, 𝑘 >  0 is the amount 
of the total capital expenditure required for executing the growth strategy and (𝑘 – 𝑘𝑎) is the 
amount of capital to be deployed by the VC on the Entrepreneurial Firm. Parties are assumed 
to split firm ownership after carrying the equity round according to the amount of capital that 
each of the parties contributed to the Entrepreneurial Firm. As a result, post-equity round 
firm ownership held by the Entrepreneur is denoted by 0 <  𝑄𝐸  <  1 and 𝑄𝐸 =
𝑘𝑖+𝑘𝑎
𝑘𝑖+𝑘
, while 
post-equity round firm ownership held by the VC is denoted by 0 <  𝑄𝑉𝐶  <  1 and 𝑄𝑉𝐶 =
𝑘−𝑘𝑎
𝑘𝑖+𝑘
= 1 − 𝑄𝐸.   
The Entrepreneurial Firm generates a continuous-time profit flow (𝜋), which is assumed 
to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) diffusion process given by: 
 𝑑𝜋 = 𝛼𝜋𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝜋𝑑𝑧 (3.1) 
where 𝜋 >  0, 𝛼 and 𝜎 stand for the trend parameter (i.e., the drift) and to the 
instantaneous volatility, respectively. Additionally, assuming that agents are risk neutral, 
𝛼 =  𝑟 –  𝛿, where 𝑟 >  0 is the risk-free rate and 𝛿 >  0 stands for the asset yield. Finally, 
𝑑𝑧 is the increment of a Wiener process. Entrepreneurs and VCs are assumed to understand 
that the continuous profit flow (𝜋) follows the same stochastic process. 
3.3.1.1. The option to invest on the Growth Opportunity held by the 
Entrepreneur 
Following the contingent-claim approached used by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the value 
of the option held by the Entrepreneur to invest in the growth opportunity of the 
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Entrepreneurial Firm, 𝐸(𝜋), must satisfy the following Ordinary Differential Equation 
(ODE): 
 1
2
𝜎2 𝜋2 𝐸′′(𝜋) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝜋 𝐸′(𝜋) − 𝑟 𝐸(𝜋) + 𝜋 = 0 (3.2) 
where the last term on the left hand side of equation (3.1) refers to the current profit flow 
of the Entrepreneurial Firm and the remaining terms refer to the growth option held by the 
Entrepreneurial Firm. The general solution for (3.1) comes: 
 𝐸(𝜋) = 𝐴𝜋𝛽1 + 𝐵𝜋𝛽2 +
𝜋
𝛿
 (3.3) 
where 𝐴 and 𝐵 are constants to be determined, while 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the roots of the 
fundamental quadratic, given by: 
 
𝑄𝐸(𝛽) =
1
2
𝜎2 𝛽 (𝛽 − 1) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝛽 − 𝑟 = 0 (3.4) 
i.e. 
 
𝛽1 =
1
2
−
(𝑟 − 𝛿)
𝜎2
+√(
𝑟 − 𝛿
𝜎2
−
1
2
)
2
+
2𝑟
𝜎2
> 1 (3.5) 
 
𝛽2 =
1
2
−
(𝑟 − 𝛿)
𝜎2
−√(
𝑟 − 𝛿
𝜎2
−
1
2
)
2
+
2𝑟
𝜎2
< 0 (3.6) 
Assuming that 𝜋𝐸
∗  stands for the optimal profit trigger to obtain Entrepreneur’s support to 
the growth opportunity, and considering that, in order to execute the growth strategy, 𝑄𝐸  <
 100%, and naming 𝐶𝑃𝑀(𝜋) as the contingent payment mechanism set between parties, the 
problem must be solved by considering the following boundary conditions: 
 𝐸(0) = 0 (3.7) 
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𝐸(𝜋𝐸
∗ ) =
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 . 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝛿
. 𝑄𝐸 − 𝑘𝑎 + 𝐶𝑃𝑀(𝜋𝐸
∗ ) (3.8) 
 𝐸′(𝜋𝐸
∗) =
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝛿
. 𝑄𝐸 + 𝐶𝑃𝑀′(𝜋𝐸
∗ ) (3.9) 
Respecting condition (3.7) and noting that 𝛽2  <  0, then 𝐵 on the equation (3.3) must be 
equal to zero. Therefore, for the remaining of this paper, 𝛽 ≡  𝛽1. The unknowns 𝐴 and 𝜋𝐸
∗  
are obtained by combining conditions (3.8) and (3.9), i.e., the value matching and the smooth 
pasting conditions, respectively. Notice that the value matching condition held by the 
Entrepreneur is positively influenced by the CPM that was set between the parties. Solutions 
for the optimal profit trigger and for the option to invest on the growth opportunity depend 
on the specification defined for 𝐶𝑃𝑀(𝜋), and shall be presented on the following sections 
for each of four major different types of CPMs we previously introduced. 
The economic interpretation of condition (3.8) is straightforward. When the Entrepreneur 
invests in such growth opportunity, she or he is entitled to a 𝑄𝐸 fraction of the value of the 
Entrepreneurial Firm after exercising the option to expand (i.e, 
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃.𝜋𝐸
∗
𝛿
), and to a future 
contingent payment given by 𝐶𝑃𝑀(𝜋), at the expense of a cash outflow of 𝑘𝑎. Condition 
(3.13) will resemble this same interpretation by taking the perspective of the VC, which shall 
not only bear a cash outflow of (𝑘 – 𝑘𝑎) but will also be liable on a future contingent 
payment given by 𝐶𝑃𝑀(𝜋). 
3.3.1.2. The option to invest on the Growth Opportunity held by the VC 
The value of the option to invest on the growth opportunity held by the VC, given by 
𝑉𝐶(𝜋), should also satisfy an ODE, as shown in equation (3.10) below. However, unlike the 
Entrepreneur, this option does not include the current profit flow 𝜋 of the Entrepreneurial 
Firm, as VCs can only profit by undertaking the Growth Opportunity, and not from existing 
firm profitability, when they decide not to participate in this growth strategy.  
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 1
2
𝜎2 𝜋2 𝑉𝐶′′(𝜋) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝜋 𝑉𝐶′(𝜋) − 𝑟 𝑉𝐶(𝜋) = 0 (3.10) 
The general solution for (3.10) is: 
 𝑉𝐶(𝜋) = 𝐶𝜋𝛽1 + 𝐷𝜋𝛽2 (3.11) 
where 𝐶 and 𝐷 are constants to be determined, while 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the roots of the 
fundamental quadratic, as presented in equations (3.5) and (3.6). Similarly to the 
Entrepreneur, the boundary conditions are as follows: 
 𝑉𝐶(0) = 0 (3.12) 
 
𝑉𝐶(𝜋𝑣
∗) =
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 . 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝛿
. 𝑄𝑉𝐶 − (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) − 𝐶𝑃𝑀(𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ ) (3.13) 
 𝑉𝐶′(𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ ) =
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝛿
. 𝑄𝑉𝐶 − 𝐶𝑃𝑀′(𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ ) (3.14) 
where 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗  stands for the optimal profit trigger to support the growth strategy for the VC 
firm. Respecting condition (3.12) and noting that 𝛽2  <  0, then 𝐷 on equation (3.11) must 
be equal to zero and, as before, 𝛽 ≡  𝛽1. Differently to the Entrepreneur case, notice that the 
value matching condition stated on equation (3.13) will be negatively affected by the CPM. 
The unknowns 𝐶 and 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗   are obtained by combining conditions (3.13) and (3.14), i.e., 
the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions, respectively. Solutions for the optimal 
profit trigger and for the option to invest on the growth opportunity depend on the 
specification defined for 𝐶𝑃𝑀(𝜋). 
3.3.2. Aligning Entrepreneurs, VCs and Growth Opportunities through 
Contingent Payment Mechanisms 
We are interested in determining the conditions under which Entrepreneurs and VCs 
would be willing to jointly support the growth opportunity held by the Entrepreneurial Firm, 
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i.e., the conditions under which 𝜋𝐸
∗ = 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ . From a deal structuring perspective, parties can 
reach such an agreement either by pre-determining all  deal terms – including firm ownership 
and any eventual up-front share consideration or premium, as in the previous Chapter – or 
by choosing to let part of definite deal terms be contingent on future performance benchmarks 
of the Entrepreneurial Firm.  
The relevance of this issue within an EF context is highlighted by the fact that post-equity 
round firm ownership is assumed to be split according to the equity contributions made by 
the Entrepreneur and the VC, even though the value of the assets in place held by the 
Entrepreneurial Firm might be greater than the face value of his equity contributions prior to 
executing the growth strategy (i.e., 
𝜋
𝛿
 might be greater than or, more generally, might be 
different from ki). 
On the other hand, and differently from a typical M&A context, Entrepreneurial Financing 
decisions allow the Entrepreneur to retain a portion of the ownership of the Entrepreneurial 
Firm and, therefore, significantly profit from the value creation effects generated by the 
growth opportunity. In fact, without an outside investor that would allow Entrepreneurs to 
obtain the indispensable resources to execute the envisaged growth strategy, the value of their 
option to invest in the Growth Opportunity would be equal to zero. 
These two forces shall drive how CPMs are set, and we are specifically interested in 
understanding how CPMs can be designed in such a way that 𝜋𝐸
∗ = 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ . With this purpose, 
we now analytically define each of the four major CPMs we previously introduced. 
Broadly, and following the option analogy, we regard CPMs as binary call options and 
not as common call options on stock (Bruner and Stiegler, 2014), since their payoffs are 
actually discontinuous, i.e., either a fixed amount, or a variable amount linearly dependent 
on the value of its underlying asset.  
Therefore, we analytically define fixed amount CPMs as cash-or-nothing call binary 
options, as the Entrepreneur is entitled to obtain a fixed amount of cash if the Entrepreneurial 
Firm achieves or exceeds a given performance benchmark. Concerning variable amount 
CPMs, we introduce two relevant assumptions. First, taking into account that 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 >  1 
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stands for the expected expansion of the profit flow generated by the Entrepreneurial Firm 
following the exercise of the option to invest in the growth opportunity, we assume that 
performance benchmarks (which we will name as 𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁  >  𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 >  1) are grounded on the 
profitability of the Entrepreneurial Firm – and not on an operating measure or other financial 
measure different from profits – given by 𝜋. Second, we assume that the Entrepreneur will 
be entitled, in this case, to a multiple (𝑚 >  0) on the excess profit that the Entrepreneurial 
Firm generates over a given benchmark. Considering these two assumptions, we define 
variable amount CPMs as asset-or-nothing call binary options, as the underlying asset of 
this binary option is the profitability of the Entrepreneurial Firm itself. 
As a result, when computing the conditions under which 𝜋𝐸
∗ = 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ , fixed amount CPMs 
require determining the amount of cash (named as 𝜃) that might be due to Entrepreneurs 
while variable amount CPMs require determining the multiple (named as 𝑚) on the excess 
profitability that will determine the amount of the contingent payment. 
Concerning due date, and taking into account the considerations for valuing fixed and 
variable amount CPMs we presented, when CPMs are due at term, contingent payments 
might be modelled as traditional binary options (Hull, 2012), while when CPMs are due at 
hit, contingent payments should be modelled as binary barrier options (Rubinstein and 
Reiner, 1991, Rubinstein, 1992). In the case of CPMs due at term, we will assume this term 
is exogenously determined by parties and given by 𝑡 >  0. In the case of CPMs due at hit, 
we will assume that parties exogenously set a time period under which the Entrepreneur 
might be entitled to the CPM (given by 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥), i.e., a time period under which the parties 
agree that if the performance benchmark is set, the Entrepreneur is entitled to the contingent 
payment. 
Throughout the Chapter, subscripts will be used to indicate the type of CPM to which a 
given function or variable refers to, by first indicating the acronym for the CPM amount, 
using an 𝐹 for fixed amount CPMs and a 𝑉 for variable amount CPMs, and then by indicating 
the acronym for the CPM due date, using a 𝑇 for CPMs due at term and a 𝐻 for CPMs due 
at hit. Subscripts are not used when such function or variable is not affected by the type of 
CPM it may refer to. 
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In Table 6, we summarize the key CPM specifications that will be used for valuing each 
of the four major types of CPMs we introduced, and for analysing the conditions under which 
𝜋𝐸
∗ = 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ . 
  Due Date 
Alignment 
Variable   At Hit (H) At Term (T) 
A
m
o
u
n
t 
V
ar
ia
b
le
 (
V
) CPMVH 
 
Asset-or-Nothing Binary 
Barrier Option 
CPMVT 
 
Asset-or-Nothing Binary 
Option 
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given 
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ix
ed
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F
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Cash-or-Nothing Binary 
Barrier Option 
CPMFT 
 
Cash-or-Nothing Binary 
Option 
θ 
 
i.e., the 
amount of the 
contingent 
payment 
Table 6. Alternative specifications for Contingent Payment Mechanisms 
Four relevant considerations should be highlighted at this point. First, based on the 
seminal work by Black and Scholes (1973), each of the four specifications is consistent with 
the underlying stochastic process that governs the profit flow of the Entrepreneurial Firm, 
i.e., a Geometric Brownian Motion. Second, with our approach we intend to highlight the 
role that uncertainty may hold on determining how parties value CPMs and not on how CPMs 
may influence the behavior and effort of Entrepreneurs and VCs towards the accomplishment 
of the performance benchmarks, as in Lukas et al. (2012). Third, and unlike the previous 
Chapter, we do not intend to point out how asymmetric expectations on profit growth may 
govern the agreement between Entrepreneurs and VCs with the purpose of supporting the 
growth opportunity held by the Entrepreneurial Firm. Notwithstanding, the closed-form 
solutions which we will derive on the following sub-sections should also exist when parties 
hold different expectations on profit growth. Finally, within the real options framework 
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previously presented for analyzing EF decisions, it is assumed that, when obtaining support 
to the growth strategy, the Entrepreneurial Firm immediately spends the total capital 
expenditure requirements (named as 𝑘) and immediately records an increase in its 
profitability to 𝜋∗. 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃. As a result, model outcomes should be carefully interpreted when 
the underlying growth strategy is expected to be put in place throughout a long period or 
when its payoffs shall only become visible on a far future. 
On the following sections we will present, for each of the four major CPMs we introduced, 
how each contingent payment instrument is valued, the option to invest on the growth 
opportunity for Entrepreneurs and VCs, their underlying profit triggers and the optimum 
contingent payment 𝜃 or optimum contingent payment multiple 𝑚 that would allow 
Entrepreneurs and VCs to jointly support the Growth Opportunity held by the Entrepreneurial 
Firm. 
3.3.2.1. Fixed Contingent Payment at Term 
The value of this CPM is taken as a cash-or-nothing call (Hull, 2012) as follows: 
 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝑇 = 𝜃𝐹𝑇 𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑁(𝑑2𝐹𝑇) (3.15) 
where 
 
𝑑2𝐹𝑇 = 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃. 𝜋
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇𝜋
∗) + 𝑡(𝑟 − 𝛿 −
𝜎2
2 )
𝜎√𝑡
 
(3.16) 
𝑁(𝑧) stands for the cumulative normal density function, 𝜋∗ stands for the profit trigger, 𝜋 
stands for the current profit, 𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇 stands for the profit growth expansion benchmark for 
triggering the contingent payment and 𝜃𝐹𝑇 stands for the amount of the contingent payment. 
Note that in the moment in which parties exercise their option to invest in the growth 
opportunity (i.e., when 𝜋𝐸 = 𝜋𝐸
∗  and 𝜋𝑉𝐶 = 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ ), the current profitability of the 
Entrepreneurial Firm is 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 . 𝜋
∗, and the profitability benchmark is given by 𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇𝜋
∗. 
Therefore, when computing 𝜋𝐸
∗  and 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗ , 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 .  𝜋
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇 .  𝜋∗
) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 .  𝜋
∗
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇 .  𝜋∗
) in equation 
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(3.16), implying that 𝑁(𝑑2𝐹𝑇 ) does not depend on 𝜋 and that  
𝜕𝑁(𝑑2𝐹𝑇) 
𝜕𝜋
= 0. This will allow 
closed-form solutions to be derived for each of the value functions of the option to invest in 
the growth opportunity, for each of the profit triggers and for the optimum CPM that will 
allow parties to jointly support the Growth Opportunity21. 
As a result, by combining equations (3.8) and (3.15) and accordingly with (3.9) at this 
stage, we obtain the value matching and smooth pasting conditions that allow us to derive 
the option to invest on the growth opportunity held by the Entrepreneur in the presence of a 
fixed amount CPM due at term, as well as the profit trigger held by the Entrepreneur to invest 
in the Growth Opportunity given by 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝑇
, i.e. 
 
𝐸𝐹𝑇(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 
((𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑄
𝐸 − 1)
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝑇
𝛿
+ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝑇 − 𝑘
𝑎)(
𝜋
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝑇
)
𝛽
+
𝜋
𝛿
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 <  𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝑇  
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑄
𝐸
𝜋
𝛿
+ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝑇 − 𝑘
𝑎, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥  𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝑇 
 (3.17) 
where 
 
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝑇
=
𝑒−𝑟𝑡(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛽𝛿 (𝜃𝐹𝑇 𝑁(𝑑2𝐹𝑇) − 𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑎)
(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑘𝑎 + 𝑘𝑖))(𝛽 − 1)
 (3.18) 
Similarly, by combining equations (3.13) and (3.15) alongside with (3.14), we obtain the 
value matching and smooth pasting conditions that allow us to derive the option to invest on 
the Growth Opportunity held by the VC in the presence of a fixed amount CPM due at term, 
as well as the profit trigger held by the VC to invest in the Growth Opportunity given by 
𝜋𝑉𝐶𝐹𝑇
∗ , i.e. 
 
𝑉𝐶𝐹𝑇(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑄
𝑉𝐶
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝑇
𝛿
− 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝑇 − (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎)) (
𝜋
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝑇
)
𝛽
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 <  𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝑇
  
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝜋
𝛿
𝑄𝑉𝐶 − 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝑇 − (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥  𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝑇
 
 (3.19) 
                                                 
21 Note that if the profitability benchmark is exogenously determined and not dependent on 𝜋∗ – meaning 
that 𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇𝜋
∗ would be replaced by a constant in equation (3.16) – 𝜕𝑁(𝑑2𝐹𝑇) 𝜕𝜋⁄  would be have to be 
numerically determined. As a result, profit triggers both for Entrepreneurs and VCs alongside optimum CPM 
design would be obtained by numerical procedures. The same reasoning applies to the remaining CPMs 
presented on the following sections. 
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where 
 
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝑇
=
𝑒−𝑟𝑡(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛽𝛿 (𝜃𝐹𝑇  𝑁(𝑑2𝐹𝑇) + 𝑒
𝑟𝑡(𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎))
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎)(𝛽 − 1)
 (3.20) 
By equating 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝑇
= 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝑇
 – i.e., equations (3.18) and (3.20) – and solving for 𝜃𝐹𝑇, we 
obtain the optimum fixed contingent payment at term that would enable both Entrepreneurs 
and VCs to jointly support the Growth Opportunity. 
 
𝜃𝐹𝑇
∗ =
𝑒𝑟𝑡(𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑖(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1))
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1) (𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝑁(𝑑2𝐹𝑇)
 (3.21) 
3.3.2.2. Variable Contingent Payment at Term 
For valuing this CPM, we will assume that the amount of the contingent premium equals 
a given multiple 𝑚 over all the profit in excess of the existing profitability prior to executing 
the growth strategy. This is the reason why on equation (3.22), we not only introduce the 
variable 𝑚 to account for the contingent payment multiple but also the term (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃  −  1) to 
account for the fact that the contingent payment will be computed on the excess profitability 
prior to the growth strategy. 
This CPM is then taken as an asset-or-nothing call (Hull, 2012), as that the Entrepreneur 
will be entitled to a fraction or a multiple of the underlying asset, i.e., the profit generated by 
the Entrepreneurial Firm. 
 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑇 = 𝑚𝑉𝑇 𝜋 (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)𝑒
−𝛿𝑡𝑁(𝑑1𝑉𝑇) (3.22) 
where 
 
𝑑1𝑉𝑇 = 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 . 𝜋
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑇 . 𝜋
∗) + 𝑡(𝑟 − 𝛿 +
𝜎2
2 )
𝜎√𝑡
 
(3.23) 
Following the same approach of the previous section, whereby we consider that at the 
moment in which parties decide to invest in the growth opportunity 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 .  𝜋
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑇.  𝜋∗
) =
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𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑇
), we may obtain the value of the option to invest in the Growth Opportunity to 
the Entrepreneur and to the VC, alongside each of their optimum investment profit triggers, 
by combining equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.22) for the Entrepreneur, and by combining 
equations (3.13)(3.14) and (3.22) for the VC, as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑉𝑇(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 
((𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑄
𝐸 − 1)
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝑇
𝛿
+ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑇 − 𝑘
𝑎)(
𝜋
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝑇
)
𝛽
+
𝜋
𝛿
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 <  𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝑇
  
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑄
𝐸
𝜋
𝛿
+ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑇 − 𝑘
𝑎 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥  𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝑇
 
 (3.24) 
where 
 
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝑇
=
𝑒𝑡𝛿𝑘𝑎(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛽𝛿 
(−𝑒𝑡𝛿(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑘𝑎 + 𝑘𝑖)) + (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝑚𝑉𝑇 𝛿 𝑁(𝑑1𝑉𝑇))(𝛽 − 1)
 (3.25) 
and 
 
𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑇(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝑇
𝛿
𝑄𝑉𝐶 − 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑇 − (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎)) (
𝜋
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝑇
)
𝛽
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 <  𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝑇
  
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝜋
𝛿
𝑄𝑉𝐶 − 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑇 − (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥  𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝑇
 
 (3.26) 
where 
 
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝑇
=
𝑒𝑡𝛿(𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎)(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛽𝛿 
(𝑒𝑡𝛿𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) − (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝑚𝑉𝑇 𝛿 𝑁(𝑑1𝑉𝑇))(𝛽 − 1)
 (3.27) 
Both 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝑇and 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝑇
 present asymptotes dependent on 𝑚𝑉𝑇, which are obtained by finding 
the roots on the denominator of equations (3.25) and (3.27). For such values of 𝑚𝑉𝑇, there is 
no possible agreement between Entrepreneurs and VCs to support a given Growth 
Opportunity.  
For the Entrepreneur, the asymptote on 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝑇 is given by: 
 
𝑚𝑉𝑇 =
2 𝑒𝑡𝛿(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑘
𝑎 + 𝑘𝑖))
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛿 𝑁(𝑑1𝑉𝑇))
 (3.28) 
For the VC, the asymptote on 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝑇
 is given by: 
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𝑚𝑉𝑇 =
𝑒𝑡𝛿𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎)
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛿 𝑁(𝑑1𝑉𝑇))
 (3.29) 
By equating 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝑇 = 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝑇
 – i.e., equations (3.25) and (3.27) – and solving for 𝑚𝑉𝑇, we 
obtain the optimum multiple on the CPM due at term that would enable both Entrepreneurs 
and VCs to jointly support the Growth Opportunity. 
 
𝑚𝑉𝑇
∗ =
𝑒𝑡𝛿  (𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) [𝑘 − 𝑘𝑖(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)]
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1) 𝑘 (𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛿 𝑁(𝑑1𝑉𝑇)
 (3.30) 
3.3.2.3. Fixed Contingent Payment at Hit 
Following the approach by Rubinstein and Reiner (1991), this CPM is derived as an up-
and-in cash-or-nothing binary barrier option, assuming that the performance benchmark that 
will trigger the contingent payment is greater than or equal to its current level, as follows: 
 
𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝐻 = 𝜃𝐹𝐻 ((
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝐻 .  𝜋
∗
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃  .  𝜋
)
𝑎+𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝐻 .  𝜋
∗
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃  .  𝜋
)
𝑎−𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥)) (3.31) 
where 
 
𝑎 =  
𝑟 − 𝛿
𝜎2
 (3.32) 
 
𝑏 = √
(𝑟 − 𝛿)2 + 2 log(1 + 𝑟) 𝜎2
𝜎2
 (3.33) 
 
𝑧 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝐻 . 𝜋
∗
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 . 𝜋
)
𝜎√𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥
+ 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 
(3.34) 
Similarly to the previous sub-sections, as 
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝐻  .  𝜋
∗
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 .  𝜋
=
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝐻 .  𝜋
∗
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 .  𝜋∗
 and log (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝐻  .  𝜋
∗
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 .  𝜋
) =
log (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
), we obtain the value of the option to invest in the growth opportunity to the 
Entrepreneur and to the VC, alongside each of their optimum investment profit triggers, by 
combining equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.31) for the Entrepreneur, and by combining equations 
(3.13), (3.14) and (3.31) for the VC, as follows: 
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𝐸𝐹𝐻(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 
((𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑄
𝐸 − 1)
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝐻
𝛿
+ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝐻 − 𝑘
𝑎) (
𝜋
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝐻
)
𝛽
+
𝜋
𝛿
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 <  𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝐻
  
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑄
𝐸
𝜋
𝛿
+ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝐻 − 𝑘
𝑎, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥  𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝐻
 
 (3.35) 
where 
 
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝐻
=
(
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
−𝑏
(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛽𝛿  [𝜃𝐹𝐻 (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑎
[𝑁(−𝑧) (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
2𝑏
+𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥)] − 𝑘𝑎 (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑏
]
(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑘
𝑎 + 𝑘𝑖))(𝛽 − 1)
 
(3.36) 
and 
 
𝑉𝐶𝐹𝐻(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝐻
𝛿
𝑄𝑉𝐶 − 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝐻 − (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎)) (
𝜋
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝐻
)
𝛽
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 <  𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝐻
  
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝜋
𝛿
𝑄𝑉𝐶 − 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝐻 − (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥  𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝐻
 
, (3.37) 
where 
 
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝐻
=
(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛽𝛿 
[
 
 
 
 
1 +
𝜃𝐹𝐻 (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑎−𝑏
((
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
2𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + 𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥))
𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎
]
 
 
 
 
 
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝛽 − 1)
 
(3.38) 
By equating 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝐹𝐻
= 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝐹𝐻
 – i.e., equations (3.36) and (3.38) – and solving for 𝜃𝐹𝐻, we 
obtain the optimum fixed contingent payment at hit that would enable both Entrepreneurs 
and VCs to jointly support the Growth Opportunity. 
 
𝜃𝐹𝐻
∗ =
(
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑏−𝑎
(𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎) [𝑘 − 𝑘𝑖(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)]
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) [(
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
2𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + 𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥)]
 (3.39) 
3.3.2.4. Variable Contingent Payment at Hit 
Taking this CPM as an up-and-in asset-or-nothing binary barrier option, we follow 
Rubinstein (1992) to analytically derive the value of this contingent asset, considering that 
the profit benchmark is equal or greater than its current value, as follows: 
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𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝐻 = 𝑚𝑉𝑇 𝜋 (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)((
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻.𝜋∗
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃. 𝜋
)
𝑎+𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻.𝜋∗
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃. 𝜋
)
𝑎−𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥)) (3.40) 
where 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑧 are defined in equations (3.32), (3.33) and (3.34), respectively. 
Considering that (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻.𝜋
∗
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 .𝜋
) = (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
) as before, we obtain the value of the option to invest 
in the growth opportunity to the Entrepreneur and to the VC, alongside each of their optimum 
investment profit triggers, by combining equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.40) for the 
Entrepreneur, and by combining equations (3.13), (3.14) and (3.40) for the VC, as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑉𝐻(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 
((𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑄
𝐸 − 1)
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝐻
𝛿
+ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝐻 − 𝑘
𝑎) (
𝜋
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝐻
)
𝛽
+
𝜋
𝛿
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 <  𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝐻
  
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑄
𝐸
𝜋
𝛿
+ 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝐻 − 𝑘
𝑎, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥  𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝐻
 
, (3.41) 
where 
 
𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝐻
=
(
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑏
𝑘𝑎  (𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) 𝛽𝛿  
(𝑚𝑉𝐻 𝛿 ( 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑎
[(
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
2𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + 𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥)] − (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑏
(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑘𝑎 + 𝑘𝑖))) (𝛽 − 1)
 (3.42) 
and 
 
𝑉𝐶𝑉𝐻(𝜋) =
{
 
 
 
 
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝐻
𝛿
𝑄𝑉𝐶 − 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝐻 − (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎)) (
𝜋
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝐻
)
𝛽
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 <  𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝐻
  
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝜋
𝛿
𝑄𝑉𝐶 − 𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝐻 − (𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜋 ≥  𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝐻
 
, (3.43) 
where 
 𝜋𝑉𝐶∗ 𝑉𝐻 =
 𝛽 
[
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖)𝛿
−
𝑚𝑉𝐻 (
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑎−𝑏
(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)((
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
2𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + 𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥)
𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎 ] (𝛽 − 1)
 
(3.44) 
As in the variable amount due at term CPM, there are both asymptotes on 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝐻
 and 
𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝐻
, which are, respectively, given by: 
 
𝑚𝑉𝐻 =
(
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑏−𝑎
[𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑘
𝑎 + 𝑘𝑖)]
𝛿 (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) ((
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
2𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + 𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥))
 (3.45) 
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𝑚𝑉𝐻 =
(
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑏−𝑎
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃(𝑘 − 𝑘
𝑎)
𝛿 (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)(𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) ((
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
2𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + 𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥))
 (3.46) 
By equating 𝜋𝐸
∗
𝑉𝐻
= 𝜋𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑉𝐻
 – i.e., equations (3.42) and (3.44) – and solving for 𝑚𝑉𝐻, we 
obtain the optimum multiple on the CPM due at hit that would enable both Entrepreneurs 
and VCs to jointly support the Growth Opportunity. 
 
𝑚𝑉𝐻
∗ =
(
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
𝑏−𝑎
(𝑘 − 𝑘𝑎)[𝑘 − 𝑘𝑖(𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1)]
𝛿 (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 1) 𝑘 (𝑘 + 𝑘𝑖) ((
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
)
2𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + 𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥))
 (3.47) 
3.4. Numerical example 
We now illustrate the economic intuition behind the results introduced on the previous 
section through a numerical example. We start by listing the numerical assumptions we use 
in Table 7, and by summarizing the model outputs regarding investment timing and the 
design of CPMs. We conclude this section by presenting a set of sensitivities on some of the 
key value drivers. 
Risk Parameters  Capital and Growth Opportunity  Contingent Payment Mechanism 
Variable 
Numerical 
Assumption 
 Variable 
Numerical 
Assumption 
 
Variable 
Numerical 
Assumption 
𝑟 
 
𝜎 
 
𝛿 
0.04 
 
0.30 
 
0.08 
 𝑘𝑖  150.00 
 
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑇 2.50 
 𝑘𝑎 275.00 
 
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝑇 , 𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐹𝐻 , 𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝐻 2.75 
 𝑘 500.00  𝑡 2.00 years 
 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 2.50 
 
𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 5.00 years 
Table 7. Numerical assumptions 
By combining the risk parameters 𝑟, 𝛿 and 𝜎, we obtain 𝛽 =  2.28 through equation (3.5), 
and by combining 𝑘𝑖, 𝑘𝑎 and 𝑘, we obtain 𝑄𝐸  =  65.4% and 𝑄𝑉𝐶  =  34.6%, following the 
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approach introduced in section 3.3.1. We have also set the profit benchmark for the variable 
amount at term CPMs (𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑉𝑇) equal to the expected profit growth (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃), assuming that the 
amount of this contingent payment would be grounded on all excess profit above the expected 
growth. 
3.4.1. Contingent Payment Mechanisms and optimum investment timing 
Results on the optimum CPM design – comprising both optimum amount for fixed 
contingent payments and optimum multiple for variable contingent payments – alongside 
their underlying profit triggers (𝜋∗) are presented in Table 8. 
Our numerical example shows that CPMs which are due at hit should present lower 
multiples or fixed amounts then those due at term, when parties understand that profit 
benchmarks should be attainable in the short-term or, equivalently, when they understand 
that the probability of profits staying below the benchmark (or reverting to levels below the 
benchmark) at term is significant, considering the underlying uncertainty on the profit flow 
of the Entrepreneurial Firm. 
  Key Assumptions Optimum CPM Design 
CPM 
Supporting 
Equations 
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃 𝑒𝐶𝑈𝑅 𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁 𝜃
∗ 𝑚∗ 𝝅∗ 
𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝑇 
(3.18), (3.20), 
(3.21)  
2.50 2.50 2.75 258.57 - 47.52 
𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑇 
(3.25), (3.27), 
(3.28) 
2.50 2.50 2.50 - 3.65x 47.52 
𝐶𝑃𝑀𝐹𝐻 
(3.36), (3.38), 
(3.39) 
2.50 2.50 2.75 74.81 - 47.52 
𝐶𝑃𝑀𝑉𝐻 
(3.42), (3.44), 
(3.45) 
2.50 2.50 2.75 - 1.87x 47.52 
Table 8. Illustration of optimal Contingent Payment Mechanism design 
In fact, results reveal that 𝜃𝐹𝑇
∗  is more than triple than 𝜃𝐹𝐻
∗ , while 𝑚𝑉𝑇
∗  is slightly more than 
double than 𝑚𝑉𝐻
∗ , even when the latter comprises a higher profit benchmark (2.75 against 
2.50). The practical implication of this result is that, CPMs which are due at term should lead 
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to higher contingent payments than CPMs which are due at hit, when their underlying 
performance benchmarks are likely to be achieved before the term22. 
3.4.2. Contingent Payment Mechanisms and the value of the investment 
opportunity to the Entrepreneur 
In the previous section, we showed that, when CPMs are optimally set, optimum 
investment timing is the same for each of the four alternative CPMs. However, as different 
CPMs are differently valued, their underlying value of the investment opportunity should 
differ. This argument also holds from Table 7, since the same optimum fixed contingent 
payments present different amounts when due at term or at hit, and same applies to optimum 
variable contingent payments, whose multiples differ when payments are due at term or at 
hit. 
From the perspective of the Entrepreneur, we posit that CPMs which are due at hit should 
be more valuable than those which are due at term, controlling for the likelihood of the profit 
benchmark to be achieved (i.e., the closer 
𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃
𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁
 is to 1) and that variable contingent payments 
should be more valuable than their fixed counterparties, as they may generate a positive 
payoff for lower levels of profitability and may generate a higher payoff than fixed amount 
contingent payments when profitability exceeds its underlying threshold. From the 
perspective of the VC, the converse argument should hold.  
                                                 
22 Moreover, we find that optimum investment timing is independent of CPM selection, as 𝜋 ∗ =  47.52 for 
each of the different alternative CPMs. In fact, this would also stand for the profit trigger of a central planner 
who would look into the option to invest in this growth opportunity by aggregating the option to invest in this 
growth opportunity, which is held by the Entrepreneur and the VC. As CPMs stand for an asset on the option 
to invest in the growth opportunity held by the Entrepreneur and for an equal liability on the option to invest in 
the growth opportunity held by the VC, these offset each other from the aggregate perspective of a central 
planner, whose optimum investment triggers would then remain unchanged to those computed by Entrepreneurs 
and VCs. 
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Figure 7. Value of the investment opportunity held by the Entrepreneur for each type of Contingent Payment Mechanism 
In Figure 7, and further assuming that 𝑚 =  4.0 and that 𝜃 =  150.00, we illustrate this 
intuition on the value of the investment opportunity held by the Entrepreneur for the range 
𝜋 <  𝜋∗. Dashed lines stand for CPMs which are due at hit while normal lines stand for 
CPMs which are due at term. 
3.4.3. Profit growth expectations and profit triggers 
More aggressive profit growth expectations are expected to decrease profit triggers, 
making the investment opportunity more attractive both to the Entrepreneur and to the VC. 
We may observe such relationship in Figure 8, as we plot the profit trigger to invest on the 
growth opportunity (𝜋∗) against the expected profit growth (𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃), when parties engage into 
optimum CPM design. For simplicity, we plot a single curve for all the different CPMs, since 
all of their profit triggers are the same. 
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Figure 8. Profit growth expectations and profit triggers when Contingent Payment Mechanisms are optimally designed 
3.4.4. Volatility, value of the investment opportunity to the Entrepreneur 
and profit triggers 
Uncertainty of future business performance is taken as one of the main reasons behind the 
use of CPMs, as mentioned in section 3.1. We will now illustrate, within the framework we 
introduced, how uncertainty influences investment timing and the value of option to invest 
in the growth opportunity for each of the CPMs we derived. For this purpose, we will keep 
the assumptions that 𝑚 =  4.0, that 𝜃 =  150.00 and further assume that the current profit 
of the Entrepreneurial Firm is 𝜋0 =  30.00. In Figure 9, we show how profit triggers are 
affected by uncertainty from the perspective of the Entrepreneur, plotting a single curve for 
all the different CPMs, as before. In Figure 10, we plot volatility against the value of the 
investment opportunity held by the Entrepreneur, for each of the four major CPMs we 
derived. 
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Figure 9. Volatility and profit triggers when Contingent Payment Mechanisms are optimally designed 
As expected, Figure 9 reveals that additional volatility increases the profit triggers 
required by Entrepreneurs and VCs to support the investment opportunity, while, from the 
Entrepreneur’s perspective, Figure 10 reveals that, in the presence of CPMs, growing 
volatility generates additional value to the investment opportunity. For lower levels of 
volatility, results similar to those in section 3.4.2 hold, implying that CPMs which are due at 
hit are more valuable to those which are due at term, and variable amount CPMs are more 
valuable than fixed amount CPMs. 
However, for higher levels of volatility, we observe that the value of the investment 
opportunity with a fixed amount CPM which is due at hit actually converges to the value 
fixed amount CPM which is due at term, since for very high levels of uncertainty, the 
probability of the profit threshold to be hit before the term, converges to the probability of 
the profit threshold to be hit at the term. 
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Figure 10. Profit flow volatility and value of the investment opportunity held by the Entrepreneur 
3.4.5. Profit benchmarks and value of the investment opportunity to the 
Entrepreneur 
As profit benchmarks affect the likelihood of a contingent payment to become firm, a 
negative relationship between both is expected to be found. Keeping the assumptions that 
𝑚 =  4.0, 𝜃 =  150.00 and 𝜋0  =  30.00 we illustrate this in Figure 11, where we plot the 
value of the option held by the Entrepreneur to invest in the Growth Opportunity against a 
range of profit benchmarks above the expected profit growth (i.e., 𝑒𝐵𝐸𝑁 > 𝑒𝐸𝑋𝑃), and in 
Figure 12, where we plot the relationship between a range of profit benchmarks and the 
optimum multiple for a variable CPM due at term. A similar relationship on optimum 
multiple behaviour would be visible for a variable CPM due at hit. 
Figure 11 shows that profit benchmarks negatively influence the value of the investment 
opportunity to the Entrepreneur, while, conversely, Figure 12 reveals that profit benchmarks 
positively affect the optimum contingent payment multiple on a variable amount CPM due 
at term. 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
300
400
500
600
Profit Flow Volatility
V
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
In
v
e
s
tm
e
n
tO
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
E
Fixed CPM at Term
Variable CPM at Term
Fixed CPM at Hit
Variable CPM at Hit
74 
 
Figure 11. Profit benchmarks and value of the investment opportunity held by the Entrepreneur 
 
 
Figure 12. Profit growth benchmarks and optimum multiples in variable amount Contingent Payment Mechanisms due at 
term 
3.4.6. Due dates and optimum contingent payments 
By analysing fixed amount CPMs, we now intend to illustrate how due dates may affect 
contingent payment design and, particularly, the amount of the contingent payment that 
should be set by Entrepreneurs and VCs so that the Entrepreneurial Firm obtains their joint 
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support to proceed with the envisaged growth strategy. Similar results would hold to variable 
amount CPMs, in which we would observe analogous outputs on optimum contingent 
payment multiples. 
Assuming that 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  𝑡, Figure 13 reveals that the contingent payment period holds a 
different effect for CPMs which are due at hit and CPMs which are due at term. While for 
CPMs due at term, longer contingent payment periods lead to higher optimum amounts, 
CPMs which are due at hit present lower optimum amounts. 
The intuition behind this result lays on the fact that longer payment periods increase the 
probability of the profit benchmark to be achieved at any moment within the payment period, 
therefore making more valuable CPMs which are due at hit. When CPMs are due at term, 
longer payment periods actually stand for a longer deferred payment whose present value is 
inferior. In addition, in CPMs due at term, the underlying performance measurement is made 
at a specific moment of time and, therefore, in this sense less probable than for CPMs which 
are due at hit. 
 
 
Figure 13. Due dates and optimum θ (assuming 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  𝑡) 
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3.5. Discussion of the results 
Model outputs illustrated on the previous section are generally consistent with those in 
prior literature. The impact of uncertainty on CPM design and optimum investment timing 
shown in section 3.4.4 and the impact of the contingent payment period on the amount of the 
optimum contingent payment illustrated in section 3.4.6 is broadly similar to the hypothesis 
derived by Lukas et al. (2012). As an increase in uncertainty leads to an increased value of 
the option to invest in the growth opportunity held by the Entrepreneur, results in section 
3.4.6 are also consistent with Mantecon (2009), Ragozzino and Reuer (2009) and Lukas and 
Heimann (2014), in the sense that these authors predict that an increase in uncertainty 
increase the attractiveness of CPMs. 
The impact of the profit benchmark on CPM design we introduced in section 3.4.5 differs 
from Lukas et al. (2012), as these authors developed a framework for M&A decisions which 
involve an initial payment to the vendor of the target firm, instead of an equity issuance. 
Therefore, Lukas et al. (2012) argue that a trade-off might exist between such initial payment 
and the amount of a fixed contingent payment, when profit benchmarks increase. We 
conjecture that Lukas et al. (2012) would obtain a similar result to ours in a setting without 
initial payment. 
Our results show that, when optimally designed, different CPMs are equivalent when it 
comes to determining optimum investment timing, as profit triggers revealed to be the same 
for each of the four alternative CPMs we investigated23. As a result, the choice of which CPM 
should be set between Entrepreneurs and VCs should actually be driven by variables which 
are exogenous to the framework we designed, such as: 
 
− Liquidity constraints on the VC side could limit the amount of funds available for 
deploying on a given investment opportunity or condition the timing within which 
                                                 
23 By following the approach from the previous Chapter, it could also be shown that an optimum up-front 
share premium would also have the same profit triggers than those presented for the different CPMs. 
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such funds are available (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Such variable could lead a 
preference for a mechanism whose expected amount is lower or for a mechanism 
that would increase the chance of its underlying liability to be financed through 
the Entrepreneurial Firm itself; 
 
− Time constraints on the VC side, given that the underlying VC cycle may condition 
the amount and the timing of the contingent liabilities that it may be able to accept 
at the moment in which the investment opportunity is being screened. In particular, 
a VC would not be allowed to bear a contingent liability which might be due after 
the fund term; 
 
− Liquidity preferences on the Entrepreneur side, which may favor a deal structuring 
mechanism in which she or he would be entitled to an up-front cash in, instead of 
a contingent payment or even an up-front share premium; 
 
− Risk preferences on the Entrepreneur side may drive the choice between an up-
front cash in, and a fixed or a variable contingent payment. Risk-averse 
Entrepreneurs should prefer up-front payment mechanisms to contingent 
payments, settle lower benchmarks for triggering contingent payments and may 
reveal a preference for fixed amount CPMs, that protect them against down-side 
performance; 
 
− Credit risk may play a role in analyzing a potential CPM. Entrepreneurs may 
regard CPMs as deferred payment mechanisms (such as vendor loans) and may 
therefore subject the acceptance of this contingent asset to a proper assessment of 
the credit risk of the VC and of the CPM that may minimize such risk; 
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− Post-deal performance measurement and integration may restraint the settlement 
of CPMs, as deal terms may reduce the perception of decision-control held by the 
Entrepreneur – meaning that potential performance might be influenced by 
decisions taken by the VC and affect the probability of a contingent payment to 
take place – and lead to the establishment of discretionary expenses, profit 
decisions or a new corporate organization that may affect the ability of the parties 
to properly measure the future performance of the Entrepreneurial Firm (Bruner 
and Stiegler, 2014); 
 
− Overall deal terms require both Entrepreneurs and VCs to agree on a wide set 
financial and non-financial terms (including compensation, performance bonuses, 
value-adding roles by VCs, and corporate governance), which generate a set of 
negotiation trade-offs and lead to different choices of CPMs. 
3.6. Chapter summary 
In this Chapter we discussed how Contingent Payment Mechanisms (also known as 
Contingent Earn-Outs) enable of EF decisions. First, we presented a taxonomy of contingent 
payment mechanisms, by combining features regarding their term and amount. Second, we 
introduced each of these alternative mechanisms on the real options framework for analysing 
Entrepreneurial Financing decisions derived on the previous Chapter. 
We concluded that, when optimally designed, different contingent payment mechanisms 
are equivalent in obtaining joint support from Entrepreneurs and VCs regarding optimum 
investment timing and, therefore, that the choice on the optimum mechanism to use depends 
on variables which are exogenous to the model, such as liquidity preferences or constraints, 
timing requirements, post-deal integration or overall deal terms. 
On the following Chapter, and leaving aside the debate on how Entrepreneurs and VCs 
may be supportive of EF decisions, we will take a public policy perspective on the Start-up 
Firm (SuF) financing segment, with the purpose of discussing which might be the most 
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effective mechanism that Governments may put in place in order to promote investment 
volumes on this specific firm segment.   
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4. Should Public Venture Capitalists invest, 
co-invest, or not invest in Start-up Firms? 
Public Venture Capital (PVC) initiatives are popular amongst Governments worldwide. 
In Europe, and according to the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA24), PVC 
investment stood for 1.1% of total investment amounts in Private Equity (PE) and Venture 
Capital (VC) and 8.0% of total investment volumes between 2007 and 2014, with a record 
high being reached in 2014, both in terms of investment amounts (2.6%) and investment 
volumes (10.3%)25. In the United States, the Government created the first PVC programs in 
the 1970s (Leicht and Jenkins, 1998, Jenkins and Leicht, 1996) and launched the Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program in the 1980s, which provided over 7 billion 
dollars to small high-technology firms between 1983 and 1997 (Lerner, 1999), and has been 
extended by the Congress since 2000 and until 2017. Argentina (Butler et al., 2015), Australia 
(Lerner and Watson, 2008), Canada (Brander et al., 2008, Ayayi, 2004), Chile (Murray, 2007, 
Avnimelech and Teubal, 2008), New Zealand (Murray, 2007), Israel (Avnimelech et al., 
2010, Avnimelech and Teubal, 2008), Portugal (Jeng and Wells, 2000), Spain (del-Palacio 
et al., 2012) and Taiwan (Chen et al., 2012) also established similar PVC initiatives, most of 
which targeting Entrepreneurial Firms on the early stage/ high-tech segment.  
Why should Governments sponsor such PVC initiatives aimed at funding young and 
innovative Entrepreneurial Firms? On the one hand, investment opportunities held by such 
                                                 
24 EVCA was recently renamed as “Invest Europe”. 
 
25 Figures from “EVCA Yearbook – European Private Equity Activity in 2014”. Sample includes Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United 
Kingdom. It is worth mentioning that Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania 
and Ukraine do not record any PVC volumes or amounts during the 2007-2014 period. 
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Entrepreneurial Firms are deemed to hold positive externalities, in the sense that returns from 
their R&D expenditures may actually exceed their private returns (Lerner, 1999, Lerner, 
2002). Knowledge generated within such context is hardly appropriable and intellectual 
property protection is limited in Entrepreneurial Firms. As a result, private returns lag behind 
social returns leading to under-investing on this firm segment (Peneder, 2008)26. On the other 
hand, investing in Entrepreneurial Firms requires significant information asymmetry risks to 
be mitigated by Independent Venture Capitalists27 (IVCs28). By investing in such 
Entrepreneurial Firms, PVCs provide a signaling or certification effect (Lerner, 2002, 
Guerini and Quas, 2016) to private investors which might be relevant for IVCs to assess their 
willingness to participate in future equity rounds. Additionally, the establishment of PVC 
initiatives might be particularly relevant on the nascent stages of the VC industry, by allowing 
investment professionals to be trained and then moved to private VC organizations (Lerner, 
1999)29. This not only contributes to a lower informational gap on VC as an asset class itself, 
but also to promote the investment on the Entrepreneurial Firms segment, as such investment 
professionals become acquainted with this early-stage market segment both from a demand 
and supply side perspective. Finally, as a result of its vast economies of scale (Murray, 1998), 
VC fund economics feature strong incentives for General Partners (GPs) to abandon early-
stage equity finance as their track-record allows them to sustain their presence on the market. 
                                                 
26 Peneder (2008) lists a set of institutional mechanisms to overcome the under-investing phenomenon in 
Entrepreneurial Firms, including (i) the establishment of an effective system of intellectual property rights, (ii) 
the existence of public research centers that favor industrial applications over long run and (iii) the provision 
of public subsidies to innovation. 
 
27 Independent Venture Capitalists (IVCs) should be more accurately mentioned as Private Venture 
Capitalists, as this category comprises the broader range of VCs, such as Captive Venture Capitalists, Corporate 
Venture Capitalists, Institutional Venture Capitalists and Informal Venture Capitalists (Sapienza & Villanueva, 
2007). However, throughout this paper we are particularly interested in analyzing the behavior of non-captive 
(i.e., independent) VC organizations and, for the sake of convenience, we will adopt acronym IVC with the 
purpose of more easily distinguish from PVC. 
 
28 We will use the acronym IVC throughout the Chapter interchangeably either to refer to “Independent 
Venture Capital” or “Independent Venture Capitalists”, depending on context. 
 
29 Please refer to the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) example which we refer on this section. 
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Independent GPs have the incentive to focus on significantly increasing the amount of funds 
under management – with the purpose of maximizing their management fees – and on 
minimizing monitoring and portfolio risk (Murray, 2007) – in order to increase the 
probability of providing consistent returns on investment. The investment record of early-
stage funds is poor (EVCA, 2014) – with 10-year internal rate of returns standing for 1.32% 
on the VC segment against 9.63% on the buyout segment as of 31st December 201330. 
Moreover, small, early-stage funds have a series of structural weaknesses that hinder their 
potential risk-adjusted profitability. These funds face higher due diligence and monitoring 
costs, need to provide high levels of management support and guidance to investees, have a 
more limited ability to fully benefit from diversification, bear higher ownership dilution risks, 
and present a skewed risk/ return profile which requires exceptional successes to be generated 
within the portfolio so that an attractive risk-adjusted return is provided to their Limited 
Partners (LPs). In addition, they are unable to attract the largest and most professional LPs31 
and hold limited ability in recruiting experienced professional investment executives 
(Murray, 2007, Lawton, 2002, Hood, 2000). 
The combination of positive externalities, information asymmetry risks and VC fund 
economics lead to a market failure on the Entrepreneurial Financing segment (Murray, 2007, 
van der Schans, 2015, Giacomo, 2004), which motivates public authorities to intervene on 
the VC market. Such intervention should target the provision of equity – in order to close this 
                                                 
30 This result holds a wide range of possible interpretations, which should be put into perspective. First, the 
focus of PVC initiatives on the early-stage segments and their presumable inability to generate adequate risk-
adjusted returns might be driving down returns on the VC segment as a whole. Still, further data on returns on 
PVC funds and their investment strategy would be required to assess such assertion. Second, the persistence of 
low returns on the VC segment might contradict the market failure hypothesis, in the sense that low returns 
stand for a sign that IVCs are actually allocating excessive amounts of cash to this firm segment. IVCs might 
be accepting excessive share premiums on the equity rounds they support, or might be unable to find 
Entrepreneurs willing to accept the appropriate share premiums for the risk that IVCs accept to bear when 
investing in this firm segment. 
 
31 Large institutional LPs typically seek for bigger-ticket fund allocations, so that these may have an 
influential impact on their overall fund performance. As early-stage fund sizes tend to be small when compared 
to other PE and VC segments, they become less attractive to large institutional LPs. 
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equity gap32, 33 – when efficient IVCs avoid the Entrepreneurial Firm segment due to an 
unattractively priced investment proposal34, or should target the improvement of 
entrepreneurial quality and context (Lerner, 2010), when IVCs avoid this segment due to an 
insufficient supply of investment opportunities35 (Murray, 2007, Mason and Brown, 2013, 
Mason and Harrison, 2001). 
Criticism on PVC initiatives highlight that such instruments may primarily serve interest 
groups or politicians seeking for private benefits. As a result, Entrepreneurial Firms may seek 
transfer payments that increase profits, by conducting transfers to politically connected 
companies, while Governments may seek to select firms based on their likely success, 
regardless of their actual need for capital. In this case, Governments launch PVC initiatives 
so that they can claim credit on the success of the investees, even when their marginal 
contribution to value creation is low (Lerner, 2002, Lerner, 1999).  
According to Harrison and Mason (2000), Giacomo (2004) and Murray (2007), 
Governments may intervene on the VC market either through a direct intervention36 – where 
                                                 
32 Murray (1995) distinguishes two different types of equity gaps: the initial equity gap, which describes the 
financing problems faced by Start-up Firms looking for seed capital and the second equity gap, which happens 
at a stage when initial seed or start-up capital is exhausted and no additional equity providers are prepared to 
provide follow-on financing. 
 
33 Interestingly, research carried by Da Rin et al. (2006) on a set of 14 European countries found no evidence 
of a shortage of supply of VC funds in Europe. 
 
34 This seems to be the case of Italy, where Colombo et al. (2007) carried an empirical research on a net of 
550 NTBFs, whose results “only partially confirm the relevance of founders’ competencies as important drivers 
of VC investment decisions”, suggesting the presence of other inefficiencies in the VC market. 
 
35 Murray (2007) illustrates the inexistence of attractive investment opportunities by citing a set of statistics 
relating to the proportion of small business owners seeking for external financing, and the proportion of Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) that point easy access to finance as their primary concern. 
 
36 One of the most original forms of public intervention on the Entrepreneurial Financing markets is pictured 
by Ayayi (2004), who assessed the performance of the Canadian LSVCFs (Labor-Sponsored Venture Capital 
Funds). These operated similarly to open-ended mutual funds, were capitalized by individual investors and had 
a regional focus. Significant tax benefits were awarded to investors with the purpose of committing their capital 
for eight years to inherently risky SMEs. LSVCFs were managed by labor unions or federations and had the 
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a PVC organization is established and the Government simultaneously assumes the role of a 
GP and of a LP – or through an indirect intervention, where IVCs act on behalf of the 
Government. In this case, Governments essentially act as LPs and may establish equity 
enhancement schemes. Within these, Governments may subsidize the operating costs of VC 
funds, co-invest with private LPs matching their requirements, be willing to accept a capped 
return, concede a buyout option for private LPs, underwrite part of all of the risk of financial 
loss borne by GPs and LPs and enhance the internal rates of return earned by private LPs by 
accepting a reordering of cash-flows, so that public LPs are the first to provide capital and 
the last to have their capital reimbursed37. 
Given that Governments may let their decision-making process be influenced by the 
dynamics of political conditions, indirect or hybrid interventions on the Entrepreneurial 
Financing markets are seen as a best practice (Gilson, 2003, Lerner, 2010). In addition, PVC 
organizations might be hindered by their inability of hiring and retaining appropriate 
investment professionals or their incapacity of learning and benefiting from their own 
investment experience. As a result, PVCs become less capable of providing valuable advice38 
                                                 
purpose to fulfill a set of social goals, including job creation and regional economic development. Results reveal 
that even though LSVCFs were able to attract significant amounts of capital due to its tax benefits, their 
performance was significantly poor when compared to a wide range of benchmarks (from sectorial mutual funds 
to stock indexes) due to poor management and fund regulations. Still, Ayayi (2004) found evidence that 
LSVCFs did not use their funds to aggressively price their deals and that were able to deploy their capital into 
local communities. 
 
37 Governments may also engage on a fund of funds initiative, which may specifically target Entrepreneurial 
Firms or other firms of policy interest. Examples include the Fonds de Promotion pour le Capital Risque – 
FPCR established in France with 150 million euros under management in 2001 and the UK High Technology 
Fund, established in 2000 by the British Government with £ 126 million under management, of which £ 20 M 
were provided by Public Authorities. 
 
38 Value creation effects from IVCs on investee led academia to discuss whether IVCs provide a treatment 
effect – i.e., whether their monitoring and advice activities actually contribute to improve their performance 
(Hellmann and Puri, 2002) – or benefit from a selection effect, in which experienced IVCs evidence better 
performance since they are able to select the best deals (Bertoni, 2011; Croce et al., 2013). Still, Cumming and 
Fischer (2012) analyzed the contribution of a non-profit business advisory center in Canada, having found that, 
in this case, public funded business advisory services to Entrepreneurial Firms are positively associated with 
firms’ sales growth, patents, finance and alliances. 
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to their portfolio firms and are therefore less prone to generate benchmark returns. Moreover, 
and depending on their size and on how the industry matures, PVC organizations might 
negatively influence the institutional framework of the local VC industry – especially when 
it is still nascent – by crowding out private investors (Munari and Toschi, 2015) and offering 
finance below an appropriate risk premium (Jääskeläinen et al., 2007). Hence, taking into 
account the previously described features of VC fund economics and the risk/return profile 
of early stage investing, only by providing more attractive profit expectations to private LPs 
may Governments actually contribute to narrow the equity gap (Gilson, 2003, Hirsch, 2006, 
Jääskeläinen et al., 2007). By co-investing pari passu with other private LPs, Governments 
merely help VC funds reaching their minimum efficient scale (Murray, 2007)39. 
Several studies attempt to empirically assess the impact and the performance of the wide 
range of PVC initiatives worldwide. Beuselinck and Manigart (2007) analyzed the relevance 
of PVC investment on a set of ten European countries for the 1989 to 2003 period, having 
concluded that early stage and high-tech VC investments are higher in countries where PVC 
initiatives are more important, that PVC programs are less dependent on economic cycles 
than IVC investments – providing a contribution to stabilize a traditionally cyclical industry 
– and that PVC investment is negatively correlated with the number of listings on the local 
stock market40. Similar results were obtained by Jeng and Wells (2000). Leleux and 
Surlemont (2003) found that PVCs do not favor labor-intensive industries, nor even that 
                                                 
39 Lerner (2010) points out other policy principles that should govern the functioning of PVC initiatives, 
including (i) the establishment of efficient technology transfer offices, (ii) the acceptance of the generalized 
accepted standards regarding partnerships and preferred stock structures, (iii) the establishment of shorter lead 
times on the public-side regarding shared decision-making processes with IVCs, and (iv) the establishment of 
evaluation initiatives of public programs. 
 
40 Michelacci and Suarez (2004) and Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2007) show that the presence of liquid stock 
markets allow VCs to exit from their portfolio companies more easily and allow VC financing to become more 
attractive to Entrepreneurs, since VC control ownership is expected to last for a more limited period of time. 
By enabling a faster turnover of portfolio firms, liquid portfolio markets allow a larger rate of firms to be backed 
by IVCs. Carpentier et al. (2010) analyze the Canadian experience on the TSX Venture Exchange – a public 
equity market for newly created companies with no history or sales are allowed to list – with the ultimate goal 
of “graduating” its best performers to the main exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). These authors 
found that the returns of this “public VC market” are able to compete with the private ones. 
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PVCs co-invest their investments less than IVCs. Alongside del-Palacio et al. (2012) whose 
study focused on the Spanish market, as well as Jeng and Wells (2000) and Brander et al. 
(2014) whose samples compare developed countries worldwide, Leleux and Surlemont 
(2003) found no support to the crowding-out hypothesis of PVC initiatives, having in turn 
obtained empirical evidence to support the opposite assertion. The authors showed that PVCs 
actually lead to a spillover on the flow of private investors into the VC markets and found a 
positive association between PVC volumes and later-stage deals, in general41. Differently, 
Munari and Toschi (2015) empirically investigated the performance of PVC funds according 
to three performance measures – exit rate and IVC attraction rate, through staging and 
syndication – having found support for the crowding-out hypothesis and having showed that 
PVCs exhibit lower performance than their private peers42,43. Similar results on performance 
and on the crowding-out hypothesis were obtained by Cumming and MacIntosh (2006), when 
studying the impact of the LSVCFs established in Canada. 
                                                 
41 Lerner (1999) also provides positive guidance on the impact of PVC initiatives performed by the SBIR 
program in the United States, as well as Cumming (2007), who observed that the Innovation Investment Fund 
(IIF) set up by Australia facilitated investment in start-up, early stage and high tech firms, alongside the 
provision of monitoring and value-added advice to investees. On a set of seven European countries, Luukkonen 
et al. (2013) found no statistically significant difference between the performance of firms held by PVCs and 
IVCs. However, the contributions of IVCs funds proved to be significantly higher than those of PVCs regarding 
the development of the business idea, professionalization and exit orientation. 
 
42 Munari and Toschi (2015) argue that the reason behind the poor performance of the PVC initiatives is 
grounded on the existence of unclear, multiple and conflicting goals for PVCs – from local development, to 
employment, entrepreneurial culture or industry restructuring – which incentivize self-serving behaviors and 
low PVCs accountability for selecting and monitoring high-quality firms (Fisher, 1998; Hood, 2000). In 
addition, PVCs are not able to attract and retain talented investment professionals – when compared to IVCs – 
and are therefore unable to positively influence the performance of their portfolio companies. This restraints 
the ability of PVCs  to attract private LPs as investors or private GPs as co-investors, since these form limited 
profit expectations. Finally, PVCs frequently support regional investment initiatives, driving investment to less 
innovative regions and underachieving companies, subordinating financial objectives to policy goals (Mason 
and Pierrakis, 2013). In fact, such regional VC funds tend to establish contacts in their neighborhoods, whose 
value creation resources might be less valuable when compared to other regions, leading to unintended effects 
that may contradict the aims of closing regional disparities in risk finance and entrepreneurship (Harrison and 
Mason, 2000; Sunley et al., 2005). 
 
43 Munari and Toschi (2015) based their research on a sample of 628 VC-backed companies in the United 
Kingdom, from 1998 to 2007, in which they are able to distinguish PVCs between regional and governmental 
types. 
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Munari and Toschi (2015) also point out that PVC initiatives may actually serve the 
purpose of encouraging the involvement of qualified GPs and LPs in depressed regions 
(Sunley et al., 2005, Mason and Harrison, 2003, Murray, 1998). Such catalyst effect is 
assessed by Brander et al. (2014) and Grilli and Murtinu (2015). The former found that 
enterprises funded both by PVCs and IVCs obtain more investment than enterprises uniquely 
funded by PVCs or by IVCs. The latter studied the impact of PVC on sales of new-
technology-based firms (NTBFs). Results revealed that PVC-backed NTBFs 
underperformed IVC-backed firms, but when PVCs co-invested alongside IVCs, the former 
are able to inflict a positive and statistically significant impact on sales. This is consistent 
with Grilli and Murtinu (2014), who showed that, on a dataset of firms based on the European 
Union, firms held by IVC investors generate a significant and positive performance on sales 
growth, firms held by PVCs record a negligible change on sales, and firms in which IVCs 
and PVCs co-invested – while letting IVCs retaining the lead – also had a positive and 
significant performance on sales. Co-investing exemplifies the establishment of close 
relationships with the IVC community with the purpose of improving the performance of 
PVC initiatives, which is advocated by Hood (2000) and Lerner (2002). 
Overall, the literature provides multiple and dissimilar results on the success of PVC 
programs, leading to the idea that there are no “one-size-fits-all” impacts and that their 
performance is significantly mediated by contextual conditions, not only on the supply-side 
but also on the demand-side.  
In spite of its growing prominence, several authors highlight that public intervention on 
the VC and Entrepreneurial Financing (EF) markets lacks theoretical guidance (Lerner, 1999, 
Avnimelech and Teubal, 2008). Therefore, Governments often undertake programs without 
a clear understanding on the full consequences of their actions and without synchronizing 
political and investment cycles (Gilson, 2003). Murray (2007) understands that a 
standardized evaluation method is “urgently required” for better understanding the impact of 
PVC initiatives, alongside a set of best-in-class programs from which performance 
benchmarks could be derived (Jeng and Wells, 2000). 
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Avnimelech and Teubal (2008) provided a theoretical approach to guide public 
intervention on the Entrepreneurial Financing markets. Grounded on the successful 
initiatives by Israel, Chile and Korea, the authors propose a conceptual three stage model, 
where Government support is crucial on transiting countries from the first stage – where there 
is a direct public support to research and development initiatives – to the third stage, where 
they should essentially provide indirect support to the existing ecosystem of IVCs and 
Entrepreneurial Firms. During the second stage, Governments should simultaneously carry a 
direct, indirect or hybrid intervention, as the privatization of finance is taken as a gradual 
process that should be adapted to the variety of countries’ institutional, cultural and political 
contexts. Such evolutionary perspective was further described in Avnimelech et al. (2010) 
and Lerner and Tag (2013). 
Still, in spite of such conceptual contributions, analytical grounded literature on the topic 
is scarce and, to the best of our knowledge, limited to Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001), 
Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2007) and Wong (2014). However, these do not deal with the topic 
of direct intervention of public authorities on the VC and Entrepreneurial Financing markets, 
but rather with the instruments that public authorities may use in order to indirectly stimulate 
equity financing markets. Other relevant existing theoretical contributions are focused on 
understanding the behavior and performance of private GPs and LPs, but not from a public 
intervention perspective (Liu and Yang, 2015, Sorensen et al., 2014). 
Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2001) designed a partial equilibrium model for analyzing how 
government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies for investing in equipment and 
output subsidies may influence VC activity. Model outputs reveal that a subsidy for investing 
in equipment induce GPs to reduce their managerial support to investee firms, while an output 
subsidy should be neutral regarding professional advice. However, only entrepreneurial 
training provides welfare gains, by decreasing costs to market, and favoring industry output 
alongside firm creation. Still, improving entrepreneurial training holds the downside effect 
of crowding out managerial support from GPs to Entrepreneurial Firms. 
Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2007) set up a two-period model in industry equilibrium with 
the purpose of analyzing how taxes and subsidies may contribute to foster the VC market, in 
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terms of quality and quantity of investees. Corporate income taxes reduce firm creation, even 
when the tax is paid by mature companies, as lowering the value of mature firms diminishes 
the gains from setting up new companies as well. Corporate income taxes will postpone and 
impair the reward to effort in Start-up Firms (SuFs). Since subsidies are independent from 
firm performance, they do not strengthen incentives towards improved entrepreneurship 
quality and even reduce social welfare. Capital gains tax has an ambiguous effect on firm 
creation, while personal income tax holds a positive effect44. From a policy making 
perspective, and alongside Murray (1998), the authors highlight that public policy should be 
designed with the purpose of generating higher quality entrepreneurship, rather than higher 
firm creation volumes. Such theoretical findings are close to those of Holtz-Eakin (2000), 
whose empirical findings showed that introducing preferential tax treatments for VCs would 
not be enough to eliminate the equity gap, but somehow contradict Gompers and Lerner 
(2004), who found evidence of a moderately negative effect on the capital gains tax on VC 
investing and fund raising. 
In a setting where Entrepreneurs are assumed to be risk averse and VCs are assumed to be 
risk-neutral, Wong (2014) highlights how Government intervention on the EF markets 
through tax incentives and regulatory measures may contribute to ameliorate the asymmetric 
information problem between Entrepreneurs and VC. In this model, Governments are then 
able to promote investment volumes, by allowing risk sharing to be shifted between 
Entrepreneurs and VCs. In particular, when tax incentives and regulations are uncertain, and 
efforts by VCs are hidden, Entrepreneurs are shown to transfer part of their risk to VCs, 
which will bear most of the risk of the project. In turn, when tax incentives and regulations 
are available, and entrepreneurial effort is hidden, risk is shifted towards risk averse 
Entrepreneurs, even though optimal entrepreneurial effort is not achieved. Overall, Wong 
                                                 
44 Some of these results are not consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Da Rin et al. (2006) on 
a dataset of 14 European countries. The opening of stock markets provided a positive effect on the development 
of active VC markets, while reductions in the corporate capital gains tax rate increased the share of both high-
tech and early stage investment. Additionally, a reduction in labor regulation also led to a higher share of high-
tech investments and increased public spending on R&D was found not to have significant influence on the 
early stage investment. 
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(2014) reveals that when inputs from one party become hidden, Government intervention 
may drive risks to move to that party, therefore alleviating information asymmetry risks. 
We intend to provide a contribution to fill this literature gap, by taking a real options 
perspective on the decision-making process faced by IVCs, PVCs and Governments in 
general, when considering investing in or subsidizing a certain SuF. In particular, we are 
interested in assessing (i) how optimum investment timing may change between IVCs and 
PVCs, (ii) how a co-investment by IVCs and PVCs might be put in place and how such co-
investment will affect optimum investment timing, and (iii) how a subsidy might be set up 
with the purpose of anticipating optimum investment timing by IVCs. 
On the side of IVCs, we will properly account for the partnership structure that features 
typical VC investing. In this setting, GPs will be compensated by the value creation effect of 
the investment they will back (essentially, the net present value from the investment on the 
SuF) – net of expected taxation on capital gains– and by the performance compensation GPs 
will earn if return on investment exceeds a certain benchmark (i.e., the carried interest). 
When scrutinizing the decision-making process of PVCs, we will take into account that 
taxation is neutral for their capital budgeting process (i.e., tax expenditures borne by SuFs 
stand for tax revenues to the Government), and, based on the literature findings, that 
investments undertaken by PVCs will generate a lower value creation effect than those 
carried by IVCs. In addition, assuming that optimum investment timing by IVCs is observed, 
we consider that PVCs take into account the opportunity cost they bear, as when investing 
on the SuF, PVCs forego the option of not undertaking the investment, waiting for the 
profitability of SuFs to reach the trigger required by IVCs, and providing Governments with 
the benefits from incremental tax revenues without carrying any investment, either through 
a PVC organization or through a subsidy to the Entrepreneurial Firm. Our model explicitly 
deals with such waiting option. 
We will also investigate the co-investment case, where IVCs invest alongside PVCs. We 
show that – on the absence of portfolio risk mitigation procedures, financing constraints, 
perceived investment performance contributions or other drivers of co-investment decisions 
– IVCs would only be willing to co-invest with PVCs if they are able to benefit from an 
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equity enhancement effect, which we will model as a share premium to be offered to IVCs 
by PVCs. Within this context, PVCs would be willing to co-invest and offer a share premium 
to IVCs with the purpose of benefiting from the incremental efficiency on investment 
outcomes and avoiding the opportunity cost borne when fully investing on SuFs by 
themselves. 
Finally, we compare the co-investment case with the subsidy case, in which Governments, 
instead of acting as PVCs, provide a subsidy to SuFs with the purpose of supporting their 
investment, anticipating optimum investment timing from IVCs and benefiting from the 
incremental tax revenues brought by the exercise of such option to invest by IVCs. 
Through a numerical example with representative assumptions on its underlying variables, 
model reveals that co-investment will actually be more effective in anticipating optimum 
investment timing than subsidies. This will allow us to derive a set of empirically testable 
propositions regarding the determinants of PVC, which we will investigate through a dataset 
of European countries. 
This Chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.1, we setup the real options framework 
that will support our investigation and present its underlying economic intuition through a 
numerical example. Based on such insights, we outline the major public policy and 
managerial implications in section 4.3, while in section 4.4, we point out the theoretical 
hypothesis that may govern the relevance of PVC initiatives and render an empirical study 
on their prevalence. We summarize this Chapter in section 4.5. 
4.1. Model 
Our setting comprises one SuF which is expected to generate a flow of profits before 
payroll and taxes named as 𝑥, following a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) diffusion 
process given by: 
 𝑑𝑥 = 𝛼𝑥𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑥𝑑𝑧 (4.1) 
where 𝑥 >  0, 𝛼 stands for the trend parameter (i.e., the drift) and 𝜎 to the instantaneous 
volatility. Considering that agents shall be risk neutral within this setting, 𝛼 =  𝑟 –  𝛿, where 
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𝑟 >  0 is the risk-free rate and 𝛿 >  0 stands for the asset yield. Lastly, 𝑑𝑧 is the increment 
of a Wiener process. 
Assuming that no debt is available to support such investment opportunity, and that the 
Entrepreneur will support an exogenously determined 𝑄𝐸 ∈ (0; 1) fraction of the total capital 
expenditures, the SuF will be seeking for an equity investor – taken as a IVC and/ or a PVC 
– to obtain a capital commitment of 𝑘 >  0. Entrepreneurs and investors are then assumed 
to share firm ownership according to the amount of capital that each party provided to the 
SuF45. 
The SuF will bear payroll costs amounting to 𝑤. 𝑥, where 𝑤 ∈ (0; 1) and corporate 
income tax given by 𝑇𝐶 ∈ (0; 1). Investors will be liable on capital gains tax – named as 𝑇𝐺 ∈
(0; 1) – at the moment in which they will divest from the SuF – given by 𝐸𝐷 >  0 – while 
wages are subject to personal income tax, named as 𝑇𝑃 ∈ (0; 1). 
If the SuF is subsidized by the Government to support the investment, it will get a subsidy 
named as 𝑠𝑢𝑏 ∈ (0; 𝑘). When 𝑠𝑢𝑏 > 0, Entrepreneurs need not to seek for IVCs or PVCs to 
provide 𝑘, but rather 𝑘 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏. As a result, Entrepreneurs retain a 𝑞𝐸 ownership in the SuF, 
given by: 
 
𝑞𝐸 = 𝑄𝐸
𝑘
𝑘 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏(1 − 𝑄𝐸)
 (4.2) 
Notice that when 𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 0, then 𝑞𝐸 = 𝑄𝐸. In this case, external investors will deploy a 
total capital commitment amounting to 𝑘, in exchange for a (1 − 𝑄𝐸) ownership in the SuF. 
For the rest of the paper, and for generalization purposes, we will use 𝑞𝐸 to refer to the 
ownership in the SuF held by the Entrepreneur, irrespective of 𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 0 or 𝑠𝑢𝑏 > 0. 
In the co-investment case, IVCs and PVCs will, respectively, hold a fraction 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 and 
(1 − 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶) of the remaining firm ownership (1 − 𝑞𝐸), while these two parties may agree on 
                                                 
45 Therefore, we implicitly assume that the Entrepreneur is able to offer the Start-up Firm an amount of 
capital equal to 𝑄𝐸×
𝑘
(1−𝑄𝐸)
. 
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a share premium between them, named as 𝑝46,47. Therefore, when illustrating the results on 
the investment case performed by the IVC where no co-investment takes place, we will 
assume that 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 1, 𝑝 = 0 and 𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 0, while when going through the investment case 
performed by the PVC without co-investment, we will assume that 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 0, 𝑝 = 0 and 
𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 0. In section 4.1.3, we analyze the co-investment case, in which 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 will let be 
exogenously determined and 𝑝 will be computed such that IVCs and PVCs hold the same 
optimum investment trigger on 𝑥. 
4.1.1. The option to invest in the Start-up Firm held by the Independent 
Venture Capitalist 
Taking into account the typical structuring of venture partnerships, we assume that this 
investment opportunity shall be screened by an established IVC fund, whose GP is entitled 
to decide whether to invest or not. GPs usually hold a minor stake 𝑖 ∈ (0; 1) on the IVC fund 
and benefit from a performance-based compensation mechanism (i.e., the carried interest). 
Considering that the GP and its IVC fund are already established during investment 
screening, we assume that there are no incremental revenues or costs rising from management 
fees or increasing monitoring costs when GPs exercise the option to invest48. 
                                                 
46 On the co-investment case, 𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 0 and therefore the Entrepreneur will retain a 𝑄𝐸 = 𝑞𝐸 ownership in 
the SuF. 
 
47 As a result, IVCs will retain a (1 – 𝑞𝐸)×(𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 + 𝑝) share on the Start-up Firm, while PVCs will retain a  
(1 − 𝑞𝐸)×(1 − 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝) share on the SuF. Bear in mind that, in the co-investment case, 𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 0 and therefore 
𝑞𝐸 = 𝑄𝐸 . 
 
48 Typically, management fee structure changes throughout fund life. During the investment period, 
management fees are charged over total committed capital, while during the divestment period, they are charged 
over the acquisition cost of portfolio firms. In this sense, it could be argued that deploying a greater amount of 
capital on the acquisition of portfolio firms would lead GPs to perceive an incremental revenue on the 
divestment period, which should be introduced on their decision-making model. However, if GPs are profit-
maximizers, they have strong incentives to fully deploy the committed capital during the investment stage with 
the purpose of maximizing their management fees during the divestment period. As a result, regardless of the 
amount k, GPs will always be seeking for additional investment opportunities to exhaust the committed capital 
and benefit from management-fee maximization. This understanding allows us to consider that management 
fees may not be regarded as incremental revenues during the screening stage of one given investment 
opportunity. Still, and even though that is not the focus of this paper, we acknowledge that when comparing 
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Following the contingent-claim approach presented by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the 
value of the option to invest in the SuF – 𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) – must satisfy the following Ordinary 
Differential Equation (ODE): 
 1
2
 𝜎2 𝑥2 𝐼𝑉𝐶′′(𝑥) + (𝑟 − 𝛿) 𝑥 𝐼𝑉𝐶′(𝑥) − 𝑟 𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) = 0 (4.3) 
The general solution for (4.3) is: 
 𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) = 𝐴 𝑥𝛽1 + 𝐵 𝑥𝛽2 (4.4) 
where 𝐴 and 𝐵 are constants to be determined, while 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the roots of the 
fundamental quadratic, given by: 
 
𝒬 =
1
2
𝜎2𝛽(𝛽 − 1) + (𝑟 − 𝛿)𝛽 − 𝑟 = 0 (4.5) 
i.e. 
 
𝛽1 =
1
2
−
(𝑟 − 𝛿)
𝜎2
+√(
𝑟 − 𝛿
𝜎2
−
1
2
)
2
+
2𝑟
𝜎2
> 1 (4.6) 
 
𝛽2 =
1
2
−
(𝑟 − 𝛿)
𝜎2
−√(
𝑟 − 𝛿
𝜎2
−
1
2
)
2
+
2𝑟
𝜎2
< 0 (4.7) 
Assuming that 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  stands for the optimal trigger for the IVC to exercise the option to 
invest in this investment opportunity, and naming 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) as its pre-capital gains tax net 
present value, 𝑖. 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) as the value of the expected capital gains tax and 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) as the 
value of the carried interest earned by the GP (i.e., its performance based compensation), the 
problem must be solved by considering the following boundary conditions: 
 𝐼𝑉𝐶(0) = 0 (4.8) 
 𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) − 𝑖. 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) + 𝐶𝐼(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) (4.9) 
                                                 
two different investment opportunities, GPs hold an economic incentive to prefer the one requiring the greatest 
amount of capital k.  
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 𝐼𝑉𝐶′(𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶′(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) − 𝑖. 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶′(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) + 𝐶𝐼′(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) (4.10) 
Respecting condition (4.8) and noting that 𝛽2  <  0, then 𝐵 on equation (4.4) must be 
equal to zero. Therefore, 𝛽 ≡  𝛽1. The unknowns 𝐴 and 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  are obtained by combining 
conditions (4.9) and (4.10), i.e., the value matching and the smooth pasting conditions, 
respectively49. The interpretation of the value matching condition is straightforward: at the 
moment in which GPs exercise an option to invest in a SuF, these are entitled to the net 
present value of such investment given by 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ), and to the contribution to its carried 
interest that such investment opportunity will generate – given by 𝐶𝐼(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) – net of the 
capital gains tax GPs are expected to be liable on at the moment in which it divests, given by 
i.𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ). We now analytically define each of these three components. 
First, 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) shall essentially portray the fraction of the payoff on the investment on 
the SuF which is attributable to the GP – given by i. The LPs of the VC fund shall then 
provide (1 − 𝑖)(1 − 𝑞𝐸) fraction of the total capital required by the SuF.  
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) = (
𝑥(1 − 𝑤)(1 − 𝑇𝐶)
𝛿
) (1 − 𝑞𝐸)(𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 + 𝑝)𝑖 − (𝑘 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏)𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶𝑖 (4.11) 
Second, carried interest is contingent on the realized payoff of the investment at the exit 
date. If such a realized payoff exceeds a given hurdle – determined by the hurdle rate ℎ >  0 
– GPs are entitled to a fraction 𝑠 >  0 of that excess payoff. Such divestment is expected to 
occur on the moment 𝐸𝐷 >  050 after the investment is made51. Considering that the payoff 
                                                 
49 Notice that we do not provide closed-form solutions to this system of equations since it is not possible to 
obtain closed-form derivatives for 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ) and 𝐶𝐼(𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ ), as these will depend on the integral of the 
cumulative normal distribution density function in order to t. 
50 “ED” stands for exit date. 
 
51 With the purpose of keeping results as tractable as possible, we assume that when screening a given 
investment opportunity, GPs will take into account the expected value of such performance based 
compensation. Still, the actual carried interest attributable to GP might be pooled against the overall 
performance of the VC fund and not awarded to GPs individually, on each of the realized investments. This is 
more frequent in Europe than in the USA, where carried interest is usually computed and paid to GPs on a deal 
by deal basis. We will briefly discuss the impact of the pooling effect in section 4.3. 
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from such variable compensation resembles that of a call option, we compute 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) similarly 
to Sorensen et al. (2014)52 following the classic approach by Black and Scholes (1973) and 
Scholes (1976). Taking 𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) as the gross return of the IVC fund on the investment and 
𝐻(𝑘) as the hurdle, we have: 
 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) = [𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥)𝑒
−𝛿 𝐸𝐷𝑁(𝑑1𝐶𝐼) − 𝐻(𝑘)𝑒
−𝑟 𝐸𝐷𝑁(𝑑2𝐶𝐼)](1 − 𝑖)(1 − 𝑇𝐶)𝑠 (4.12) 
where 𝑁(𝑧) stands for the cumulative normal distribution density function, and 
 
𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) = (
𝑥(1 − 𝑤)
𝛿
) (1 − 𝑇𝐶)(1 − 𝑞
𝐸)(𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 + 𝑝) (4.13) 
 
𝐻(𝑘) = ∫ (𝑘 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏) 𝑒ℎ 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝐸𝐷
0
 (4.14) 
 
𝑑1𝐶𝐼 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥)
𝐻(𝑘)
) + 𝐸𝐷(𝑟 − 𝛿 −
𝜎2
2 )
𝜎√𝐸𝐷
 
(4.15) 
 𝑑2𝐶𝐼 = 𝑑1𝐶𝐼 − 𝜎√𝐸𝐷 (4.16) 
Finally, and similarly to carried interest, we define 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) as a short position on a call 
option, given that taxation on capital gains is contingent on 𝑥 at the moment in which the 
divestment takes place – since taxation will only occur if divestment consideration exceeds 
the invested capital 𝑘. This is similar to a hurdle on carried interest when ℎ =  0, as shown 
below: 
 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) = [𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥)𝑒
−𝛿 𝐸𝐷𝑁(𝑑1𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶) − 𝑞
𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑘 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏)𝑒−𝑟 𝐸𝐷𝑁(𝑑2𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶)]𝑇𝐺  (4.17) 
                                                 
52 Unlike Sorensen et al. (2014) and for tractability purposes, we did not include the “catch-up” region, in 
which GPs are awarded with a fraction (typically, 100%) of the payoffs above the hurdle until they are entitled 
with the same share s > 0 of the payoffs which are below the hurdle. For similar reasons, we did not account 
for transaction costs which might be borne by IVCs and PVCs both on investment and divestment, including 
potential performance fees due to the management of the portfolio firm (commonly mentioned as “ratchet”). 
Estimates presented by Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) reveal that, on a sample of 635 mergers and acquisitions 
involving public companies from 1985 to 2004, mean advisory fees stand for 0.524% and 0.659% of the deal 
value for acquirers and targets, respectively. We argue that these should be greater on the PE and especially on 
the VC segment, as deals with private firms are smaller and information asymmetries are more severe, driving 
acquirers to undertake relatively more time consuming due diligence procedures. 
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where 𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) is the same as before, and 
 
𝑑1𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐺𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥)
𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑘 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏)
) + 𝐸𝐷(𝑟 − 𝛿 −
𝜎2
2 )
𝜎√𝐸𝐷
 
(4.18) 
 𝑑2𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 𝑑1𝐶𝐺𝑇 − 𝜎√𝐸𝐷 (4.19) 
For generalization purposes – and in order to avoid redundancies with section 4.1.3, where 
we will handle the co-investment case – we kept 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶, 𝑝, and 𝑠𝑢𝑏 on the above formulation. 
However, please bear in mind that, in this case, we will set 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 1, 𝑝 = 0 and 𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 0. 
4.1.2. The option to invest in the Start-up Firm held by the Public Venture 
Capitalist 
PVCs might be regarded as a specific type of VC organization where Governments 
simultaneously act as GPs and LPs (Murray, 2007). Therefore, from a public policy 
perspective, we take PVCs as neutral to carried interest, management fees and any other form 
of GP compensation that might be set on the PVC organization. For an analogous reason, we 
take PVCs as neutral to taxation, since Governments offset the tax expenditures borne by 
portfolio firms through their own tax collection53. In fact, one may regard such incremental 
tax revenues as a proxy of the social welfare generated by the investment opportunity or some 
kind of spillover effect from Government spending. 
Based on the recent literature findings by Grilli and Murtinu (2015) and on the more 
general assessment of public sector inefficiency in output generation (Afonso et al., 2005, 
Afonso et al., 2010, Adam et al., 2011, Gao, 2015), which was also followed by Barbosa et 
al. (2016) on a real options approach to analyze public stimulus for private investment, we 
assume that the value generation effect of the investment undertaken by PVCs will be lower 
                                                 
53 We excluded Social Security charges as an incremental tax revenue in the sense that, unlike other income 
taxes, such incremental revenue leads to an incremental liability to the Government rising from increasing state 
pensions or costs with social protection. Still, Social Security charges stand for an additional cost bore by SuFs 
which hinders their profitability, whose impact on our framework is portrayed by the variable 𝑤. In section 
4.2.2. we present a sensitivity analysis on 𝑤, which might be understood to address the impact of Social Security 
charges on the theoretical hypothesis we derive. 
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than the one by IVCs by (1 –  𝜙) and 𝜙 ∈ (0; 1). This parameter 𝜙 then stands for an 
efficiency gap between PVCs and IVCs. 
In addition, assuming that Government is able to observe the investment behavior of IVC, 
when exercising the option to invest on the SuF, Governments forego the option to wait for 
its profitability 𝑥 to reach 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ , let IVC perform the investment on the SuF and obtain an 
incremental tax revenue, without having to carry any expenditure on the SuF. Therefore, 
when valuing the option to invest in the SuF, Governments take into account this short 
position on this contingent asset, which we value as a cash-or-nothing binary barrier option 
(Rubinstein and Reiner, 1991). These options pay a pre-determined amount of cash – in our 
case, the incremental tax revenues – whether during a certain period of time – given by 𝐸𝐷 
– the underlying asset – given by 𝑥 – reaches a given barrier, which stands for the optimum 
investment trigger held by the IVC, and named as 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ . This opportunity cost is then 
modelled as a short position on a binary barrier option and shall be named as 𝛹(𝑥). 
For similar reasons to the previous section, and except otherwise mentioned, we kept 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶, 
𝑝, and 𝑠𝑢𝑏 on the above formulation. However, please bear in mind that, in this case, we will 
set 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 0, 𝑝 = 0 and 𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 0. 
Following the contingent-claim approach as before, the value of the option held by the 
PVC to invest in the SuF – 𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥) – must satisfy the following ODE: 
 1
2
 𝜎2 𝑥2 𝑃𝑉𝐶′′(𝑥) + (𝑟 − 𝛿) 𝑥 𝑃𝑉𝐶′(𝑥) − 𝑟 𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥) = 0 (4.20) 
The general solution for (4.20) is: 
 𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥) = 𝐶 𝑥𝛽1 + 𝐷 𝑥𝛽2 (4.21) 
where 𝐶 and 𝐷 are constants to be determined, and 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the previously derived 
roots of the fundamental quadratic given by (4.5). 
Considering that 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  stands for the optimal trigger for the PVC to exercise the option to 
invest in the SuF, the problem must be solved by considering the following boundary 
conditions, in which  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥) is net present value of the investment undertaken by the 
PVC, 𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) stands for the incremental tax revenues that the Government benefits from, 
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and 𝛹(𝑥) stands for the opportunity cost borne by Governments from not benefiting from 
the incremental tax revenues that would be obtained if the IVC invested on the SuF instead: 
 𝑃𝑉𝐶(0) = 0 (4.22) 
 𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) + 𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) − 𝛹(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) (4.23) 
 𝑃𝑉𝐶′(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶
′ (𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) + 𝑇𝐴𝑋′(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) − 𝛹′(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) (4.24) 
Respecting condition (4.22) and noting that 𝛽2 <  0, then 𝐷 on equation (4.21) must be 
equal to zero and, as before, 𝛽 ≡  𝛽1. The unknowns 𝐶 and  𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  are obtained by combining 
equations (4.23) and (4.24), i.e., the value matching and smooth pasting conditions, 
respectively. Again, the interpretation of the value matching condition is direct. Similarly to 
IVCs, at the optimum investment timing, PVCs are entitled to the net present value of the 
investment on the SuF, given by 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ). However, unlike IVCs, PVCs benefit from 
additional corporate and personal tax revenues rising from exercising the option to invest on 
the SuF – 𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) – lose the contingent asset 𝛹(𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ), which stands for the incremental 
tax revenues that Governments would obtain if profitability of the SuF reaches 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  and IVCs 
exercise their option to invest, and are not liable on capital gains tax54. We will now depict 
each of these individual components. 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥) is similar to 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥), except for the holding on the SuF – which will be 
(1 − 𝑞𝐸)(1 − 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝) instead of (1 − 𝑞𝐸)(𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 + 𝑝)𝑖 – and for the inefficiency factor on 
the value creation effect of the investment in the SuF. Therefore, we introduce the (1 –  𝜙) 
coefficient, with 𝜙 >  0. 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥) is then defined as follows: 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥) = (
𝑥(1 − 𝜙 − 𝑤)(1 − 𝑇𝐶)
𝛿
) (1 − 𝑞𝐸)(1 − 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 − 𝑝) − 𝑘(1 − 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶) (4.25) 
                                                 
54 We do not include capital gains tax on 𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ), since it would simultaneously stand for a liability at 
divestment date (given by 𝐸𝐷) to the the PVC and an asset (i.e., a tax revenue) to the Government at the 
divestment date. 
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The tax collection brought to Governments and rising from the exercise of the option to 
invest in the SuF is given by 𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥), which will account for either corporate income tax – 
given by 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) – and personal income tax – named as 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) – as follows: 
 𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) + 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) (4.26) 
where 
 
𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) = (
𝑥(1 − 𝜙 − 𝑤)
𝛿
)𝑇𝐶  (4.27) 
 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) =
𝑥𝑤
𝛿
𝑇𝑃 (4.28) 
Assuming that PVC is able to observe 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ , the contingent asset 𝛹(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) stands for a set 
of potential incremental tax revenues to the Government – named ∆𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) – that will be 
valued as a cash-or-nothing binary barrier option (Rubinstein and Reiner, 1991), provided 
that such contingent benefit will only be earned by the Government if 𝑥 hits a certain barrier 
given by 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ . Such incremental tax revenues are obtained by comparing tax revenues when 
𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 =  1 and 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 =  0, as shown in equations (4.33) and (4.34). Incremental tax 
revenues are caused by the higher taxable income generation rate of the IVC on the investee 
firm (which we take as 𝜙) – bringing both incremental corporate income tax and capital gains 
tax revenues to the Government – and by the incremental corporate income tax revenues over 
the carried interest – set as 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) – earned by the GP of the IVC fund. We then have: 
 
𝛹(𝑥) = ∆𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) [(
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑥
)
𝑎+𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧) + (
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑥
)
𝑎−𝑏
𝑁(−𝑧 + 2 𝑏 𝜎 √𝐸𝐷)] (4.29) 
where 
 
𝑎 =  
𝑟 − 𝛿
𝜎2
 (4.30) 
 
𝑏 = √
(𝑟 − 𝛿)2 + 2 log(1 + 𝑟) 𝜎2
𝜎2
 (4.31) 
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𝑧 =
log (
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗
𝑥 )
𝜎√𝐸𝐷
+ 𝑏 𝜎 √𝐸𝐷 (4.32) 
 
∆𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) = ∆𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) + 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥)⏞      
𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 1
, and 
(4.33) 
 
∆𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) =
𝑥𝜙
𝛿
𝑇𝐶 +
𝑇𝐶
1 − 𝑇𝐶
𝐶𝐼(𝑥)⏞  
𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 1
 (4.34) 
4.1.3. The option to co-invest in the Start-up Firm held by the Public 
Venture Capitalist 
On the co-investment case, we let the proportion of capital to be provided by IVCs and 
PVCs – given by 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 and (1 − 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶) – to be exogenously determined, and let IVCs and 
PVCs set the share premium 𝑝55, which will enable both parties to have the same optimum 
investment timing, and co-investment to take place. Such share premium 𝑝 is obtained by 
equating their respective triggers 𝑥∗and solving for 𝑝, and stands for an equity enhancement 
effect that the Government is willing to provide to IVCs, in the sense of Murray (2007). 
From the perspective of the IVC, no changes occur to the setting presented in section 
4.1.1, where no co-investment took place, except that 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 ∈ (0; 1), instead of 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 1 
and we do not impose that 𝑝 = 0, as 𝑝 shall be endogenously determined56. Therefore, and 
as before, we obtain the relevant unknowns A and 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  by combining conditions (4.9) and 
(4.10), while 𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) remains as the relevant function for portraying the value of the option 
to invest in the SuF held by the IVC. 
                                                 
55 One could argue that 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶  could also serve the purpose of aligning optimum investment timing. However, 
in the absence of capital constraints or any other effects not explicitly derived by our framework, changing 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 
will not affect 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  or 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ , since it only lead the whole investment opportunity and its value matching 
conditions to become proportionately smaller or larger, yielding no effect on optimum investment timing. 
 
56 In addition, 𝑠𝑢𝑏 = 0 is maintained. 
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Things change a little from the perspective of the PVC for three reasons. First, we assume 
that co-investing allows the inefficient factor 𝜙 to be eliminated, which is equivalent to set 
𝜙 =  0 in the no co-investment case presented in section 4.1.2.  Second, and for the same 
reason, when exercising the option to co-invest, the Government does not forego the 
contingent asset 𝛹(𝑥), since that there are no incremental tax revenues lost. Third, total tax 
revenues generated to the Government in this setting – to be named as 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂(𝑥) instead of 
𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) – should include capital gains tax arising from the investment performed by IVCs – 
named as 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) – and should include corporate income tax on the carried interest, which 
is expected to be earned by the GP of the IVC fund. With this purpose, we set 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂(𝑥) to 
capture the amount of corporate income tax revenues which are generated in this setting. 
We define 𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂(𝑥) as the function of the option to co-invest in the SuF, which is 
obtained similarly to 𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥), but considering the following alternative set of boundary 
conditions: 
 𝑃𝑉𝐶(0) = 0 (4.35) 
 
𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ ) = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ )⏞          
𝜙=0
+ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ ) 
(4.36) 
 
𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂′(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ ) = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶′(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ )⏞          
𝜙=0
+ 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂′(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ ) 
(4.37) 
 
where 
 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ ) = 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ ) + 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ ) + 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ ) (4.38) 
and 
 
𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝑂(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ ) = 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ )⏞        
𝜙=0
+
𝑇𝐶
1 − 𝑇𝐶
𝐶𝐼(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗ )⏞      
𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 (4.39) 
Analogously to the previous section, considering condition (4.35) and noting that 𝛽2  <
 0, 𝐷 on equation (4.21) must be equal to zero and 𝛽 ≡  𝛽1 as before. The unknowns 𝐶 and  
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𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗  are obtained by combining equations (4.36) and (4.37), i.e., the value matching and 
smooth pasting conditions, respectively. By equating 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑂
∗  and 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  and solving for 𝑝, we 
obtain the optimum share premium 𝑝∗, that would allow IVCs and PVCs to jointly co-invest 
on the SuF. 
4.1.4. The option to subsidize the Start-up Firm held by the Government 
In this setting, we assume that instead of investing or co-investing in the SuF through its 
PVC organization, Governments may choose to provide a subsidy to the SuF, which we name 
as 𝑠𝑢𝑏 > 0. The decision to provide or not such subsidy may also be pictured as a real option 
as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for two reasons. On the one hand, by subsidizing the SuF, the 
Government is entitled to benefit from incremental tax revenues from corporate income tax, 
personal income tax and capital gains tax and, in this sense, the subsidizing decision might 
be regarded as an investment decision. On the other hand, the flexibility held by the 
Government in deciding when to support the SuF, allows the Government to determine the 
profitability trigger of the SuF for which it will be willing to subsidize it. Finally, the return 
on the subsidy is actually uncertain as it is dependent on a stochastic variable, given by 𝑥. 
Notwithstanding, the amount of the subsidy that Governments may be willing to offer, 
may not be enough for the SuF to be able to perform the envisaged investment on its own. 
As a result and in any case, we assume that the SuF will still have to seek for an external 
equity provider, which we will assume to be an IVC fund with the decision-making process 
we described in section 4.1.1. We will then consider that 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 1 and that 𝑠𝑢𝑏 > 057. 
Thus the option to subsidy the SuF also becomes a “co-investment” decision, in the sense 
that both the Government and the IVC (managed by its GP) should be simultaneously willing 
to fund the SuF so that the investment opportunity might be undertaken. The former should 
be willing to provide a subsidy, while the latter should be willing to underwrite an equity 
                                                 
57 We also maintain that 𝑝 = 0 and 𝜙 = 0 in this setting. 
104 
issuance on 𝑘 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏. We shall now formulate 𝒮(𝑥) – the option to subsidy the SuF held by 
the Government – so that the optimum subsidy can be derived. 
Following the contingent-claims approach, 𝒮(𝑥) must satisfy the ODE described in 
equation (4.40), whose general solution is presented in (4.41): 
 1
2
 𝜎2 𝑥 𝒮′′(𝑥) + (𝑟 − 𝛿) 𝑥 𝒮′(𝑥) − 𝑟 𝒮(𝑥) = 0 (4.40) 
 𝒮(𝑥) = 𝐸 𝑥𝛽1 + 𝐹 𝑥𝛽2 (4.41) 
𝐸 and 𝐹 are constants to be determined, while 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the previously derived roots 
of the fundamental quadratic given by (4.5). 
Naming 𝑥𝒮
∗  as the optimal trigger for the Government to exercise the option to subsidy the 
SuF, the problem is solved by introducing the following boundary conditions, in which  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝒮(𝑥)  is the incremental tax revenues that the Government benefits from and sub is the 
amount of the subsidy to be awarded to the SuF: 
 𝒮(0) = 0 (4.42) 
 𝒮(𝑥𝒮
∗) = 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝒮(𝑥) − 𝑠𝑢𝑏 (4.43) 
 𝒮′(𝑥𝒮
∗) = 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝒮′(𝑥) (4.44) 
where 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝒮(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋𝒮(𝑥) + 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥) + 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥)
⏞      
𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 1
 
(4.45) 
and 
 
𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋𝒮(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥)
⏞    
𝜙=0
+
𝑇𝐶
1 − 𝑇𝐶
𝐶𝐼(𝑥)⏞  
𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 1
 (4.46) 
Regarding condition (4.42) and considering that 𝛽2  <  0, then 𝐹 on equation (4.41)  must 
be equal to zero and, as before, 𝛽 ≡  𝛽1. The unknowns 𝐸 and  𝑥𝒮
∗ are obtained by combining 
equations (4.43) and (4.44), i.e., the value matching and smooth pasting conditions, 
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respectively. Finally, we obtain the optimum subsidy 𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ by equating 𝑥𝒮
∗ and 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  and 
solving for sub. 
4.2. Numerical example 
This illustration aims to demonstrate the numerical solutions for the framework we 
derived on the previous section and highlight the economic intuition that governs its results. 
With this purpose, we will render a set of sensitivities on the base case for all of its relevant 
variables. A summary of key variables and numerical parameters is presented in Table 9. 
Where possible, we use parameters from Sorensen et al. (2014). 
Our assumption for 𝑤 was computed through a sample of 4,523,712 companies obtained 
in Bureau van Dijk – Amadeus (Amadeus) database for the 2011 to 2014 period, covering 
firms located in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom, and excluding 
companies from the financial services, real estate and insurance industries. As costs with 
payroll available in Amadeus include Social Security charges and 𝑤 does not, we grossed-
down those through an estimate of the average employer Social Security contributions 
obtained on the OECD Tax Database, for the same period, whose sample included European-
only Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) members. 
Our assumption for 𝜙 was based on an arithmetic average from the estimates of the output 
efficiency gap on public spending for European countries, presented in Afonso et al. (2005), 
Afonso et al. (2010), Adam et al. (2011) and Gao (2015), amounting to 16.0%, 22.0%, 27.0% 
and 6.0%, respectively. Excluding the lower estimate from Gao (2015) would lead to 𝜙 =
 22.0% instead of 𝜙 =  18.0%, which we would not materially change results. Still, we will 
run sensitivities on 𝜙 and show that the economic intuition of our results remains unchanged. 
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Variable Symbol 
 
Parameter Symbol Value Source 
Earnings before taxes and gross 
payroll 
𝑥 
 
Risk-free rate 𝑟 0.05 
Sorensen et al. 
(2014) 
IVC’s investment trigger on 𝒙 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  
 
Volatility on 𝑥 𝜎 0.25 Liu and Yang (2015) 
PVC’s investment trigger on 𝒙 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  
 
Expected SuF return 𝛿 0.11 
Sorensen et al. 
(2014) 
Co-investment trigger on 𝒙 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗  
 
Amount of the investment 𝑘 150 - 
Optimum share premium 𝑝∗ 
 
Gross payroll on 𝑥 𝑤 0.60 
Bureau van Dijk 
Amadeus 
Subsidy trigger on 𝒙 𝑥𝒮
∗ 
 Ownership retained by the 
Entrepreneur 
𝑄𝐸 0.20 - 
Optimum subsidy 𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ 
 Co-investor ownership allocated to 
IVC 
𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶  0.50 - 
IVC’s SuF investment value to investment 
opportunity value at trigger 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶  
 
PVC efficiency gap 𝜙 0.18 
Afonso et al. (2005), 
Afonso et al. (2010), Adam 
et al. (2011), Gao (2015) 
IVC’s capital tax liability to investment 
opportunity value at trigger 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 
 
Average personal income tax 𝑇𝑃 0.19 OECD 
IVC’s carried interest value to investment 
opportunity value at trigger 
𝜔𝐶𝐼 
 Average effective corporate income 
tax 
𝑇𝐶  0.25 
Eurostat, European 
Commission and DG 
Taxation & Customs (2015) 
PVC’s SuF investment value to 
investment opportunity value at trigger  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶  
 Average capital gains tax at fund 
level 
𝑇𝐺 0.15 EVCA (2013)
58 
PVC’s incremental tax revenues to 
investment opportunity value at trigger 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 
 
Expected holding period (years) 𝐸𝐷 4.00 Braun et al. (2015) 
PVC’s contingent asset value to 
investment opportunity value at trigger 
𝜔𝜓 
 
Hurdle rate ℎ 0.08 
Metrick and Yasuda (2011), 
Sorensen et al. (2014), Liu 
and Yang (2015) 
Output Parameters   
 
Carried interest 𝑠 0.20 
Sorensen et al. 
(2014) 
β = 3.39 a = 0.96 b = 0.39 
 
GP stake on the IVC fund 𝑖 0.01 - 
Table 9. Baseline variables and assumptions 
The list of variables resembles the set of decision-making criteria that were introduced in 
the previous sections – namely, 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ , 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ , 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗  and 𝑥𝒮
∗  – while introducing 𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶, 𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇, 
𝜔𝐶𝐼, 𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶, 𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 and 𝜔𝜓. This group of variables is intended to capture the weight 
that each of these components holds on the value of the investment opportunity when IVCs 
                                                 
58 We assumed 𝑇𝐺 = 15.0% as the average minimum and maximum capital gains tax at fund level reported 
for Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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and PVCs exercise their option to invest in the SuF, i.e., when 𝑥 = 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  and 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ . 
Formally, and for example, 
 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 =
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ )
𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ )
 (4.47) 
 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 =
𝑇𝐴𝑋(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ )
𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ )
 (4.48) 
Analyzing these output variables will also allow us to depict how value creation is 
governed when IVCs and PVCs exercise their option to invest in the SuF. 
Following our discussion from the introductory section of this Chapter, we take the view 
that investing in early stage SuFs generates positive externalities (Lerner, 1999, Lerner, 
2002). As a result, from a public policy perspective, we assume that Governments will be 
interested in fostering investment volumes in such firm segment. We will then compare how 
each of the four different deal arrangements anticipate optimum investment timing or, 
equivalently, minimize optimum profitability triggers. 
4.2.1. Baseline results 
Our baseline results show that 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.12, 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.32, 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.80 with 𝑝∗ =
45.7% and 𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.31 with 𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.08, meaning that 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ > 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ > 𝑥𝒮
∗ > 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ . 
Taxation on personal income, taxation on corporate income, as well as taxation on capital 
gains that would be borne by PVCs, allow Governments to generate a set of incremental 
revenues from exercising the option to invest, when compared to IVCs, enabling them to 
offset their efficiency gap – measured by ϕ – and still significantly exceed the return on 
investment obtained by IVCs. As a result, we find that 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ > 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ .  
Our results also reveal that 𝑥𝒮
∗ > 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ . On each of these two scenarios, Governments 
benefit from incremental revenue taxes, since by letting IVC co-invest alongside PVC or by 
letting IVC invest on the SuF and then partly subsidizing 𝑘, they do not bear the efficiency 
gap when PVCs invest on their own. From the perspective of the IVC, the subsidy provides 
a one-time effect on the value of the investment opportunity, while co-investing generates an 
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actual equity enhancement effect (Murray, 2007), as IVCs provide (1 − 𝑞𝐸) 𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 = (1 −
20.0%)×50.0% = 40.0% of the required capital, but retain a (1 − 𝑞𝐸) (𝑞𝐼𝑉𝐶 + 𝑝∗) =
(1 − 20.0%)×(50.0% + 45.7%) = 76.5% share on the SuF. In the absence of capital 
constraints, portfolio risk mitigation and value creation policies held by IVCs, we show that 
a mere allocation of money from PVCs on the co-investment is not enough for anticipating 
their optimum investment timing. 
As the baseline example illustrated some of the intuition governing the framework derived 
throughout the previous sections, we now carry a set of sensitivity analysis with the purpose 
of further depicting results and highlighting further insights to our research.  
4.2.2. Efficiency gap (ϕ) and gross payroll on x (w) 
The results of the sensitivity analysis on 𝜙 and 𝑤 are presented in Table 10. As expected, 
an increase in 𝑤 leads to an increase in 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ , 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ , 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗  and 𝑥𝒮
∗, as it decreases the profitability 
of the SuF. In turn, the greater the efficiency gap measured by 𝜙 is, the greater 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  is, as 
the value of the investment on the SuF becomes lower for PVCs. In addition, we observe that 
the greater the efficiency gap is, the greater is the gap between 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ and 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ is or, 
equivalently, the lower the ratio 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗
𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  is. For example, when 𝜙 = 0.12 and 𝑤 = 0.45, 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗
𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ =
83.1%, but when 𝜙 increases to 𝜙 = 0.24, 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗
𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 65.8%. 
Therefore, we conjecture that more inefficient Governments should be more likely to 
make use of co-investing, as incremental tax revenues become more significant. 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ , 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗  
and 𝑥𝒮
∗ remain unchanged to changes in 𝜙 as they do not depend on this parameter. When the 
investment is carried by IVCs, whether it is subsidized or not, or when co-investment takes 
place, 𝜙 = 0. 
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 𝝓 = 𝟎.𝟏𝟐 𝝓 = 𝟎.𝟏𝟖 𝝓 = 𝟎.𝟐𝟒 
𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 72.09 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 51.18 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 72.09 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 57.04 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 72.09 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 64.65 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 42.53 
𝑝∗ = 34.7% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 46.39 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 66.85 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 42.53 
𝑝∗ = 34.7% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 46.39 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 66.85 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 42.53 
𝑝∗ = 34.7% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 46.39 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 66.85 
𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟎 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.12 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 65.47 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.12 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.32 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.12 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 89.20 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.80 
𝑝∗ = 45.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.31 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.08 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.80 
𝑝∗ = 45.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.31 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.08 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.80 
𝑝∗ = 45.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.31 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.08 
𝒘 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 158.59 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 91.11 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 158.59 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 111.22 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 158.59 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 144.58 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 66.25 
𝑝∗ = 69.69% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 74.97 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 98.86 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 66.25 
𝑝∗ = 69.69% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 74.97 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 98.86 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 66.25 
𝑝∗ = 69.69% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 74.97 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 98.86 
Table 10. Sensitivity analysis on ϕ and w 
4.2.3. Amount of investment (k) and volatility on x (ϭ) 
Profit triggers 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ , 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ , 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗  and 𝑥𝒮
∗ increase with 𝑘 as shown in Table 11, in order to 
sustain return on investment. Similarly, as 𝜎 increases the value of the option to invest, 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ , 
𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ , 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗  and 𝑥𝒮
∗  increase with 𝜎. However, 𝜎 leads to asymmetric effects between 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ and 
𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ , with changes in 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  being much greater than those in 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ , especially when 𝜎 >
 0.25. 
This behaviour points out the existence of a gap on the financing market for high risky 
projects that might be filled by PVCs, even when comparing with the option to co-invest. 
This would be the case on the early stage segment, where we then expect PVCs to have a 
higher share in deal volumes. Even though results from this numerical example are not 
illustrative, we may conjecture that that for very high degrees of uncertainty (𝜎 >  0.25) 
subsidizing might be preferable to co-investing, as it may act as a remedy to the impact of 
uncertainty on the profitability of the SuF. 
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 𝒌 = 𝟓𝟎 𝒌 = 𝟏𝟓𝟎 𝒌 = 𝟐𝟓𝟎 
𝝈 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 26.82 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 21.17 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 80.46 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 63.51 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 134.10 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 105.86 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 14.14 
𝑝∗ = 44.81% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 15.62 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 26.09 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 42.43 
𝑝∗ = 44.81% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 46.87 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.28 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 70.72 
𝑝∗ = 44.81% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 78.12 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 130.46 
𝝈 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 33.04 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 25.11 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.12 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.32 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 165.20 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 125.53 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 17.27 
𝑝∗ = 45.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 19.10 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 26.36 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.80 
𝑝∗ = 45.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.31 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.08 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 86.33 
𝑝∗ = 45.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 95.52 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 131.80 
𝝈 = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 91.82 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 31.41 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 275.45 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 94.22 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 459.08 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 157.04 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 33.81 
𝑝∗ = 85.79% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 45.03 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 50.00 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 101.42 
𝑝∗ = 85.79% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 102.84 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 117.49 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 169.04 
𝑝∗ = 85.79% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 171.41 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 195.82 
Table 11. Sensitivity analysis on k and σ 
4.2.4. Taxation (TC and TG) 
Growing effective taxation rates lead to different effects on IVCs and PVCs, as we show 
in Table 12. The latter will demand an increasing 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ , since the profitability of the SuF is 
hindered by 𝑇𝐶 and 𝑇𝐺 lowers the net proceeds from divesting to the IVC. The former will 
benefit from a greater tax collection that will lead 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  to decrease. Equivalently, for very 
low taxation levels, and depending on the efficiency gap 𝜙, we would observe 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ > 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ . 
We then conjecture that Governments whose overall taxation are greater might be more 
supportive of PVC initiatives. 
Similarly to Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2007), 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  reveals a higher sensitivity to 𝑇𝐶 than 
to 𝑇𝐺, as the impact of 𝑇𝐺 is contingent on 𝑥 at divestment, while 𝑇𝐶 negatively affects 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶, alongside 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐶 . We would also highlight that the greater taxation is, the more 
effective co-investing becomes comparing to subsidizing in what regards anticipating 
optimum investment timing. This is because the share premium mechanism introduced in 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗  is neutral to taxation at the IVC fund level, differently than subsidization which is subject 
to 𝑇𝐶. 
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On the lower panel of Table 12, we depict how 𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶, 𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇, 𝜔𝐶𝐼, 𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶, 𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 
and 𝜔𝜓 change with 𝑇𝐶 and 𝑇𝐺. As for IVCs, increasing 𝑇𝐶 negatively affects 𝜔𝐶𝐼 as this 
component is the only one which is exclusively affected by 𝑇𝐶. As the value of investing on 
the SuF is simultaneously affected by  𝑇𝐶 and 𝑇𝐺, IVCs are willing to trade-off 𝜔𝐶𝐼 in favor 
of 𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶and 𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇. Conversely, increasing 𝑇𝐺 makes the value of investing on the SuF 
less profitable than carried interest, which is not affected by 𝑇𝐺. As a result, IVCs are willing 
to trade-off 𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶and 𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 for 𝜔𝐶𝐼 in this case. 
 𝑻𝑪 = 𝟎.𝟏𝟓 𝑻𝑪 = 𝟎.𝟐𝟓 𝑻𝑪 = 𝟎.𝟑𝟓 
𝑻𝑮 = 𝟎.𝟎𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 87.18 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 77.53 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 98.66 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 75.60 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 113.68 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 74.23 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 52.76 
𝑝∗ = 32.61% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.35 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 64.15 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.79 
𝑝∗ = 45.24% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.25 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.69 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 50.86 
𝑝∗ = 61.75% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.17 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 93.21 
𝑻𝑮 = 𝟎.𝟏𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 87.59 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 76.96 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.12 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.32 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 114.20 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 74.13 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 52.77 
𝑝∗ = 32.99% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.41 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 64.60 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.80 
𝑝∗ = 45.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.32 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.08 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 50.87 
𝑝∗ = 62.24% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.22 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 93.54 
𝑻𝑮 = 𝟎.𝟐𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 88.02 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 76.43 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.60 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.05 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 114.75 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 74.04 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 52.78 
𝑝∗ = 33.39% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.48 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 65.07 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.81 
𝑝∗ = 46.12% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.37 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.49 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 50.88 
𝑝∗ = 62.77% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.29 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 93.89 
       
 𝑻𝑪 = 𝟎.𝟏𝟓 𝑻𝑪 = 𝟎.𝟐𝟓 𝑻𝑪 = 𝟎.𝟑𝟓 
𝑻𝑮 = 𝟎.𝟎𝟓 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 100.41% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −2.65%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 2.24%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 = −33.39% 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 155.28% 
𝜔𝜓 = −21.89% 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 100.69% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −2.66%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 1.97%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 = −41.14% 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 161.22% 
𝜔𝜓 = −20.08% 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 100.96% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −2.67%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 1.70%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 = −44.74% 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 158.41% 
𝜔𝜓 = −13.68% 
𝑻𝑮 = 𝟎.𝟏𝟓 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 105.96% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.37%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 2.41%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 = −35.05% 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 159.01% 
𝜔𝜓 = −23.96% 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 106.3% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.4%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 2.1%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 = −41.82% 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 162.34% 
𝜔𝜓 = −20.52% 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 106.60% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.43%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 1.83%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 = −44.89% 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 158.52% 
𝜔𝜓 = −13.63% 
𝑻𝑮 = 𝟎.𝟐𝟓 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 112.11% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −14.72%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 2.60%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 = −36.65% 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 162.54% 
𝜔𝜓 = −25.89% 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 112.49% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −14.78%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 2.29%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 = −42.46% 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 163.37% 
𝜔𝜓 = −20.91% 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 112.86% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −14.84%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 1.98%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 = −45.03% 
𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 158.60% 
𝜔𝜓 = −13.57% 
Table 12. Sensitivity analysis on TC and TG 
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As for PVCs, and before interpreting how 𝑇𝐶 and 𝑇𝐺 affect its value drivers, we should 
first highlight two important results. First, the opportunity cost borne by the Government 
when PVC invests in the SuF given by 𝛹(𝑥) may stand for over 20.0% of the value of the 
option to invest, having a material impact on the decision-making process of PVCs. Second, 
and unlike IVCs, PVCs should be willing to exercise their option to invest on the SuF even 
when 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶(𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ ) is negative, as such loss is offset by a set of incremental tax revenues, 
even in the presence of an efficiency gap. 
The influence of 𝑇𝐶 and 𝑇𝐺 in 𝜔𝜓 is mediated by the impact that these two variables inflict 
in 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ . As increasing 𝑇𝐶 and 𝑇𝐺 restrains return on investment, they exert positive impact in 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ . Therefore, the gap between 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  and 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  becomes greater and the less likely it 
becomes for 𝑥 to reach 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ . As a result, the opportunity cost that Governments incur from 
readily investing in the SuF becomes lower, as perceived incremental tax revenues from 
letting IVCs carry the investment are also lower. In addition, as 𝑇𝐶 and 𝑇𝐺 anticipate optimum 
investment timing for PVCs, 𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑃𝑉𝐶 and 𝜔𝑇𝐴𝑋 decrease their share on value creation. 
4.2.5. Profit sharing (s) and holding period (ED) 
In Table 13 we are particularly interested in understanding how 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  is affected by 
changes in profit sharing and in holding period, since 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  is only indirectly affected by these 
components through 𝜓(𝑥). These two variables influence the value of the carried interest 
component – given by 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) – while the expected capital tax gain liability – given by 𝐶𝐺𝑇(𝑥) 
– is not affected by s. 
Common sense would suggest that more aggressive profit sharing mechanisms would lead 
IVCs to anticipate their optimum investment timing, as they would be entitled to retain a 
greater share of the payoffs generated above the hurdle. However, our results show exactly 
the opposite result. In fact, and consistently with Liu and Yang (2015), when increasing s, 
𝐶𝐼(𝑥) becomes relatively more valuable than 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥), only if the hurdle is achieved at 
divestment date. The likelihood of the hurdle to be achieved at this moment is greater, the 
greater 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  is. Therefore, performance-based compensation schemes such as carried interest, 
may actually lead to the counter-intuitive result of postponing optimum investment timing. 
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 𝒔 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟓 𝒔 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟎 𝒔 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓 
𝑬𝑫 = 𝟑 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 101.22 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 74.62 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 102.69 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 74.69 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 104.54 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 74.78 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 52.35 
𝑝∗ = 46.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 58.01 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 80.05 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 52.72 
𝑝∗ = 47.39% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 58.48 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 80.73 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 53.19 
𝑝∗ = 48.81% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 59.05 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 81.59 
𝑬𝑫 = 𝟒 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 98.85 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.31 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.12 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.32 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.40 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.32 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.73 
𝑝∗ = 45.53% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.22 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.95 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.80 
𝑝∗ = 45.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.31 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.08 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.87 
𝑝∗ = 45.81% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.40 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.22 
𝑬𝑫 = 𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 98.41 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.98 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 98.51 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.98 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 98.61 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.98 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.62 
𝑝∗ = 45.33% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.07 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.76 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.64 
𝑝∗ = 45.38% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.11 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.80 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.67 
𝑝∗ = 45.43% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.14 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.85 
Table 13. Sensitivity analysis on s and ex 
Additionally, longer holding periods measured by 𝐸𝐷 lead to a lower present value of 
both 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) and 𝐶𝐺𝑇(𝑥). Therefore, IVCs trade-off 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) for 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) in their decision-
making process, leading 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  to decrease with 𝐸𝐷. 
4.2.6. Hurdle rate (h) and stake in IVC held by the GP (i) 
Our sensitivity analysis on ℎ describes the opposite effect from the one described for 𝑠 in 
the previous section, as presented in Table 14. Increasing the hurdle decreases the likelihood 
of 𝑥 exceeding such threshold at divestment date and, as a result, 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) becomes less 
attractive than 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥). This is also visible on the lower panel of Table 14, where we 
observe that 𝜔𝐶𝐼 decreases with ℎ. 
In turn, 𝑖 holds a significant effect on decreasing 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ . The greater is a GP “skin in the 
game”, the less valuable 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) is, and the more  𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶(𝑥) driven becomes its decision-
making process, leading to lower 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  levels. This effect is particularly strong for very low 
levels of 𝑖, where 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  significantly lowers from 𝑖 = 0.005 to 𝑖 = 0.010, but reveals a more 
gradual change when  𝑖 > 0.010. 
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 𝒉 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎 𝒉 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟖 𝒉 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟔 
𝒊 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟓 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 104.51 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 75.42 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 100.33 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 75.34 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶∗ = 98.84 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶∗ = 75.31 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 53.17 
𝑝∗ = 48.28% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 59.04 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 81.58 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 52.11 
𝑝∗ = 46.27% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.71 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.65 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.73 
𝑝∗ = 45.53% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.22 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.95 
𝒊 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟎 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 100.68 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.34 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.12 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.32 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 98.45 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.31 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 52.20 
𝑝∗ = 46.44% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.82 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.82 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.80 
𝑝∗ = 45.67% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.31 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.08 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.63 
𝑝∗ = 45.34% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.09 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.77 
𝒊 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟎 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 99.27 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.32 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 98.58 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.31 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ = 98.26 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ = 75.31 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.84 
𝑝∗ = 45.74% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.36 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 79.15 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.67 
𝑝∗ = 45.40% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.14 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.83 
𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗ = 51.58 
𝑝∗ = 45.25% 
𝑥𝒮
∗ = 57.03 
𝑠𝑢𝑏∗ = 78.68 
       
 ℎ = 0.00 ℎ = 0.08 ℎ = 0.16 
𝒊 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟓 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 94.99% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −7.36%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 12.37%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 103.78% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.15%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 4.37%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 107.12% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.48%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 1.35%  
𝒊 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝟎 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 102.23% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.01%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 5.79%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 106.28% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.40%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 2.12%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 107.89% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.55%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 0.67%  
𝒊 = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟎 
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 105.51% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.33%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 2.82%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 107.48% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.52%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 1.04%  
𝜔𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐼𝑉𝐶 = 108.27% 
𝜔𝐶𝐺𝑇 = −8.59%  
𝜔𝐶𝐼 = 0.33%  
Table 14. Sensitivity analysis on h and i 
4.3. Policy implications 
The theoretical model and the numerical example introduced on the previous section allow 
us to outline a set of policy implications, which may be relevant not only for public decision-
makers, but also for private LPs investing in IVC funds.  
First, our results reveal that, in general, co-investment between IVCs and PVCs is more 
efficient than direct subsidization of the SuF in anticipating optimum investment timing, if 
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Governments are willing to provide an equity enhancement effect to IVCs through a share 
premium, or any other equivalent mechanism that leverages its value appropriation. This 
follows from our baseline case, but also from the sensitivity analysis we rendered in sections 
4.2.2 to 4.2.6. 
Second, more inefficient Governments should be more willing to allow PVCs to co-invest 
alongside IVCs as this deal structure may eliminate the efficiency gap between these two 
types of investors, and the benefits for Governments from its elimination directly increase 
with their inefficiency. Following the same argument, direct subsidization might be a more 
effective mechanism in anticipating optimum investment timing than direct PVC investment, 
as it also enables such efficiency gap to be eliminated, by letting IVCs lead the investment. 
This was highlighted in section 4.2.2. 
Third, volatility is determinant in establishing a market failure on financing the segment 
of early stage companies by IVCs, whose volatility on their future profit generation is higher. 
Therefore, PVCs should be focused on this deal segment according to results from section 
4.2.3. In addition, decreasing perceived volatility should be an explicit focus of public policy 
intended to foster investment volumes. This may encompass either long-term oriented 
economic and fiscal policies as well as specific policies intended to decrease operating costs, 
improve entrepreneurial quality or minimizing investment downside risk. Conversely, we 
may conjecture that subsidies, as uncertainty-free payoffs, might be more effective in 
anticipating optimum investment timing for IVCs, when volatility on profit generation is 
extreme. 
Forth, our results from section 4.2.6 reveal that the stake held by the GP on its IVC fund 
stands as one of the most effective mechanisms to foster investment volumes by IVCs and 
anticipate their optimum investment timing, while profit sharing mechanisms grounded on 
carried interest instruments hold the opposite effect. Therefore, public policies aimed at 
increasing 𝑖 might be regarded as a positive contribution to promoting investment volumes. 
An example of such instruments includes multi-fund commitments, where public LPs could 
commit funds to subsequent funds, subject to certain performance benchmarks to be verified 
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on the initial fund and to an increase in commitments by GPs on the subsequent fund, 
controlling for its investment strategy. 
Finally, results from section 4.2.5 suggest that public policy should be more or less 
supportive of PVC initiatives, depending on the average fund age of their IVC peers and on 
their performance since inception. These two variables influence how GPs value 𝐶𝐼(𝑥), 
which in turn affects 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ . In particular, if IVC funds are newborn, they envisage 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) as 
valuable and will therefore demand greater 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗ , further deepening the gap between the 
optimum investment timing held by IVCs and PVCs. As the investment period progresses, 
GPs are informed of the pooled performance of the portfolio firms on its IVC fund and, 
therefore, of the probability of obtaining a positive carried interest after fund liquidation. 
Two different scenarios might be in place at this point. First, the pooled performance of the 
IVC fund is such that GPs understand they will not benefit from carried interest and then will 
assume that 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) = 0 for the remaining investment decisions of the IVC fund. Hence, 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  
shall decrease, meaning that IVCs might be either more willing to directly invest in target 
companies, or co-invest alongside PVCs, who will have to provide a lower equity 
enhancement. Second, if the pooled performance of the IVC fund is such that the GP admits 
that it will be entitled to the carried interest, it will assume that 𝐶𝐼(𝑥) > 0 for the remaining 
investment decisions of the IVC fund. As a result, as the carried interest becomes more 
valuable and the holding period becomes shorter, 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  increases. Again, the gap between 
𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  and 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  will be greater, and PVCs should be more willing to directly intervene on the 
equity financing market. Such behavior should however be also influenced by progress on 
investment execution vis-à-vis the investment period, as this may be determinant in securing 
management fees for the GP during the divestment period. If execution is low and the 
investment period is about to end, then 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  should decrease regardless of prospects on 
carried interest, as GPs are incentivized to maximize the amount of management fees to be 
earned during the divestment period, and which are usually a function of the acquisition cost 
of portfolio firms. In addition, fund raising plans or initiatives by GPs may also exert 
influence on current investment decision-making. These two effects are not captured in our 
framework from section 4.1. 
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4.4. Empirical evidence on the determinants of investment by Public 
Venture Capitalists 
In this section we investigate whether some of the outcomes from our theoretical model 
introduced in section 4.1 and illustrated in section 4.2 are empirically supported. We will be 
specifically interested in examining the determinants of investment volumes carried by 
PVCs, taking into account that volumes stand for a more appropriate measure of earlier 
optimum investment timing than investment amounts. 
4.4.1. Hypothesis 
Grounded on the relevant literature contributions and on the underlying intuition of the 
framework we introduced in section 4.1, we posit the following set of theoretical 
propositions: 
H1:  Co-investment volumes are positively correlated with the share of PVC investment 
in total PE and VC investment volumes in countries in which Governments are more 
inefficient. 
This follows our results from section 4.2.2, where we showed that the gap between 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  
and 𝑥𝐶𝑂
∗  was followed by a greater efficiency gap, measured by 𝜙. This view is also grounded 
on Murray (2007) and Munari and Toschi (2015), who pointed out that one of the drivers for 
the establishment of PVC initiatives lays on leveraging private financing through co-
investment on Leleux and Surlemont (2003), who revealed that PVCs do co-invest less than 
IVCs, and on Grilli and Murtinu (2014) and Grilli and Murtinu (2015), who revealed that 
firms in which PVCs and IVCs co-invested recorded better performance than those in which 
only PVCs invested. 
H2:  Higher shares of PVC investment in total PE and VC investment volumes occur in 
countries in which Governments are more efficient. 
This is a corollary from H1 and it is also derived from our results in section 4.2.2. As we 
expect more inefficient Governments to have a greater share on PVC investment volumes 
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through co-investment practices, we expect more efficient Governments to have a greater 
share of direct PVC investments.  
H3:  Higher shares of PVC investment in total PE and VC investment volumes occur in 
countries in which a greater proportion of seed stage deals are observed. 
This follows our discussion in sections 4.2.3 and 4.3 on the impact of profit volatility over 
the 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  and 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗ , especially for very high levels of volatility – as in the case of seed 
investments, which face a hyper-uncertain environment faced by early stage firms 
(Venkataraman, 1997). 
H4:  Higher shares of PVC investment in total PE and VC investment volumes occur in 
countries in which taxation is greater. 
Governments with higher tax levels should be able to more easily profit from investment 
activities carried by PVCs and, therefore, as illustrated in 4.2.4, present a lower 𝑥𝑃𝑉𝐶
∗  which 
incentivizes direct PVC investment. Analogously, in countries where greater effective 
taxation rates are observed, we expect 𝑥𝐼𝑉𝐶
∗  to increase and IVCs to become more focused on 
opportunities yielding a more aggressive return profile, leaving room for PVC initiatives. 
This follows Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2007) who argued that corporate income taxes would 
postpone effort in SuFs. 
In addition to H1, H2, H3 and H4, we introduce a set of other hypothesis, which essentially 
stand for control variables on examining the determinants of PVC volumes. 
H5:  Higher shares of PVC investment in total PE and VC investment volumes occur in 
countries in which the macroeconomic environment is more positive. 
This theoretical hypothesis might be either regarded as a control variable, or as a corollary 
from H3, in the sense that it may also depicts the role that volatility inflicts on the PVC 
investment decision-making. Following the approach by the World Economic Forum, we 
take the macroeconomic environment as a measure of economic stability, given by 
Government budget balance, gross national savings, inflation, public debt and country credit 
rating. 
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H6:  Lower shares of PVC investment in total PE and VC investment volumes occur in 
countries in which companies have easier access to equity financing. 
This hypothesis controls for the equity gap that Governments may fill by launching PVC 
initiatives, when perceiving that companies find important restraints on raising capital 
(Beuselinck and Manigart, 2007). In fact, this hypothesis will allow us to depict whether 
perceived market failures on the equity financing market (Giacomo, 2004, Murray, 2007, 
van der Schans, 2015) actually motivate Governments to launch PVC initiatives. 
H7:  Shares of PVC investment in total PE and VC investment volumes are uncorrelated 
to macroeconomic business cycles. 
We replicate this hypothesis introduced by Beuselinck and Manigart (2007), arguing that 
Governments intend to close potential equity gaps through PVC initiatives and therefore their 
investment pattern should not be driven by business cycles or return opportunities. Following 
their results and following the fact that their sample broadly replicates our sample of 
European countries, we do expect a similar outcome. 
4.4.2. Data and method 
Our dataset comprises a sample of European countries for which data on PVC investment 
is available on the annual statistical yearbook published by EVCA, including Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. As data covered the 2007 to 2014 period, a total 
number of 104 observations was collected. This subset of countries stands for 90.4% of total 
investment amounts and 89.6% of total investment volumes in Europe for the 2007-2014 
period according to EVCA, and allowed us to compute the share of PVC investment volumes 
on the total PE and VC investment volumes for each the countries in our sample. This will 
stand for our dependent variable which we will name as 𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑂𝐿. Data for the independent 
variables that follow our theoretical hypothesis was obtained through a range of different 
sources, which we summarized in Table 15. 
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Variable Name Variable Description Source Supporting  Sign 
Research Hypothesis 
COINV 
Share of co-investment deals in total PE and VC deals, per 
country per year 
EVCA Yearbook 
H1 (+) 
GOVINEFF 
This is the inverse of the Government Efficiency indicator 
(GOVEFF), ranging from a scale from 1 to 7, per country and per 
year. This is computed by dividing 7 by the result obtained in 
GOVEFF. 
World Economic 
Forum, Executive 
Opinion Survey  
GOVEFF 
Annual composite indicator of Government Efficiency available 
for each of the countries in our dataset, ranging from a scale from 
1 to 7, assessing (i) the wastefulness of government spending, (ii) 
the burden of government regulation, (iii) the efficiency of legal 
framework in setting disputes, (iv) the efficiency of legal 
framework in challenging regulations, and (v) the transparency of 
government policymaking 
World Economic 
Forum, Executive 
Opinion Survey 
H2 (+) 
SEED Share of seed deals in total PE and VC deals, per country and per year EVCA Yearbook H3 (+) 
TAXGDP 
Tax and Social Security contributions as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP), per country and per year 
Eurostat H4 (+) 
Control Variables 
MACRO 
Annual composite indicator of Macroeconomic Environment, available 
for each of the countries in our dataset, summarizing (i) public budget 
balance, (ii) gross national savings, (iii) inflation, (iv) government debt 
and (v) country credit rating 
World Economic 
Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report 
H5 (+) 
VCACCESS 
Annual indicator available for each of the countries in our dataset, 
ranging from 1 (extremely difficult) to 7 (extremely easy), picturing 
how easy it is for Entrepreneurs with innovative projects to find 
venture capital 
World Economic 
Forum, Executive 
Opinion Survey 
H6 (-) 
YEARS2007-2014 
Dummy variables for each of the years on the sample, equal to 1 if data 
refers to a given year and equal to 0 otherwise 
- H7 
Not 
significant 
Table 15. Variables definition 
As for Government efficiency and access to equity financing, we relied on survey data 
rendered by the World Economic Forum, which provides annual records for each of the 
countries included in our sample. While there are several quantitative measures of 
Government efficiency on the literature (Afonso et al., 2005, Afonso et al., 2010, Gao, 2015, 
Adam et al., 2011), no consistent data and methodology exists on this indicator for a time 
series ranging from 2007 to 2014. Differently, ease of access to equity financing is not an 
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observable variable and, as a result, proxies or survey data had to be introduced in our 
empirical investigation. 
Similarly to Beuselinck and Manigart (2007), given that our sample covers eight 
observation years across thirteen different European countries, we set up a panel data 
regression, with the purpose of mitigating problems of biased and inconsistent parameters in 
cross-sectional time-series models (Baltagi, 2008). We run three linear regression models, 
specified as follows59: 
(I) 𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑡𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷
+ 𝛽4𝑐𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑡𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑡𝑉𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽7𝑐𝑡2007
+⋯𝛽8𝑐𝑡2014 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 
(4.49) 
(II) 𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑡𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑡𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷
+ 𝛽4𝑐𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑡𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑡𝑉𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 
(4.50) 
(III) 𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑡𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑡𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽4𝑐𝑡𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑡𝑉𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 
(4.51) 
Regression (I) reflects the whole set of theoretical hypothesis described in section 4.3 
Considering that PVC investment volumes are expected not to be correlated with economic 
cycle, we run regression (II), in which we exclude the dummy variables on investment years. 
Finally, as H2 might be conceived as a corollary of H1, in regression (III) we exclude its 
underlying variable 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝐹𝐹.  
4.4.3. Results 
We show regression results in Table 1660. As expected, macroeconomic cycle depicted by 
dummy variables on investment years does not have any significant statistical impact over 
                                                 
59 For ease of implementation, variables PVCVOL, COINV, SEED and TAXGDP have been multiplied by 
100 in the four models. This should be taken into account when interpreting the regression coefficients.  
 
60 We ran multicollinearity tests on regression results, which revealed that independent variables are not 
significantly correlated. VIF levels among independent variables in all regressions stood below the 10.0 
threshold suggested by Hair et al. (2010). In addition, we performed robustness tests with transformations on 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹, 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂, 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷and 𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑂𝐿. Regression results were essentially confirmed, 
122 
𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑂𝐿 in regression (I). Coefficients for 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹, 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝐹𝐹, 𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐷, 
𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐺𝐷𝑃 and 𝑉𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆 hold the predicted signs, although coefficient on 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐺𝐷𝑃 only reveals statistical significance at 87.4%. Therefore, we found no support for 
H4. In addition, regression coefficient on 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 was proved to be significant 
at 15.2%, which does not allow us to obtain strong statistical evidence on H1. 
 Regression (I) Regression (II) Regression (III) 
Regression (II) 
ex-TAXGDP 
Variables β 
Standard 
Error 
t-value Β 
Standard 
Error 
t-value β 
Standard 
Error 
t-value β 
Standard 
Error 
t-value 
(Constant) -23.85*** 8.45 -2.82 -24.89*** 7.86 -3.17 -23.50*** 8.03 -2.93 -24.32*** 6.95 -3.50 
Research Hypothesis             
COINV x GOVINEFF 0.04♯ 0.03 1.45 0.03 0.03 1.19 0.05* 0.03 1.71 0.03 0.03 1.19 
GOVEFF 4.37** 2.01 2.18 3.78** 1.57 2.41 - - - 3.78** 1.56 2.42 
SEED 0.67*** 0.08 7.99 0.68*** 0.08 8.63 0.73*** 0.08 9.31 0.68*** 0.08 8.68 
TAXGDP 0.01 0.17 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.10 - - - 
Control Variables             
MACRO 4.84*** 1.90 2.56 4.17** 1.82 2.29 5.72*** 1.74 3.29 4.28*** 1.67 2.56 
VCACCESS -4.12* 2.26 -1.82 -2.87** 1.35 -2.13 -1.19 1.18 -1.01 -2.88** 1.34 -2.16 
2008 -2.78 3.02 -0.92 - - - - - - - - - 
2009 -1.54 3.60 -0.43 - - - - - - - - - 
2010 -5.22 4.07 -1.28 - - - - - - - - - 
2011 -4.84 3.95 -1.23 - - - - - - - - - 
2012 -1.00 4.02 -0.25 - - - - - - - - - 
2013 -2.17 4.13 -0.53 - - - - - - - - - 
2014 -2.67 3.91 -0.68 - - - - - - - - - 
Observations  104   104   104   104  
R2  0.630   0.613   0.590   0.613  
Adjusted R2  0.577   0.589   0.573   0.593  
***, **, * and ♯ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 15% levels respectively 
Table 16. Regression results 
This pattern is confirmed in regression (II), where  𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐺𝐷𝑃 remained statistically 
insignificant and 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 lost statistical significance to 23.7%, even though 
maintaining the expected sign. Regression (II) without  𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐺𝐷𝑃 resembles the same results, 
                                                 
with 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐺𝐷𝑃 and 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 proving to be statistically insignificant. In addition, residuals statistics 
revealed that outliers are not impacting regression results. Centered leverage values range between 0.006 and 
0.207 with a mean of 0.048, while Cook’s distance mean was 0.011 on a 0.000 to 0.142 range. 
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providing no clear evidence on the impact of 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 on 𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑂𝐿. Still, we 
obtain supporting evidence for H2, H3, H5, H6 and H7. 
By excluding 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝐹𝐹 in regression (III) we attempt to highlight the effect of 
𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 over 𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑂𝐿. In this case, 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 maintains the 
expected sign and becomes statistical significant at 10.0%, providing some supporting 
evidence for H1. As 𝑉𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐸𝑆𝑆 becomes insignificant in this specification, we argue that 
these results may reveal that PVC-sponsored co-investment initiatives may actually eliminate 
restrictions on the access to equity financing. 
Four important considerations should be summarized on regression results. Firstly, we 
acknowledge that our data poses four relevant restraints to our investigation, providing room 
for further research on the field: it depicts a relative short period of time which is largely 
affected by the 2007-2008 financial crisis, it is restricted to the European market, it is only 
able to capture Government intervention on the equity financing market through PVC (i.e., 
direct and not indirect) initiatives and it simultaneously comprises deals on the PE (or later-
stage) and on the VC (or early-stage) segments. Depicting whether the determinants of PVC 
investment between these two segments differ stands for a relevant empirical assessment of 
the theoretical hypothesis we derived. Second, our results clearly show that taxation is not a 
relevant variable in determining PVC investment volumes, which is in contrast with H4. This 
means that Governments do not define their policy for intervening on the equity financing 
markets based on taxation, nor that they make use of PVC initiatives grounded on lower pre-
tax return on investment requirements. Third, we found no strong evidence supporting H1, 
even though we obtained supporting evidence for H2 and the coefficient on 𝐶𝑂𝐼𝑁𝑉×
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐹𝐹 revealed the expected sign. This suggests that the most inefficient Governments 
do not make use of co-investment mechanisms to overcome their efficiency gap, which may, 
in fact, be regarded as a feature of the most inefficient Governments. In this sense, even 
though it may exist an economic rationale for the most inefficient Governments to support 
co-investment, this may not be empirically observed, since these shall not to choose such 
efficiency enhancing strategies. Moreover, and to the best of our knowledge, when co-
investing alongside IVCs, PVCs do not usually offer any equity enhancement effects. 
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According to our findings from sections 4.2 and 4.3, this equity enhancement – given by a 
share premium – should be significant so that co-investment becomes possible and actually 
anticipates optimum investment timing. Forth, we call attention to the role that the 
macroeconomic environment – portrayed by H5 – plays over 𝑃𝑉𝐶𝑉𝑂𝐿 and most likely on 
the investment volumes of IVCs as well. Economic stability – measured by public debt, 
balance and rating, alongside inflation and saving rate in our regression – then seems to form 
a common ground for the establishment of relevant PVC initiatives. 
Overall, regression results provide empirical support to H2, H3, H5, H6 and H7, of which 
H2 and H3 are directly derived from our theoretical framework, while H5, H6 and H7 
confirmed previous literature findings or inferences. No clear statistical support was obtained 
for H1. 
4.5. Chapter summary 
In this Chapter we depicted the decision faced by PVCs and Governments on the best 
mechanism to promote the investment in SuFs: should PVCs invest directly in SuFs, should 
they co-invest alongside IVCs, should they let IVCs invest, or should Governments directly 
subsidize SuFs with the purpose of triggering investment from IVCs, instead? 
Focusing on the economic payoffs earned by PVCs and IVCs, we modelled each of the 
alternative investing mechanisms as a real option and illustrate that co-investing might be the 
most effective mechanism in anticipating optimum investment timing. Grounded on this 
theoretical framework, we listed a set of both public policy and managerial implications, 
derive a set of empirically testable propositions on the determinants of PVC investment 
volumes and analyse their prevalence on a sample of European countries. 
Even though taxation proved not to be correlated with PVC investment volumes, the 
remaining results provided overall empirical support to our theoretical hypothesis.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this thesis, we introduced a set of theoretical models to support decision-making 
processes in Entrepreneurial Financing (EF) decisions. 
In the first model introduced in Chapter 2, we developed a real-options framework with 
the purpose of understanding EF decisions. From a rationale economic and profit-
maximization perspective, we discussed the foundations of EF decisions and how 
expectations on profit growth influence their outcomes. In addition, we demonstrated how a 
share premium (or discount) should be computed so that the Entrepreneurial Firm is able to 
obtain joint support from Entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists (VCs) to proceed with a 
given Growth Opportunity and showed how asymmetries on future profit growth 
expectations may actually contribute to aligning Entrepreneurs and VCs in supporting them. 
Based on these findings, we are able to design a set of theoretical propositions, which may 
serve as a ground for further empirical research. 
First, we point out that Entrepreneurs would never be willing to bring in an external equity 
provider to the Entrepreneurial Firm, unless profit growth expectations are such that would 
allow them to offset losses arising from ownership dilution. This is a straight forward 
explanation to why VC-backed firms may evidence higher growth rates than non-VC-backed 
firms:  only Entrepreneurial Firms with high growth prospects seek for external equity – all 
the other would prefer to fund their growth plans internally. Therefore, we suggest that 
growth patterns of VC-backed firms might be intrinsically affected by a selection effect rather 
than a treatment effect, as discussed by Bertoni et al. (2011). 
Second, we conjecture that VCs are not willing to underwrite an equity issuance on the 
Entrepreneurial Firm unless profit growth expectations are such that allow them to offset the 
capital dilution loss they bear, from potentially retaining a lower share of the Entrepreneurial 
Firm than of the total capital outlay required by the Growth Opportunity. This may eventually 
explain a driving force of venture valuation on subsequent funding rounds: VCs may only be 
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willing to back a given Entrepreneurial Firm and accept a given ownership, if their profit 
growth expectations are greater than those of the investors on previous rounds, or if their 
perception on business risk of the Entrepreneurial Firm is lower than the one held by investors 
on the previous equity rounds. 
Third, we highlighted that Entrepreneurs and VCs may reach an agreement even when 
holding different expectations on future profit growth. On the one hand, and within the 
framework we introduced, such an agreement is feasible since the Entrepreneur is also able 
to dilute the VC through the pre-existent assets in place. On the other hand, this supports the 
idea that Growth Opportunities and Entrepreneurial Firms are not worth by themselves, but 
that they are instead worth something to someone, whose approach to venture valuation may 
not exactly mimic the intrinsic value of the underlying assets. In this sense, one could argue 
that deal prices are just mere meeting points between buyers and sellers, rather than an 
intrinsic expression of fair value of the underlying assets. 
Lastly, we showed that the greater the gap between Entrepreneurial and VC expectations 
on profit growth, the more likely an agreement is expected to be reached. The higher the 
Entrepreneur’s profit growth expectations are, the more is she or he willing to trade-off a 
lower shareholding, for the profit brought by the envisaged Growth Opportunity and, in 
addition, the more valuable the initial capital she or he deployed in the Entrepreneurial Firm 
is understood to be. 
We reckon that there are several rooms for improving and extending the framework we 
designed. First, we are taking a pure profit-maximizing view of the EF process, even though 
there is a vast set of deal drivers which were not accounted for. In particular, we would be 
interested in deepening our understanding on the Entrepreneur’s preferences for ownership 
control and liquidity (Hellman, 1998), through which we could explore a trade-off between 
the two, in a framework where we would allow VCs not only to underwrite equity but also 
to acquire ownership to the Entrepreneur. Self-determination, decision control risk and 
perceived decision control risk are also cognitive drivers of the Entrepreneurial decision-
making process, which might be introduced in our framework. Secondly, given that we 
showed that an external equity provider may join the Entrepreneurial Firm even if revealing 
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different expectations on profit growth, we argue that this might be a source for potential 
conflicting goals on the post-deal stage, which could be studied within the framework we 
derived. Thirdly, we analysed how share premiums or discounts may contribute to an 
agreement between Entrepreneurs and VCs on a single stage negotiation process and 
instantaneous Growth Opportunity execution. However, by extending the framework over 
additional stages, we may introduce into our framework additional contractual mechanisms 
(such as share repurchases) or alternative funding strategies, comprising staged capital 
infusions by VCs (Lukas et al., 2016), or a staged growth strategy execution by the 
Entrepreneur  (Schwienbacher, 2007), in addition to the Contingent Payment Mechanisms 
(CPMs) we investigated in Chapter 3. 
In the second theoretical model, which we presented in Chapter 3, we showed that CPMs 
are becoming more relevant on Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) deal volumes and that may 
also be a relevant tool for enabling EF decisions. Our novelty approach starts by 
acknowledging that there are different types of CPMs, which we propose to distinguish 
according to their amount and due date. We then identify four major types of CPMs and 
separately value each one of them, following the option analogy. After extending the real 
options framework from Chapter 2, we derived the optimum CPM design that would allow 
Entrepreneurs and VCs to jointly support a given Growth Opportunity and illustrated model 
outcomes through a numerical example, whose results allowed us to compare different CPMs 
and revealed to be consistent with previous literature findings. 
While optimum investment timing is unaffected by CPM design, the value of each of these 
mechanisms is not the same. From the perspective of the Entrepreneur, and controlling for 
the likelihood of the profit benchmark to be reached by the Entrepreneurial Firm, variable 
amount CPMs revealed to be more valuable than fixed amount CPMs, as CPMs due at hit 
revealed to be more valuable than those which are due at term. 
Regarding future research paths and following the work by Cain et al. (2011), 
Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) and Lukas and Heimann (2014), we understand that 
further empirical research is needed for testing some of the theoretical propositions on CPMs 
within an EF context, instead of a M&A context. Alternatively, and even within an M&A 
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setting, empirical research could investigate how differently variable amount and fixed 
amount CPMs are set and assess whether they are differently perceived by financial markets 
as, to the best of our knowledge, literature has not yet explored how differently these two 
alternative mechanisms may perform. The same empirical approach could follow for CPMs 
which are due at hit and for CPMs which are due at term. From an analytical perspective, the 
range of alternative CPMs extends beyond the four major types we introduced, as shown by 
Reum and Steele (1970), providing room for additional extensions of the framework we 
introduced. 
On Chapter 4, we derived the third theoretical model, comprising a real options framework 
to investigate how Independent Venture Capitalists (IVCs) and Public Venture Capitalists 
(PVCs) screen their investment decisions and compared their optimum investment timing. 
Even when taking into account the incremental revenues which might be lost by not letting 
IVCs undertaking the investment, we showed that PVCs should be willing to invest earlier 
than IVCs, not only as they are neutral to taxation (unlike IVCs), but also as they present 
substantially lower profit triggers when facing investment opportunities featuring high 
volatility on its profit generation. 
Still, given that PVCs hold an efficiency gap when compared to IVCs, Governments might 
be willing to eliminate this gap by letting PVCs co-invest alongside IVCs or by directly 
subsidizing Start-up Firms (SuFs) and letting IVCs drive the investment. We showed that 
both these mechanisms are able to significantly anticipate optimum investment timing, 
especially when they provide an equity enhancement effect to IVCs. Our results highlight 
that it is not enough for Governments to commit capital on the equity financing market to 
foster IVC investment. Filling some of the financing gaps demands governments to provide 
such equity enhancement effect to IVCs or private investors in general. In turn, co-investing 
proved to be more effective in anticipating optimum investment timing than subsidization, 
except for very high levels of uncertainty, where the opposite is true. 
Our framework also offered insights on some of the key drivers of decision-making taken 
into account by IVCs and how these may influence their optimum investment timing. 
Surprisingly, we revealed that increasing profit sharing on carried interest may actually 
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postpone optimum investment timing of the IVC fund, and that increasing its underlying 
hurdle rate anticipates optimum investment timing. As carried interest becomes more 
valuable when greater profit sharing is in place, General Partners (GPs) postpone their 
optimum investment timing with the purpose of maximizing the probability of actually 
earning their carried interest. The opposite effect is observed concerning the hurdle rate. In 
addition, increasing the equity stake held by GPs on their IVC funds under management was 
revealed as one of the most significant variables anticipating optimum investment timing. 
We tested whether our theoretical predictions regarding PVC investment volumes would 
obtain empirical support, on a sample of thirteen European countries for the 2007-2014 
period. Even though taxation proved not to be correlated with PVC investment volumes, the 
remaining results offered overall empirical support to our theoretical hypothesis. We also 
showed that PVC investment volume is not correlated with business cycle and that PVC 
investment volume is intended to suppress perceived gaps on the equity financing market. 
We end by pointing out some relevant insights on future research paths. Although we 
discussed the direct involvement of Governments as a Private Equity (PE) or VC investor 
(by establishing itself as a GP), we are not able to test – due to data insufficiency – the 
determinants of their intervention as a Limited Partner (LP), nor the impact of its aggregate 
direct and indirect intervention on the equity financing market (Buzzacchi et al., 2013, 
Jääskeläinen et al., 2007). 
Potential effects rising from competition on the equity financing market between PVCs 
and IVCs might be further investigated. We may argue that these could anticipate optimum 
investment timing. VC fund economics also provides GPs running IVC funds with strong 
incentives to abandon the small business segment, and focus on bigger deals and raising 
greater amounts of capital per fund. As management fees are proportionately paid to overall 
fund size, they provide riskless earnings to GPs. Therefore, independent GPs may join the 
equity financing market by raising small amounts of funds and then, if they succeed, target 
bigger fund sizes and bigger deals on subsequent funds. 
We did not also considered the full range of public stimuli that Governments may offer to 
foster investment volumes. These may include tax credits, tax allowances, Social Security 
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bonus, or tax based subsidies dependent on incremental employment or allocated to research 
and development initiatives (Peneder, 2008). Similarly, we have not discussed the nature and 
effectiveness of different types of Government support (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2001, Lee 
et al., 2013). For example, Lerner (2002) found evidence that a prevalent characteristic 
among under-achieving firms is the existence of research grants from numerous Government 
sources, which allow them to avoid accountability. 
Our framework assumed that Entrepreneurs did not influence the decision-making process 
of IVCs and PVCs, except for the amount of capital they would be willing to provide to the 
SuF. Their option to invest in her or his own SuF may also be modelled as a real option and 
we would then extend our framework to a two or three party alignment process, in which the 
Entrepreneur, the IVC and/ or the PVC would jointly determine the outcomes of this EF 
process. 
Finally, PVCs are argued to have a relevant role in mitigating some of the risks rising 
from information asymmetry (Lerner, 1999, Lerner, 2002), providing certification to investee 
firms, which may be specially relevant for raising capital on future equity rounds. 
Considering that staging is one of the features of VC investment processes (Dahiya and Ray, 
2012, Elitzur and Gavious, 2003, Gompers, 1995, Hsu, 2010, Leisen, 2012, Li, 2008, Lukas 
et al., 2016, Tian, 2011, Wang and Zhou, 2004), the role of PVCs as enablers of future 
investment rounds could also be depicted. 
Overall, grounded on a real options approach, we explored the EF decision in a setting 
where two parties – an Entrepreneur and a VC, or a IVC and a PVC – assess an opportunity 
to invest in an Entrepreneurial Firm (as in Chapters 2 and 3) or in a SuF (as in Chapter 4). 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we face these three elements as the “Building Blocks of 
Entrepreneurial Financing Decisions”. 
From a broader perspective, our research results point out that financial deal terms covered 
on EF decisions do not depend as much on the intrinsic value of Growth Opportunity they 
support, but rather on the relative position that each of the parties holds against such Growth 
Opportunity. On Chapters 2 and 3, we learned that optimum up-front share premium and 
optimum contingent payments depend on the expectations on future profit growth that each 
131 
of the parties anticipates, on the contribution that each of the parties will provide to the 
Growth Opportunity and on the current profit generation of the Entrepreneurial Firm assigned 
to the Entrepreneur. On Chapter 4, we learned that co-investment decisions involving IVCs 
and PVCs, or subsidization decisions from Governments to SuFs, significantly depend on the 
specific features of the investment decision process of each of the parties – such as public 
sector inefficiency or performance incentives – and not only on the specific features of the 
option to invest in the Growth Opportunity held by the SuF, including volatility on profit 
generation or capital requirements. 
The concept of alignment is then determinant to understand the outcomes of EF decisions 
and demands an understanding beyond the traditional perspective on capital budgeting, 
whose focus is grounded on assessing the intrinsic value of Growth Opportunities and not 
the transactional context in which it takes place. Given the room for further theoretical 
developments we pointed out on the literature throughout the thesis, and given the 
specificities underlying the EF decision, we end by advocating that Entrepreneurial Finance 
should form the grounds of an autonomous branch of science, bridging the analytical tools 
and supply-side view from Economics and Finance along with the demand-side view from 
Entrepreneurship. 
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